(web / desktop)"] subgraph Veriqa["Veriqa (in your host)"] direction TB TE["Transaction
engine"] CA["Channel
adapters"] OI["OpenIddict
integration"] end Channel["Trusted app
Telegram / WhatsApp /
other channels / Email"] OIDC["OpenIddict"] App <--> TE TE --- CA TE --- OI CA <--> Channel OI --> OIDC OIDC -.->|auth result| App ``` ## Building blocks
Sign in to {app}
{qr_instruction}
Sign in to {app}
", "Plain": "{text_intro}\n{open_link_hint}\n{link}" } ] } } } } ``` What matters here: * **the markup inside a variant is not escaped by the product** — it is written by whoever owns the configuration. What is escaped are the **slot values**: they come from outside, an application over the API included; * **the visible phrases stay localization keys.** `{button}`, `{qr_instruction}`, `{qr_alt}` and their kin are localized-text slots: the message contract states which key a slot looks at, and the translation for the recipient's language is what gets substituted. The markup is therefore one text for every language, and there is nothing to translate as copies. The shipped email has no phrase outside such slots — `{heading}`, `{text_intro}`, `{request_from_label}`, `{button_hint}`, `{valid_until_label}` and the rest; the two-variant example above writes its heading and the "Request from" line into the markup, and those stay in the language you wrote them in; * **what Veriqa computes is never shortened; what comes from outside is.** `{link}`, `{valid_until}` and the other values the product computes itself are substituted in full. The application name, the initiator details and a translated phrase are held to 128 characters — keep one phrase per slot short, and split a long sentence into several slots; * **the form of the QR is decided by the text, not by a setting.** A variant naming `{qr_cid}` gets the PNG attachment; a variant naming `{qr_url}` instead (the link to the QR endpoint, if your composer supplies it) gets the image by URL and carries no attachment; a variant naming neither is the email without a QR. An attachment nothing points at never happens; * **the email is one, and a step of the ladder has two editions.** A step is either a string (a text that suits any sink) or an object `{ "Subject": …, "Html": …, "Plain": … }`. Each edition is optional, but a step must specify at least one: a step specifying none fails startup, naming the message kind and the number of the step. A step specifying only `Html` does not serve the plain-text part — the selection simply moves on down the ladder, so **the two parts of one email may come from different steps**. The subject is then taken from the step chosen for `Html`; * **the last step of the ladder must rely on guaranteed slots only** (`app`, `valid_until`, `link`, `lang`). The initiator details and the QR are not guaranteed: a transaction without them simply reaches the step that names none of them — no empty paragraph in the email, and no literal `{browser}`. This is counted **per edition**: the selection runs among the steps specifying the edition asked for, so a ladder has two "last" steps — the last one with `Html` and the last one with `Plain` — and the rule holds for both. A ladder whose last `Html` step names `{browser}`, with only the `Plain` one made slot-free, fails startup; * **an HTML-only email (or a text-only one) is a legitimate declaration.** When no step specifies `Plain`, the email goes out without a text part: no error in the log, no substitution of one edition for the other. Which is exactly why you should make sure a one-part email is your choice and not a forgotten edition: in the data the two are indistinguishable.`) → the client entry (the same member in its entry of
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`) → the global section. The tenant level sits between the last two; as
with the [footer block](#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page), no reader for it is registered out of
the box.
### Allowed combinations of the two visibilities
The two keys are resolved independently, and each may come from a level of its own — a client entry
that hides the buttons over a global section that hides the QR code. Every class of devices must be left
with a way in, the QR code or the button:
| `ShowQrCode` | `ShowChannelButton: Always` | `MobileOnly` | `Never` |
| - | - | - | - |
| `Always` | allowed | allowed | allowed |
| `DesktopOnly` | allowed | allowed | **not allowed** — a phone has neither |
| `Never` | allowed | **not allowed** — every device but a phone has neither | **not allowed** — no device has either |
A pair that is not allowed neither stops the host nor breaks the page: the page is rendered as if
`ShowChannelButton` were `Always`, and a warning naming both configured values goes into the log —
whenever such a page is requested, not once at startup. The check looks at the two settings alone,
not at the channels the page carries.
### The instruction follows both settings
The built-in instruction under the title names only what the page shows. It goes into the markup in
**three wordings** — for a page with the QR code and the button, with the QR code alone and with the button
alone — and the stylesheet of the page shows exactly one of them, by the same attributes of the root
element that show and hide the QR code and the buttons (`data-qr-visibility`,
`data-channel-button-visibility`, `data-device`).
| The page shows | One channel | Several channels, a QR code for each | Several channels behind one QR code |
| - | - | - | - |
| the QR code and the button | `Scan the QR code or tap the button to sign in via {0}` | `Choose a channel and scan the QR code or tap the button` | `Scan the QR code or tap the channel button` |
| the QR code alone | `Scan the QR code to sign in via {0}` | `Choose a channel and scan the QR code` | `Scan the QR code to sign in` |
| the button alone | `Tap the button to sign in via {0}` | `Choose a channel and tap the button` | `Tap the channel button to sign in` |
So a television under `ShowChannelButton: MobileOnly` reads "Scan the QR code…" with no button
promised, and a phone under `ShowQrCode: DesktopOnly` reads "Tap the button…" — there is nothing to
reword by hand. A browser in which device detection failed gets the wording of a desktop, the same
way it gets the desktop's QR code and buttons. One QR code for several channels is what a page shows
in [hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode). Under `QrMode: Unified` the page has no tabs
and uses the wording of the last column. Under `QrMode: UnifiedWithChannels` the QR code sits on the
"Any channel" tab, followed by a tab for each channel, and the wording follows the selected tab: a
channel tab — one QR code and one button — keeps the last column, while the "Any channel" tab, where
the user picks one of several, reads `Scan the QR code you need or tap a messenger button` in place
of its first row. With [`ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab`](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode)
set to `false`, that tab shows the QR code alone and reads `Scan the QR code to sign in`. The page
opens on "Any channel", so a browser with JavaScript turned off shows the wording of that tab.
**The tabs of a page with the "Any channel" tab.** "Any channel" takes a row of the tab strip on its
own; the channel tabs follow, two to a row, and the last of an odd number spans the whole row. A
channel tab whose panel shows that channel's own QR code is labeled with the built-in text `{0} ▦`:
the name of the channel goes into `{0}`, and the mark `▦` is drawn as a QR code icon in the color of
the tab text, so the user sees which tabs hold a QR code. A tab whose panel shows no QR code of its
channel — Email signing in with an emailed link — carries the name alone. The label can be reworded
like any other text: a replacement keeps `{0}`, each `▦` in it becomes the icon, and a replacement
without the mark shows no icon.
**A page of one channel names the channel.** The page fills the `{0}` slot with the icon of the
channel followed by its name — the pair its tab would carry; a channel that has no icon is named by
the name alone. A page of several channels names none.
Each of the ten wordings is a built-in text, so it is reworded like any other: for one application
in its [`AuthPage.Texts` dictionary](#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application), for the whole
installation in the locale files. Two things to keep in mind for the three texts with a slot:
* a replacement in `AuthPage.Texts` has to carry `{0}`, as every replacement of a text with a slot
does; a translation in a locale file that drops it is shown as is, and the channel then goes
unnamed;
* `{0}` goes in the text, never inside a tag. A wording that puts it into an attribute value —
`` — is shown as plain text, with a
warning in the log (see
[Markup in the title, the instruction and a channel hint](#markup-in-the-title-the-instruction-and-a-channel-hint)).
The `Instruction` of a `ui_config` record replaces the instruction whole — one wording for every
device, with no channel named. A page whose only channel is Email with an address form shows neither
a QR code nor a channel button, yet gets the same one-channel wording; give such a page an `Instruction`
of its own.
### The page wording follows whether the QR code is shown
Strings that name the code or the button go into the markup in **every wording at once**: the
instruction in the three above, the "back to the QR code" link of the Email panel as a pair — "with
QR" and "without QR". They are switched by the same conditions as the blocks they describe: rules
keyed on the root element's `data-qr-visibility`, `data-channel-button-visibility` and `data-device`
attributes — for the pair, the `.veriqa-if-qr` / `.veriqa-if-no-qr` classes. The script of the page
takes no part in the choice. That way the page never promises a QR code or a button it does not show.
This constrains your own CSS (`CustomCssPath`) and script (`CustomJsPath`): a rule
that overrides the `display` of these wordings decouples the text from what the page shows — leaving,
say, "scan the code" on a page with no code. If you hide or show the QR code or the buttons by your own
means, switch the wordings by the same conditions.
The server always generates the QR code, even when the page does not show it: the PNG goes into the
markup as a data URI and stays hidden. Under `Never` this only adds to the response size.
## Channel layout
Where a page shows several channels, each with a QR code of its own, the channels share the page through tabs —
one on screen at a time. The `ChannelLayout` key of the `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign` section puts all of
them on screen at once instead:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"ChannelLayout": "Grid"
}
}
}
```
| Value | Behavior |
| - | - |
| `Tabs` | One channel at a time: a tab strip, and the panel of the selected tab on screen. Default. |
| `Grid` | Every channel at once: the panels stand side by side, each under the name of its channel and with its own QR code. Meant for a screen read from a distance — a television, a kiosk — where nobody switches a tab. |
Under `Grid`:
* **The card grows with the number of channels.** Its width is the usual one column (420px) plus a
column for every further channel, and never more than the window less the margins the card always
keeps. Panels that do not fit a row wrap onto the next line — down to one per line on a narrow
window.
* **A panel holds what its tab would show:** the QR code, the channel button (subject to
[`ShowChannelButton`](#channel-button-visibility)), the Email form, the channel hint.
* **There are no tabs in the markup.** Each panel is a group labeled by the visible name of its
channel, so a screen reader announces the channels rather than "tab 1 of 3".
The key arranges what the tabs would otherwise hold and nothing else. A page with nothing to arrange
is the same under either value:
* a page of one channel;
* a page laid out as [channel buttons](#channel-buttons) — any device under `ShowQrCode: Never`, a
phone under `DesktopOnly`;
* in [hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode), a page that shows one QR code for all its
channels — also where that QR code stands on the "Any channel" tab before the channel tabs
(`QrMode: UnifiedWithChannels`): its tabs stay tabs.
Which channels the page carries is a different setting — `ChannelDisplay:Mode` and the channel set.
The layout applies to the sign-in window and to the page that opens a confirmation. It is set at
the same levels as `ShowChannelButton`: the `ui_config` record (`ChannelLayout` under
`Veriqa:UiConfigurations:Records:`) → the client entry (`ChannelLayout` in its entry of
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`) → the global section.
**Your own stylesheet.** A rule of `CustomCssPath` that sets the width of `.veriqa-container`
narrows the card of the grid back to one column, and the row turns into a stack. Write it for the
one-column card only: `.veriqa-container:not(.veriqa-container--grid)`.
## Cancel button
The sign-in window carries a **Cancel sign-in** button — the way back to the application for a user
who has changed their mind. It sits below the channels, the status line and the countdown, above
the [footer block](#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page). The button is **on by default**; the `Enabled`
key of the `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:Cancel` section switches it off:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"Cancel": {
"Enabled": false
}
}
}
}
```
What pressing it does:
* **The sign-in ends as declined by the user** — the transaction fails with the reason
`declined_by_user`, the same as a "No" on the web confirmation page.
* **The browser returns to your application** — to the `redirect_uri` of the request, with the
standard `error=access_denied`, the `state` the request carried and the issuer identifier `iss`
([RFC 9207](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9207)), in the response mode it asked for
(`query`, `fragment` or `form_post`). Your application handles it like any other declined sign-in.
An ASP.NET Core client on `AddOpenIdConnect` has to be told where to send the user: without
`AccessDeniedPath` the handler throws on `access_denied` and the return ends in an HTTP 500 — see
[step 5 of the .NET quickstart](/docs/quickstart/dotnet#5-wire-up-the-client-application).
* **A confirmation arriving from the channel at the same moment does not win:** no authorization
code is issued, and the application still receives `access_denied`.
* **The chat where the question waits is told:** when the sign-in was waiting for the user's answer
to a question already shown in a messenger chat, that chat gets the same "Sign-in declined" receipt
a press of the decline button gives. Where the platform can edit a sent message — Telegram, for
one — the receipt replaces the question and its buttons go away; elsewhere — Instagram, Messenger,
WhatsApp and the like — it arrives as a new message and the buttons of the question stay, a later
press being answered with the same receipt. Nothing is sent when the question is not in a chat:
with Email, or when it is asked on the web page. Whatever happens to the receipt, the application
receives `access_denied`.
The button is a plain form, so it works on a page whose script never ran. It disappears from the page
once there is nothing left to cancel — the sign-in has expired, was declined or has failed.
**Where it is shown.** In the sign-in window only. The page that opens a confirmation has no
application to return to, and the page a phone gets after scanning a hop QR code is on another
device — neither carries the button, whatever the setting.
**Levels.** The nearest level that sets the key wins: the `ui_config` record (`Cancel:Enabled`
under `Veriqa:UiConfigurations:Records:`) → the client entry → the global section. To leave
one application without the button, set it in that client's entry:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "my-app",
"Cancel": {
"Enabled": false
}
}
]
}
}
}
```
**The text** is the Natural Key `Cancel sign-in` — the key the cancel action of the claims
completion step already uses, so the translations you have apply to the button as well. To reword
the button of the sign-in window for one application, name `Cancel sign-in` in its
[`AuthPage.Texts` dictionary](#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application).
**After an update.** The button is on by default, so it appears in every deployment that does not
set `"Enabled": false` — nothing has to be configured to get it. If you added a cancel control of
your own through `CustomJsPath`, remove it or switch the built-in button off. A
[renderer of your own](#sign-in-page-renderer) shows no button until it renders the form itself.
**What the button changes in the response of the sign-in window.** The `form-action` directive of
its Content-Security-Policy names the origin of the client's `redirect_uri` next to `'self'` (or, for
an address with a custom scheme, that scheme): a browser applies the directive to the whole
chain of redirects after a form post, and the post of the button ends on the `redirect_uri`. The
response also sets the antiforgery cookie and is sent with `Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store`.
With the button switched off the response is what it was.
## Branding
The client's logo and brand name fill the brand row at the top of the sign-in card in **every preset
but `Minimal`**; the primary color applies **only** in the `Branded` preset:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"Preset": "Branded",
"PrimaryColor": "#FF5500",
"LogoUrl": "https://your-domain.com/logo.png",
"BrandName": "Acme",
"PrimaryColorByTheme": { "dark": "#FF8A3D" },
"LogoUrlByTheme": { "dark": "https://your-domain.com/logo-dark.png" }
}
}
}
```
* `PrimaryColor` — strictly `#RRGGBB`; an invalid value falls back to a neutral default. It only
colors shared elements (the primary button, focus rings, the spinner).
* `LogoUrl` and `BrandName` together replace the product's own mark. With neither of them set at
any level, the brand row shows the red diamond and `Veriqa`. Setting **either** one replaces that
mark as a whole: a name alone shows no diamond, a logo alone shows no `Veriqa`. An unset logo
therefore does not mean "no brand row" — for a page without one, use the `Minimal` preset. Pages
other than the sign-in window (web confirmation, an expired sign-in, the email pages) show no brand
row at all.
* `BrandName` — the name beside the logo, in place of the product's own wordmark. The two are
resolved **independently**: set either one alone and the page shows what there is — the name
alone, the logo alone, or both. Unlike the logo the name has **no per-theme variant** (an
image cannot repaint itself for a dark page, text takes the page's color), so `BrandNameByTheme`
does not exist. A blank value sets nothing: the name then comes from the level below. The value
is plain text — it is encoded on output — and a localization key (see
[Texts set in configuration](#texts-set-in-configuration-are-localization-keys-too)).
* `PrimaryColorByTheme` and `LogoUrlByTheme` set the value for a single theme (`light`, `dark`).
A theme without a value of its own takes the neighboring shared key (`PrimaryColor`, `LogoUrl`).
With `Theme: Auto` the browser picks the theme, and both values — the light one and the dark
one — travel to the page.
* Messenger brand colors are **never** recolored, in any preset.
**After an update.** A logo or a brand name set while the preset is not `Branded` used to be
ignored and is now shown. A `Branded` page with neither set used to show no brand row and now
shows the product's own mark. Under `Minimal` the brand row is absent from the markup, so a custom
stylesheet or script that looked for it finds nothing.
## Footer block of the sign-in page
`FooterHtml` puts markup of your own at the bottom of the sign-in card — links to a privacy policy
and terms of service, a short legal note, a support contact. The block is shown in **every** preset,
`Minimal` and a custom stylesheet included, and on both pages that render the sign-in window: the
sign-in itself and the page that opens a confirmation. No other page Veriqa generates carries it —
the confirmation pages, the expired-link page and the email sign-in pages have no footer block.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"FooterHtml": "Privacy · Terms"
}
}
}
```
The block is set in this global section and by a client entry
(`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`), where an application sets a block of its own instead of the global
one. A `ui_config` record does **not** set it: a record is chosen by a request parameter, and what
a request may choose is the look of the page, not markup on it.
**The `Tenant` level.** The setting exists at the tenant level as well, but no reader for that
level is registered out of the box — the integrator writes one. Without it the resolution goes to
the client entry and to this section.
**A blank value sets nothing**, at every level alike. So an application whose entry carries an
empty `FooterHtml` shows the block of the global section: a lower level cannot switch off the block
an upper one sets, it can only replace it. To leave one application without a block, set the
block in the entries of the applications that need it rather than globally.
### What the markup may contain
The value is checked against a strict shape and is refused **whole** when it steps outside it —
nothing is stripped, nothing is repaired:
* **text** — any characters except `<` and `>`. A bare `&` is fine; a bare `>` is not, write it as
`>`;
* **tags** `a`, `span`, `div`, `p`, `strong`, `em`, and the void `br` (`
`, `
`, `
` —
there is no ``). Names of tags and attributes are case-insensitive;
* **attributes** `href`, `target`, `rel` and `class`, each at most once per tag, with the value in
double quotes and free of `"`, `<`, `>`. Anything else — `style`, `id`, any `on*` handler — is
refused, and so are single-quoted and unquoted values;
* **no class name of the page itself**: a `class` is refused when one of its names is `veriqa` or
begins with `veriqa-`, in any letter case and after character references are decoded. A name that
merely starts with the word — `veriqable` — is fine, and so is an empty `class`;
* **every link carries `href` and `target="_blank"`.** The address is judged in the form the browser
reads it — after character references are decoded — and must be `https://…`, `http://…` or a
root-relative `/path`. A protocol-relative `//host`, a `javascript:` or `mailto:` address, a
backslash or a control character inside the address are refused;
* **the tags are balanced**: a closing tag closes the innermost open one, and none stays open at the
end;
* comments, `
**The block is emitted as is — it is not sanitized.** The check above decides whether a value
may go into the page; it does not clean it. What the block says, where its links lead and what
they do to the person who follows them are yours to answer for. Veriqa adds no `rel` of its own
either: the attributes of your links are yours to set.
**Why `veriqa-` class names are refused.** They belong to the markup of the page: its script
reaches its own elements by class (`.veriqa-tab`, `.veriqa-panel`, `.veriqa-tooltip-host`,
`.veriqa-tooltip`), so a block carrying one of them would affect the behavior of the page it sits
on — a `class="veriqa-panel"` inside the block would be hidden by the channel tabs. Name your own
classes with a prefix of your own and style them from your stylesheet (`CustomCssPath`).
**Upgrading with such a class already set.** Earlier versions accepted a `veriqa-` class in this
block; now the value is invalid. Set in this global section, it stops the host from
starting; set in a client entry, it drops that entry — see the table below. Rename the class
before you upgrade.
### What an invalid value does
| Where the value is set | What happens |
| - | - |
| This global section | The host **does not start**, and the message names the setting and the section to correct it in. A configuration reloaded into an already running host keeps the value last read successfully instead |
| A client entry | The entry is dropped from the effective configuration **whole** — that client then resolves every one of its settings, not merely the block, from the level below. The log names the client and the setting |
| A translation in a locale file | The page renders **without** the block, and a warning naming the setting and the language goes into the log. The value stays in force for the other languages |
### Translating the block
The value is a Natural Key like every other text of the page (see
[Texts set in configuration](#texts-set-in-configuration-are-localization-keys-too)): the page looks
it up in the host locale files, and a value no file carries is emitted as is. The translation is
checked against the same shape as the value — a translation that steps outside it leaves the page
without the block.
The context suffix applies too, and with markup it is worth using: the block is a long string, and a
label keeps it from colliding with anything.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"FooterHtml": "Privacy | authpage"
}
}
}
```
```json ru.json theme={null}
{
"Privacy | authpage": "Конфиденциальность"
}
```
Note that `|` is **reserved** for that label: everything after the **last** `|` is cut off the
text the page shows. Markup that has to contain `|` of its own does not fit this convention — use a
`|` entity or another separator.
## Markup in the title, the instruction and a channel hint
Three texts of the sign-in window take inline markup of your own — a word in bold, a link, a `span`
with a class of yours:
* **the title** — the `Title` of a `ui_config` record, or your wording of the built-in title in
`AuthPage.Texts` or in a locale file;
* **the instruction under it** — the `Instruction` of a record, or your wording of a built-in
[instruction](#the-instruction-follows-both-settings);
* **a channel hint** — an entry of `Veriqa:ChannelDisplay:Hints`.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"UiConfigurations": {
"Records": {
"brandA": {
"Title": "Sign in to Acme",
"Instruction": "Confirm the sign-in to Acme"
}
}
},
"ChannelDisplay": {
"Hints": {
"whatsapp": "Send the message as it is"
}
}
}
}
```
The value passes the same check as the [footer block](#what-the-markup-may-contain), with a narrower
set of tags — inline ones only:
* **tags** `span`, `strong`, `em`, `a` and the void `br`. `div` and `p` are refused here: the text
already sits inside a heading or a paragraph;
* **attributes** `href`, `target`, `rel` and `class`, under the rules of the footer block — double
quotes, at most once per tag, nothing else;
* **every link carries `href` and `target="_blank"`**, for the same reason: a link that opens in
place ends the sign-in running on the page;
* **no class name of the page itself** — `veriqa` and anything beginning with `veriqa-` are refused;
* **no `img` and no `svg`.** An icon is a `span` with a class of yours, drawn by your own stylesheet
(`CustomCssPath`): ``. Attaching a stylesheet switches the design
preset off — see [External CSS](#external-css).
**A value that fails the check is shown as plain text.** Unlike the footer block, nothing stops the
host and no entry is dropped: the value is judged when the page renders, in the language it renders
in — a translation from a locale file is judged as translated. A value that steps outside the shape
goes onto the page **whole, as text** — the tags are visible as characters — and a warning goes into
the log. The warning names the element and the language (for a hint — the channel type); the value
itself is not logged.
**Plain text is read as HTML text.** A value with no tags passes as is, and the browser reads its
character references: `Terms & Conditions` shows "Terms & Conditions". Write a literal `<` or `>`
as `<` and `>` — a bare one fails the check, and the value is then shown as written, with the
warning above.
**The browser tab gets the title without its tags.** The `` of the document carries the text
of the title alone, with a `<br>` turned into a space.
The same holds on both pages that render the window — the sign-in itself and the page that opens a
confirmation. A renderer of your own receives these values raw — see
[Sign-in page renderer](#sign-in-page-renderer).
## Instruction after the scan
In [hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode) the page learns that the user has continued on
the phone before the confirmation arrives: the QR code was scanned, the page opened on the phone, the
transition into the messenger started — the phone page starts it by itself, and its button starts it
again on a tap. That last step says the browser began to open the app, not that the app opened. The
status line names each such step. The scan names what follows on the phone: "QR code scanned.
Continue in Telegram." for a messenger, "QR code scanned. Continue on your phone to confirm by email."
for Email, and "QR code scanned. Continue on your phone." for the QR code shared by every channel. When the phone page opens the app by itself, the last two steps
arrive together, and the status line shows only "Opening …" instead of flashing both. On the first of
them the page takes the
channel choice away — the tabs, the QR codes and the channel buttons, with the instruction under the
title that describes them — and shows an instruction in their place: by default "Continue on your
phone and confirm in the app that has opened." The subject of a confirmation, the status line and the
countdown stay. Below the instruction is the "Choose another way" button: it brings the channel
choice back on the same page, with the same sign-in — for a user who scanned with the wrong device
or changed their mind. The next step reported from a phone, the same phone included, shows the
instruction again. Once a channel has answered the start — its bot sent the question into the chat —
the button disappears from the page for good: the sign-in is bound to that channel's account from
then on, and another channel could only end in a refusal. On a sign-in, where the status line then
says "You have moved to …", the instruction disappears together with the channel choice: the page
keeps the title, the status line, the countdown and "Cancel sign-in". A page that fell back to
polling does not hear the answer and keeps the button. Reloading the page brings the channel choice
back as well; once the sign-in expires, the instruction disappears and the restart link appears.
`HopInstructionHtml` replaces the core's text with markup of your own:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"HopInstructionHtml": "<p>Check your phone: <strong>confirm in the messenger</strong> that has just opened.</p>"
}
}
}
```
The setting follows the [footer block](#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page) in every rule but one: the
same levels (this global section, a client entry, the tenant — not a `ui_config` record), a blank
value sets nothing, the same allowed shape and the same outcome of an invalid value, and the
value is a Natural Key. The exception is a translation outside the shape: the page then shows the
core's own text rather than no block, because the block sits where the channel choice was, and an
empty one would leave the user without a word on what to do next. A warning naming the setting and the
language goes into the log.
The "Choose another way" button is not part of the setting: it sits beside your markup, not inside
it, and its caption is a text of the sign-in window like any other.
The setting has no style of its own. Style the block from your stylesheet (`CustomCssPath`) through
its `veriqa-hop-instruction` class; the page's own rules set only its text color, size and spacing.
## CSS variables
The pages are styled through CSS variables prefixed `--veriqa-*`, which you can override in your
own CSS. The main names are below; the full set is declared in the package stylesheet and also
includes the `--veriqa-spacing-*` scale and the colors of the service-page badges:
```css theme={null}
:root {
/* Primary — neutral canon per theme (light: #111827, dark: #f9fafb);
the client color applies only in the Branded preset */
--veriqa-primary: #111827;
--veriqa-on-primary: #ffffff;
/* Surfaces and background (light theme) */
--veriqa-bg: #ffffff;
--veriqa-surface: #f9f9fa;
--veriqa-surface-variant: #e2e2e3;
--veriqa-surface-container: #eeeeef;
/* Text */
--veriqa-text: #1a1c1d;
--veriqa-muted: #4c4546;
--veriqa-soft: #767071;
/* Semantic colors */
--veriqa-success: #16a34a;
--veriqa-error: #dc2626;
--veriqa-warning: #eab308;
/* Radii, typography, animation */
--veriqa-radius: 8px;
--veriqa-radius-lg: 12px;
--veriqa-font-family: system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, Arial, sans-serif;
--veriqa-font-mono: "JetBrains Mono", Consolas, monospace;
--veriqa-transition-fast: 160ms ease;
}
```
## External CSS
Attach your own stylesheet via `CustomCssPath` — it loads **after** the base styles and can
override any variable. When `CustomCssPath` is set, the preset is ignored: your CSS fully defines
the look.
The stylesheet is attached to **every** page Veriqa generates: the sign-in window, the sign-in
confirmation page, the expired-link page and the email sign-in pages. Your CSS styles them all
alike — there is no separate setting for the service pages.
The expired-link page always offers one action. When the application sets `InitiateLoginUri` —
its own address for starting a sign-in (the `Client.InitiateLoginUri` key of the
[configuration reference](/docs/reference/configuration)) — the page links to it as "Start the sign-in
again"; the address must be an absolute `https` URL. Without one the page shows a "Close" button
instead. The texts of this page can be replaced like the texts of the sign-in window — see
[Rewording a page element for one application](#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application). The page belongs to a sign-in only:
a link of the sign-in flow that names an action confirmation leads to the neutral "This link is no
longer available" page instead.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"AuthPageDesign": {
"CustomCssPath": "/css/veriqa-custom.css",
"CssSriHash": "sha384-..."
}
}
}
```
Set `CssSriHash` (Subresource Integrity) if styles load from an external address — external
resources on the sign-in page are disallowed by default.
## Per-client UI configurations (ui\_config)
Beyond the global look, you can define **named UI configurations** and bind them to a specific
OIDC client. The catalog of records is the `Records` map of the `Veriqa:UiConfigurations` section
("record code → look"), so the full path of a record is `Veriqa:UiConfigurations:Records:<code>`;
a record overrides the global look for its code.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"UiConfigurations": {
"Records": {
"brandA": {
"Preset": "Branded",
"PrimaryColor": "#FF5500",
"LogoUrl": "https://your-domain.com/logo.png",
"BrandName": "Acme",
"Title": "Sign in",
"TtlSeconds": 300
}
}
},
"OpenIddict": {
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "my-app",
"DefaultUiConfig": "brandA",
"AllowedUiConfigs": [ "brandA" ]
}
]
}
}
}
```
* `DefaultUiConfig` — the record code applied by default for the client.
* `AllowedUiConfigs` — codes the client is allowed to request. A code from this list is valid even
without a catalog record — the global look is then used.
## Localization
The sign-in page uses the **Natural Keys** approach: the localization key is the English source
text, and `en` is the base language (it needs no translation file). The supported-language
registry is data-driven and built from the locale files **your host** ships: JSON dictionaries
`{lang}.json` in `wwwroot/locales` (the path is configurable via
`Veriqa:Channels:Localization:LocalesPath`) plus the base `en`. Out of the box the page renders in
English; to add a language, put its `{lang}.json` into the locales directory — no code changes
required. You do not have to translate Russian and Chinese at all: they are shipped, see
[Ready-made translations](#ready-made-translations) below. The directory itself is optional: a host
without it logs `Locale files directory not found — channel messages are sent in the base language.`
on startup, and that warning is expected.
### Ready-made translations
The whole catalog — 106 keys, everything a user reads while authenticating — is published as a
content-only package, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelLocales`. It carries `en.json`, `ru.json`, `zh.json` and
`pseudo.json` (a layout-test locale rather than a production language: it is detectable through an
explicit `Accept-Language`, but refused as `DefaultLanguage`).
```xml PackageReference theme={null}
<PackageReference Include="Veriqa.Core.ChannelLocales" Version="0.6.0" />
```
<Warning>
**The package by itself switches no language on.** Its build targets lay the files down under
`veriqa-channel-locales/` beside your entry assembly, deliberately **not** in `wwwroot/locales`:
the core catalog must never overwrite yours — the two are meant to be compared, not merged.
Until one of the two steps below is taken, the host still renders in the base language.
</Warning>
Two ways to use it:
* **copy** the files you need out of `veriqa-channel-locales/` into your own locales directory. They
are yours from then on, and you are free to edit any wording in them;
* **point at it**: set `Veriqa:Channels:Localization:LocalesPath` to the directory the package lays
down. A relative path is resolved from the host's **content root**, so set a path that is right
for the way you run the application — or an absolute one. Nothing there is yours to edit: the next
version of the package replaces those files whole.
The package is also the key list for a host that keeps a catalog of its own: `en.json` is the
authoritative set of keys, and a key missing from your files quietly falls back to English for the
user.
### Which language a user gets
The sign-in page and the messages in the channel take their language from **different** sources, and
the two legitimately differ.
**The sign-in page** follows the request: the OIDC `ui_locales` parameter first — an explicit choice
made on the relying party's side — and the browser's `Accept-Language` after it. A value matching no
language of the registry falls back to the default language:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"Localization": {
"DefaultLanguage": "en"
}
}
}
```
`DefaultLanguage` is validated at startup: the value must be in the registry (the host's locale
files + `en`), otherwise the application does not start. For example, `"DefaultLanguage": "ru"`
requires the host to ship `wwwroot/locales/ru.json`.
The language the page was rendered in travels **on the transaction**, and every later page and
message of that sign-in falls back to it — including the `form_post` auto-posting page that delivers
the authorization response, which renders in that language instead of reading the browser header
again. `Accept-Language` with the default language stays the fallback for responses that never had a
transaction, such as errors returned to the `redirect_uri`. A confirmation created
[server to server](/docs/reference/confirmation-api) has no page at all — what travels there is the
`locale` field of the request.
**A message inside a channel** follows the recipient instead. A channel that knows the user's profile
language supplies it with every event, and it outranks everything the browser said: a user whose
Telegram is in Russian gets a Russian prompt from a page rendered in English. A channel that supplies
nothing falls back to the locale the transaction carries, and failing that to the base language.
| Channel | Supplies the recipient's language |
| - | - |
| Telegram | yes — the language Telegram reports for the user |
| MAX | yes — the `user_locale` of the update |
| WhatsApp | no — the transaction locale is used |
| Email | no — see below |
**Email is a third case**, because its texts are not read inside a messenger. The sign-in email goes out
before anyone has answered, so there is no profile to ask: it is worded in the language of the request
that asked for the email — that browser's `Accept-Language` — falling back to the locale of the
transaction. The confirmation page the magic link opens does the opposite: it prefers the
transaction's locale over the `Accept-Language` of the mail client's browser, so that page matches the
sign-in window the user started in.
One installation may therefore speak two languages in one sign-in, and that is the intended behavior
rather than a misconfiguration. What it does require is that every language involved is present in the
locale files: a language nobody translated degrades to the base one silently.
### Channel and email texts — the same locale files
The same directory drives more than the sign-in page: nearly everything the user sees **in the
messenger and in the email** — button captions, the status after their answer, the visible lines of the
email — comes from there. One rule: the key is the English text, the value is what the user sees. To reword anything,
add the key with your value to the locale file of that language — no code involved.
The main keys:
| Key (also the English text) | Where it shows |
| - | - |
| `Confirm ✅` · `Decline ❌` | buttons under the confirmation request (Telegram, WhatsApp, MAX) |
| `Sign-in confirmed ✅` · `Sign-in declined ❌` | the status after the user answers **when signing in**, in the same channels |
| `Sign-in confirmed ✅ Tap Back to return to the sign-in page.` | the confirmed status in the same channels when the sign-in was **started on a phone or a tablet**: the channel opened on that same device, and the text tells the user how to get back |
| `Sign-in confirmed` · `Sign-in declined` · `Sign-in confirmed. Tap Back to return to the sign-in page.` | the same three for third-party channels when signing in — a platform need not render emoji |
| `Something went wrong ⚠️ Go back to the sign-in page and start again.` · `Something went wrong. Go back to the sign-in page and start again.` | an error while handling the answer — the channel's own text, independent of the transaction type (the emoji variant in the same channels, the plain one in third-party channels) |
| `Too many attempts. Wait a minute and start the sign-in again.` | the answer when the per-user attempt budget is spent — it advises waiting rather than starting over, which a spent budget would refuse again |
| `Sign-in time expired ⌛ Go back to the sign-in page and start again.` · `Sign-in time expired. Go back to the sign-in page and start again.` · `Sign-in time expired. Start the sign-in again from the application.` | the status **when signing in**, once the confirmation window has passed — in the same channels, in third-party channels and on the Email confirm page respectively |
| `Sign-in time expired ⌛` | the same status on the pages Veriqa itself serves |
| `Confirmed ✅` · `Declined ❌` · `Time expired ⌛` | the receipt of a confirmed action, not of a sign-in; the text is neutral and the same on every surface |
| `Confirm sign-in` | the confirmation request without initiator context |
| `Confirm sign-in to "{app}"` · `… — request from {browser} on {os}` · `… on {os}, {region}` | the request with initiator context; a translation must keep the `{slot}` set — on a mismatch the English text is used |
| `Sign in to {app}` | the subject of the Email channel's email |
| `Confirm sign-in` · `You requested sign-in via Veriqa.` · `The request came from:` · `Press the button below to confirm sign-in.` · `The link is valid until:` · `Approve sign-in` · `To confirm, open the following link:` · `Or scan the QR code to finish signing in on another device:` · `Direct link:` · `Do not forward this mail: the link grants sign-in access to your account.` · `If you did not request sign-in, simply ignore this mail.` | every visible line of the sign-in email: the heading, the intro, the label of the initiator details, the hint above the button, the label of the validity time, the button caption, the hint above the plain link, the QR code block captions, the footer. `Confirm sign-in` is the same key the confirmation request uses |
<Note>
**Which of the two confirmed texts a user gets is decided by the message template, not by the
locale file.** The receipt of a sign-in is the message kind `outcome-receipt-confirmed`, and its
template narrows by the device the sign-in was started on — the `ByDevice` group, with the values
`desktop`, `mobile`, `tablet` and `unknown`. The product ships the short text for every device and
the text with the way back under `ByDevice:mobile` and `ByDevice:tablet`. The locale file only
translates each of them. If you set the receipt of a sign-in in the configuration of the host
without `ByDevice`, phones and tablets still get the shipped text with the way back — set your
own `ByDevice` steps as well. A wording set for one application, tenant or `ui_config` record
answers for every device by itself. The addresses and an example:
[Configuration reference](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqamessagetemplates).
</Note>
<Note>
These are **installation-wide product defaults**: locale files are a host asset, one set per
process. Per-tenant wording is not configured here: the texts of the pages Veriqa renders are
reworded for one application or tenant by [a dictionary of its own](#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application).
</Note>
<Note>
**Every visible phrase of the shipped sign-in email is a localization key.** The body of the email —
both the HTML and the plain-text part — holds no wording of its own: each phrase is a
localized-text slot, so an email in the recipient's language is in that language throughout, and
translating the email is editing a locale file. A phrase does not carry a substitution inside it:
the value sits beside its label — `The link is valid until:` followed by the time,
`The request came from:` followed by the browser, the system and the region — and the name of the
application has a line of its own under the heading. The subject `Sign in to {app}` is the one text
translated as a whole. The same holds for the claims-completion emails, `claim-code-link-mail`
included.
A translated phrase is limited to 128 characters, like any value that comes from outside the
product; a longer one is cut. Values Veriqa computes itself — the link, the code, the validity
time — are substituted in full, whatever their length. If you
[set your own email body](/docs/guides/channels#your-own-mail-body), split a long sentence into
several slots rather than one.
</Note>
### One phrase, two translations: the context suffix
The key IS the English text, so one phrase yields one translation per language. When the same
English phrase must translate **differently** in different places (one channel worded unlike the
rest, say), the key carries a context label after `|`:
```json ru.json theme={null}
{
"Sign-in declined ❌": "Вход отклонён ❌",
"Sign-in declined ❌ | telegram": "Вход в Telegram отклонён ❌"
}
```
What to know:
* **the label is metadata — the user never sees it.** With no translation available, the part of
the key **before the last** `|` is shown, i.e. the clean English text, not `… | telegram`;
* **never map a key to itself** (`"X | telegram": "X | telegram"`) — that is the one way to put the
label in front of a user;
* **`|` is reserved** for the label: ordinary UI text must not contain it;
* **add a context only on a real divergence.** By default one phrase is one key with no suffix;
there is no value in contexts whose translations coincide.
### Texts set in configuration are localization keys too
The texts a `ui_config` record sets go through the **same** resolution as the built-in ones: the
configured value IS a Natural Key. There is no such thing as an unlocalizable text in the product.
| `ui_config` setting | What it sets |
| - | - |
| `Title` | the sign-in window title |
| `Instruction` | the on-page instruction of the sign-in window |
| `BrandName` | the brand name in the brand row of the sign-in window, in every preset but `Minimal` |
<Note>
**The confirmation text is set by a message template, not by a field of the record.** The
wording of the confirmation request is a **message**, and it is set by the ladder of its template:
`Veriqa:MessageTemplates:confirmation-prompt:Templates` (how the key is built and which levels it has
— in the [Configuration reference](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqamessagetemplates)). The rule of
this section applies to it in full: the text you set is a Natural Key just the same and does not
bypass localization. If one application needs a wording of its own, set it in that client's entry
(the `Application` level) rather than globally.
</Note>
What this means in practice:
* **a value with no locale entry is shown as is.** The key IS the text, so a miss breaks
nothing: the user sees exactly the string you set, merely untranslated. The base language
needs no entry at all;
* **to have the text translated, add its key to your locale files** — the same
`wwwroot/locales/{lang}.json` as every other text. The locales directory is a host asset, and the
host is you: the keys of your `ui_config` records go in there alongside the product ones.
**How to set a value that is meant to be translated.** There is no separate marker for it — use
the regular context suffix (above): the setting holds a `<text> | <label>` string and the
translation goes into the locale files.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"UiConfigurations": {
"Records": {
"brandA": {
"Title": "Sign in to the portal | brandA",
"Instruction": "Choose a channel | brandA"
}
}
}
}
}
```
```json ru.json theme={null}
{
"Sign in to the portal | brandA": "Вход в портал",
"Choose a channel | brandA": "Выберите канал"
}
```
What to know:
* **the label is metadata**: everything after the **last** `|` is invisible to the user. The
value `Privacy | Terms` renders as `Privacy` — a setting whose own text has to contain `|` does
not fit this convention;
* **a miss is not a failure**: with no locale entry the user sees `Sign in to the portal` — the
right text, merely untranslated. No label, no blank, no error;
* **you choose the base text**: the value `Политика | authpage` with no English translation shows
an English-speaking user Russian. The behavior is predictable, but the base text is best written
in the base language (`en`);
* **the label is not always needed.** A text of yours that is already unique can be translated with
no suffix — the value itself is the key. The label guards against colliding with a product key
and separates one phrase across different `ui_config` records.
<Warning>
A configured value is looked up in the locale files. If it **happens to coincide** with the key of a
product text — say, `Title` set exactly to the built-in sign-in window title — non-English
languages get the product translation instead of your string. If such a text must stay
yours, append a context suffix to the value: the key stops colliding with the product one, and the
user still sees the same string up to the last `|`.
</Warning>
### Rewording a page element for one application
A locale file rewords a text for the **whole installation**. When one application needs its own
wording of a built-in element — a feedback form that confirms a message rather than signs anyone in,
say, and wants "Confirm in WhatsApp" instead of "Open in WhatsApp" — set it in the `AuthPage.Texts`
dictionary of that application. An entry is keyed by the **built-in text** of the element — its
English text, the same string that keys it in the locale files, spelled as in the list below — and
specifies what to show in its place.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "site-feedback",
"AuthPage": {
"Texts": {
"Open in WhatsApp": "Confirm in WhatsApp | feedback",
"Sign in via Email": { "en": "Confirm via Email", "ru": "Подтвердить через Email" }
}
}
}
]
}
}
}
```
```json ru.json theme={null}
{
"Confirm in WhatsApp | feedback": "Подтвердить в WhatsApp"
}
```
**Levels.** The dictionary exists at three levels: the tenant (`AuthPage:Texts` in its record), the
application (`AuthPage:Texts` in its entry of `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`) and the `ui_config` record
(its `texts` member; in `appsettings.json` — `Veriqa:UiConfigurations:Records:<code>:Texts`). There
is no installation-wide level: that is what the locale files are for. The levels merge **entry by
entry**: for each text the most specific level that sets an entry wins, and the entries a lower level
sets for other texts stay in force. So a tenant may reword one button and an application another, and
both show.
<Note>
**The `Tenant` level.** As with the [footer block](#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page), no reader
for the tenant record is registered out of the box — the integrator writes one. Without it the
dictionary comes from the client entry and the `ui_config` record.
</Note>
**Two forms of an entry:**
* **a string is a replacement key.** It goes through the locale files exactly like a text
[set in configuration](#texts-set-in-configuration-are-localization-keys-too): the page looks the
replacement up in the locale file of its language, and with no translation shows it as is. The
context suffix `|` is allowed and advisable — above, `feedback` keeps the replacement from colliding
with a product key;
* **an object holds ready-made texts by language.** They bypass the locale files: the page shows the text
of the language it renders in as is. Name the languages the way your locale files are named
(`en`, `ru`, `zh`); the page renders in the language of the request when your locale files translate
it, and in English otherwise. A language the object does not name gets the **regular translation of
the built-in text**, not another language of the object — in the example above a user reading
Chinese gets the Chinese translation of "Sign in via Email" from your locale files.
A blank string, an empty object and an object of blank texts set nothing, and the entry then comes
from the level below.
**Slots must match.** Some built-in texts carry values the page fills in:
`Link sent to {0}. Check your inbox.`, `Confirm the address {address} to sign in to {app}.` A replacement — the string, or each
text of the object — has to carry **exactly** the same slots. One that drops or adds a slot is not
applied: the page shows the built-in text the regular way.
**Which texts are open.** The dictionary reaches the pages Veriqa renders for the user during a
sign-in or a confirmation:
* the sign-in window — on both pages that render it, the sign-in itself and the page that opens a
confirmation — including the status lines its script shows;
* the launch page of [hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode) on the phone (its heading
"Sign in via …", its instruction, the status line once the transition has started and the line
that sends the user back to the sign-in window) and the lines the window shows on a phone that
opened a sign-in by its QR code — the outcome and the way back to the sign-in window;
* the email pages: the page the magic link opens — the request of a sign-in and the line it turns into
after "Continue signing in", the "Continue" page of a confirmation and the line of the fast link —
the page that
opens the mail app for a sign-in by email, the form that requests a sign-in link, and the page of the
link that confirms an email address during claims completion.
<Accordion title="The built-in texts an entry may name">
**Sign-in window:** `Sign in via trusted channel` ·
`Scan the QR code or tap the button to sign in via {0}` · `Scan the QR code to sign in via {0}` ·
`Tap the button to sign in via {0}` · `Choose a channel and scan the QR code or tap the button` ·
`Choose a channel and scan the QR code` · `Choose a channel and tap the button` ·
`Scan the QR code or tap the channel button` · `Scan the QR code to sign in` ·
`Tap the channel button to sign in` · `Scan the QR code you need or tap a messenger button` ·
`Sign-in QR code` · `Any channel` · `{0} ▦` · `Open in Telegram` · `Open in WhatsApp` ·
`Open in Instagram` · `Open in Messenger` · `Open in WeChat` · `Open in Viber` · `Open in MAX` · `Sign in via Email` · `Send confirmation email` · `Sign in via email link` · `OR` ·
`← Back to QR code` · `← Back` · `Email address` · `Get a link` · `Send again` · `Link sent to {0}. Check your inbox.` ·
`Failed to send the link. Please try again.` · `Email link opened. Confirm the sign-in.` ·
`The confirmation email is open in your mail app. Send it to continue.` ·
`If you have already sent the email, wait for the confirmation. It usually takes a few seconds.` ·
`Email received. Verifying the sender…` · `Sender verified. Completing sign-in…` ·
`Sign-in has already started in another channel.` · `Confirmation has already started in another channel.` ·
`QR code scanned. Continue on your phone.` · `QR code scanned. Continue on your phone to confirm by email.` ·
`QR code scanned. Continue in {0}.` ·
`The page is open on your phone.` · `Opening {0}…` ·
`Continue on your phone and confirm in the app that has opened.` · `Choose another way` ·
`Back to channel selection` ·
`On iPhone, a browser page with two buttons may open first. Tap the one that opens Messenger, then confirm that you want to open the Messenger app.` ·
`Problem signing in` · `This QR code was also scanned on another device. If that wasn't you, start over.` ·
`Complete the form on your phone` · `Waiting for confirmation…` · `Confirmed. Processing…` ·
`Sign-in successful!` · `This sign-in request has expired` · `Start the sign-in again` · `Cancel sign-in` ·
`Authentication error` ·
`Send the code in the chat with the bot {0} if the bot has not sent you a confirmation` ·
`Send the code in the chat with the bot if the bot has not sent you a confirmation` ·
`Copy and open {0}` · `Copy` · `Copied` ·
`You have moved to {0}. Tap the confirmation button in the chat with {1} if you want to continue signing in, or tap cancel.` ·
`You have moved to {0}. Tap the confirmation button in the chat if you want to continue signing in, or tap cancel.`
(the last two are the status line once the bot of a channel has answered the start of a sign-in)
**Expired sign-in session page:** `Sign-in session expired` ·
`This sign-in link has expired or was already used. Please start the sign-in again from the application.` ·
`Close` · `You can close this tab.` (its link is `Start the sign-in again`, listed above)
**Phone pages of a scanned sign-in:** `Sign in via {0}` · `Continue in {0}` ·
`The app should open by itself. If it does not, tap the button below.` ·
`The {0} app should open by itself. If it does not, tap the button below.` ·
`A browser page with two buttons will open. Tap the one that opens Messenger, then confirm that you want to open the Messenger app. After that the chat with the bot will open. If nothing opens, tap the button below.` ·
`You have moved to {0}. Tap the confirmation button in the chat with {1} if you want to continue signing in, or tap cancel.` ·
`You have moved to {0}. Tap the confirmation button in the chat if you want to continue signing in, or tap cancel.` ·
(the two lines above are shared with the sign-in window, and so are `Problem signing in` and
`Copy and open {0}`, the link and the button of the spare start code, and `Continue in {0}`, the
heading of the sign-in window a phone opens by a QR code of several channels once a channel is tapped) ·
`Sign-in confirmed. Continue on the device where you started.` ·
`This sign-in is no longer active here. Check the device where you started.` ·
`Return to the sign-in window and confirm the sign-in there.` (shared with the email pages: an entry
changes it on the phone pages and on the page of the magic link alike)
**Email pages:** `Sign-in request` ·
`A sign-in to {app} was requested. If it was not you, close this page.` · `Continue signing in` ·
`Return to the sign-in window and confirm the sign-in there.` · `Cancel` · `Approve sign-in` · `Continue` ·
`Sign-in confirmed. Continue on the device where you started.` ·
`The link has expired. Request a new one.` · `The link has already been used. Request a new one.` ·
`The link is invalid or has expired. Request a new one.` ·
`Something went wrong. Try requesting a new link.` · `Confirmation required` ·
`Continue to see what you are asked to confirm.` ·
`The sign-in link has been sent to {email_masked}` · `Send again` ·
`Failed to send the link. Check the address and try again.` ·
`The Email adapter Pull mode is disabled.` · `Sign in via email link` · `Sign in with a link` ·
`Enter your email — we will send you a sign-in link.` ·
`Session not found. Return to the sign-in page.` · `Email address` · `Get a link` ·
`Confirm your email address` ·
`Confirm the address {address} to sign in to {app}.` ·
`If you did not sign in to {app}, do not confirm the address.` · `Confirm the address` ·
`The address is confirmed. Return to the sign-in page.` ·
`This link no longer works. Request a new one on the sign-in page.` · `Close` ·
`You can close this tab.`
</Accordion>
The rest keeps its built-in texts: the service pages (the response page that posts the result back to
your application and the unavailable-link page), the confirmation pages outside the
sign-in window, the claims completion form, the address
placeholder `your@email.com`, and the emails — an email is worded by its
[message template](/docs/guides/channels#your-own-mail-body). The caption of a third-party channel's button
is the name the channel reports rather than a built-in text, so the dictionary does not reach it either.
**One text is one element everywhere.** An entry changes the text wherever an open page shows it:
`Open in Telegram` is the button of the sign-in window and of the launch page on the phone, and
`Sign in via email link` is both the tab of the window and the title of the link request form. On a
page that is not open the same text stays built-in — an entry for `Confirmation required` changes the
"Continue" page of the email link and the error page that link answers with, not the confirmation
page that carries the same heading.
**A dedicated setting outranks the dictionary.** Where a text is set by its own setting — `Title`,
`Instruction`, `BrandName`, `FooterHtml`, `HopInstructionHtml` — the page shows that text, and an entry
for the built-in text it replaces does not apply. The dictionary acts only where the page falls back to
its built-in text.
**An entry that never applies is reported, once.** An entry for a text outside the list above, and a
replacement whose slots do not match, go into the configuration snapshot report with a warning naming
the level, the record and the configuration key of the entry — at startup and again when the
configuration source reloads, not on every page. The report is also where a reworded built-in text shows
up: the key is the English text, so a text the product rewords gets a new key, and an entry for the old
one finds nothing. After an update, check the report and move such entries — and the values of your
locale files — to the new keys. Among the recently reworded texts: the button of the one-tap email
(`Send confirmation email`), the status line after it (`The confirmation email is open in your mail app.
Send it to continue.`), the line of a scan (`QR code scanned. Continue on your phone.` and its variants
listed above) and the message shown when the claims completion form hits the per-address email limit. The page of
the magic link no longer asks `Do you confirm the sign-in?` with `Yes` and `No`, and the launch page on
the phone no longer has a separate button that only copies the spare start code. The host starts regardless and every other entry of
that client applies. If the dictionary cannot be resolved at all (the `ui_config` store is unreachable),
the page renders with its built-in texts and a warning goes into the log.
## Extension points
Key services can be swapped for your own implementation — register them in the
`AddVeriqaAuthServer` block.
### Sign-in page renderer
Implement `IAuthPageRenderer` for full control over the auth page HTML:
```csharp theme={null}
public sealed class MyAuthPageRenderer : IAuthPageRenderer
{
public string RenderAuthPage(AuthPageRenderContext context) => "<html>...</html>";
}
// Registration
authServer.UseAuthPageRenderer<MyAuthPageRenderer>();
```
`AuthPageRenderContext` arrives with values that are **already resolved**: `Design` is the
effective page design (the global section overridden field by field by the ownership levels),
`Title` and `Instruction` are the texts if some level set them (otherwise `null`, and the text
is yours), and `QrVisibility` is the effective QR visibility. Your renderer combines nothing on
its own and therefore cannot lose an override.
Three more members arrive resolved the same way, and a renderer of your own has to act on each —
the built-in one does:
* `ChannelButtonVisibility` — the visibility of the channel buttons, already reconciled with
`QrVisibility`: a pair that would leave a device with neither arrives as `Always`;
* `ChannelLayout` — `Tabs` or `Grid`;
* `CancelForm` — the form behind "Cancel sign-in", or `null` when this page offers no such button.
Render it as a `POST` form to `PathBase` + `CancelForm.ActionUrl` with two hidden fields:
`session_id` carrying `SessionId`, and `CancelForm.AntiforgeryFieldName` carrying
`CancelForm.AntiforgeryToken`.
`Title` and `Instruction` arrive as **localization keys**, not as finished text (see "Texts set
in configuration are localization keys too"). The built-in renderer runs them through the locale files;
your renderer does the same by calling
`IConfirmationPromptLocalizer.ResolveOrBaseText(value, language)` — otherwise a text set at a
level stops being translated, and a value with a context suffix shows its label.
They also arrive **raw**, and so does the `Hint` of a channel: the value may carry
[markup](#markup-in-the-title-the-instruction-and-a-channel-hint), and nothing has checked it. The
built-in renderer checks each value and falls back to plain text; a renderer of your own either
HTML-encodes the value before it goes into the page or checks it by rules of its own. Emitting it
as is puts whatever the setting holds into your page.
### Claims mapper
Implement `IClaimsMapper` for your own mapping of the resolved identity to OIDC claims:
```csharp theme={null}
public sealed class MyClaimsMapper(IMyDirectory directory) : IClaimsMapper
{
public async Task<Result<IReadOnlyList<Claim>>> MapToClaimsAsync(
ResolvedIdentitySnapshot resolvedIdentity,
CompletionSnapshot completion,
ClaimsMappingContext context,
CancellationToken cancellationToken = default)
{
var claims = new List<Claim>
{
new(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier, resolvedIdentity.Subject)
};
// Extra channel claims live in the resolvedIdentity.Claims dictionary
if (resolvedIdentity.Claims?.TryGetValue("name", out var name) is true)
{
claims.Add(new(ClaimTypes.Name, name));
}
// The mapping runs on the request thread, so enriching the claims from your own
// database or directory is a plain await — no sync-over-async is needed
var profile = await directory.LoadAsync(resolvedIdentity.Subject, cancellationToken);
claims.Add(new(ClaimTypes.Role, profile.Role));
return Result<IReadOnlyList<Claim>>.Success(claims.AsReadOnly());
}
}
// Registration
authServer.UseClaimsMapper<MyClaimsMapper>();
```
`UseClaimsMapper<T>()` registers the mapper as **scoped** — one instance per authorization request.
That is what lets it take a scoped dependency (`DbContext`, a unit of work, any per-request service)
straight through the constructor, as `IMyDirectory` above: no `IServiceScopeFactory` dance is needed.
The shipped default stays a singleton — it is stateless and depends on nothing.
`ClaimsMappingContext` describes who the claims are being built for:
| Member | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `ClientId` | `client_id` of the requesting relying party; `null` when the request carries none |
| `TenantId` | tenant of the request; `null` when the tenant level is not set |
| `Scopes` | scopes requested by the relying party |
The attribution is what a pairwise subject identifier needs (OIDC Core 1.0 §8.1): the same end user
gets a different `sub` per relying party. The built-in mapper does not use it — the `sub` it issues
is global across relying parties.
### Transaction event handler
Implement `ITransactionEventHandler` to react to transaction events (for example, to link a
notification channel on sign-in):
```csharp theme={null}
authServer.AddTransactionEventHandler<MyTransactionEventHandler>();
```
The handler is added **alongside** the built-in ones rather than replacing them: the port is
consumed as `IEnumerable<ITransactionEventHandler>`, so every registered handler receives every
event. The shipped handlers keep running — the sign-in window still gets its completion event, and
the audit trail still gets its records.
### Idempotent transaction creation
`CreateTransactionRequest` accepts the `IdempotencyKey` + `IdempotencyScope` pair: a repeated
request carrying the same pair returns the transaction already created instead of starting a second
one (and is refused with `idempotency_key_conflict` when the creation parameters differ).
Among the built-in entry points, `POST /api/transaction/confirmation` — the creation of a
confirmation transaction over client credentials — fills the pair in: the key comes from the
`idempotency_key` field of the request body and the scope from the authenticated `client_id`, so the
same key from two applications denotes two different requests. A repeat with the same key answers
with the same transaction and a freshly built way in. The browser authorization endpoint does not
fill the pair in: there a repeated request means a new sign-in rather than a retry of the previous
one. If you drive the engine directly, filling the pair in is up to you.
## Next steps
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Storage" icon="database" href="/docs/guides/storage">
Transaction store and the OpenIddict database: InMemory / EF Core / Redis, PostgreSQL.
</Card>
<Card title="Initiator context" icon="location-crosshairs" href="/docs/concepts/initiator-context">
What the confirmation shows: who initiated the sign-in and from where.
</Card>
<Card title="Production hardening" icon="shield-check" href="/docs/guides/hardening">
The pre-production checklist.
</Card>
<Card title=".NET quickstart" icon="rocket" href="/docs/quickstart/dotnet">
The basic integration in a few minutes.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Security and data handling
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/data-handling
What Veriqa collects, where it stores it, how long it keeps it, what it encrypts and what leaves your perimeter.
This page answers the questions a security review asks first.
<Note>
This is a factual description of the software, not legal advice and not a compliance
certification. Which of these facts matter under your regulator, and what you have to do about
them, is a decision for you and your counsel.
</Note>
## Who holds what
Veriqa is delivered as code you run. In the self-hosted model that is the whole answer to "where
does the data go":
* **You are the controller.** The database, the key material and the logs are on your
infrastructure, under your connection strings. Nothing is provisioned for you.
* **Veriqa (the vendor) is neither controller nor processor of your users' data.** No user data
reaches the Veriqa vendor: the product does not phone home, ships no telemetry and has no vendor endpoint of any
kind. The only outbound addresses in the code are the messenger APIs you configure and the SMTP
server you point it at (see [What leaves your perimeter](#what-leaves-your-perimeter)).
* **The messenger providers are your counterparties, not the Veriqa vendor's.** Telegram, the WhatsApp
Cloud API and every other messenger you enable see the messages you send through your own bot credentials. Your relationship with each
of them is direct.
## Personal data inventory
Everything the shipped product touches, and nothing beyond it.
| Data | Where it comes from | Where it lives | For how long |
| - | - | - | - |
| Channel user id (Telegram/MAX/WhatsApp id, email address) | the channel, on confirmation | transaction store; `sub` claim of the issued token | transaction: minutes. Token: your token lifetimes |
| Display name, first/last name, username | the channel profile | transaction store; `name`, `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username` claims | as above |
| Email address, `email_verified` | the channel (or typed by the user in the Email channel) | transaction store; `email` claim | as above |
| Phone number | the channel, where it exposes one | transaction store; `phone_number` claim | as above |
| Avatar image | the channel profile; Telegram's is downloaded by the adapter (at most `AvatarDataUri.MaxImageBytes`, 64 KiB, so that the image fits the 128 KB transaction snapshot; a larger photo is not delivered, and the core drops a malformed or oversized value from any adapter, so the sign-in goes on without an avatar) and kept as a `data:` URI, MAX may give an `https` URL | transaction store (channel identity snapshot); `picture` claim, issued only to clients that request the `avatar` scope, inside the payload of their access and refresh tokens in the OpenIddict database | transaction: minutes. Token records: until pruned (see below) |
| Locale | the channel profile | transaction store; `locale` claim | as above |
| IP address of the initiator | the `/connect/authorize` request | initiator-context snapshot inside the transaction | transaction: minutes. Never displayed, never logged |
| Browser, OS, device type | the `User-Agent` of that request, parsed | initiator-context snapshot | as above. Shown in the confirmation message |
| Raw `User-Agent` string | the same header | initiator-context snapshot — **only if you turn it on** | as above |
| Country and city | offline GeoIP lookup of that IP | initiator-context snapshot | as above. Shown in the confirmation message as "City, Country" |
| Audit records | transaction and channel events | the audit sink you chose | 90 days by default; only when you enable the trail |
| Relying-party expectations (an email or phone the application says it expects) | your application, when it starts a transaction | transaction store, **encrypted** | transaction: minutes |
| Confirmed-operation parameters | your application | audit records — **only if you turn it on** | the audit retention period |
| Claims Veriqa collected during a sign-in (phone, email, form fields) and the `Optional` claims the user declined | the user, on the completion step | the collected claims store, by tenant and `sub` — **only if you turn it on** | until deleted by `sub`, or by the retention you set |
**Not in the list:** message bodies from the channel (a channel adapter reads what it
needs to identify the sender and confirm, and keeps nothing else) and any
long-lived profile of the user beyond the collected claims above. The product ships **no user
directory** — see
[Channel identities](#channel-identities-nothing-is-stored-by-default).
## Collection defaults
These are on out of the box. Nothing here needs an action from you to start; each needs one to stop.
| Setting | Ships as | What it means |
| - | - | - |
| `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:Enabled` | `true` | The initiator-context snapshot is built at all |
| `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:CollectIpAddress` | `true` | The initiator's IP is written into the snapshot |
| `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:CollectUserAgent` | `true` | The `User-Agent` is parsed into browser / OS / device type |
| `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:CollectGeoLocation` | `true` | Country and city are looked up **when a GeoIP database is available and the IP is trusted** |
| `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:StoreRawUserAgent` | `false` | The raw header is *not* stored; only the parsed fields are |
Two qualifications that matter more than the flags:
**Geolocation is on by default but inert by default.** The lookup needs the satellite package
`Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.MaxMind` *and* a local `.mmdb` database, and the base packages carry
neither. Without them the provider reports itself unavailable and the geo fields stay empty — so a
stock installation collects no location, even though the flag says `true`. Adding the database is
what starts the collection. The standalone image already carries the package: there, collection
starts once you mount the database and point `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:GeoIp:DatabasePath` at it.
The IP must also be trusted: while forwarded headers are accepted from
any source (no `KnownProxies` / `KnownIPNetworks` configured), the lookup is skipped.
**The IP is collected but never shown and never logged.** It goes into the snapshot inside the
transaction and stops there: the confirmation message names only the application, browser, OS and
region, and the diagnostic log for an untrusted forwarding configuration records a result code
rather than the address.
Turning all of it off is one section:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"InitiatorContext": {
"Enabled": false
}
}
}
```
With `Enabled: false` no snapshot is built, and the confirmation message simply carries no context
line. You can also keep the context and narrow it — drop `region` from `DisplayFields`, or set
`CollectIpAddress: false` (which also removes geolocation, since the lookup has no input). Details
and the per-application narrowing are in [Initiator context](/docs/concepts/initiator-context).
## Where it is stored
| Store | What it holds | Configured by |
| - | - | - |
| Transaction store | the whole live transaction: OIDC request context, the channel identity snapshot, the resolved identity, the initiator context | `ConfigureTransactionEngine` — InMemory, EF Core or Redis ([Storage](/docs/guides/storage)) |
| OpenIddict database | OIDC clients, authorizations and tokens; the subject of a token is `{channel}:{channel_user_id}`. Access and refresh tokens are reference tokens: the client holds an identifier, and the full token — every claim it carries, `picture` included for clients with `avatar` — is kept in the token record's payload | `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Database` |
| Audit sink | audit records, if you enabled the trail | `AddVeriqaAuditTrail` — in-memory, EF Core, or an implementation of yours |
| Channel stores | Email action tokens (transaction id + normalized email), Email push correlations (transaction id only), prompt coordinates, processed-message ids, link handle fingerprints (transaction id + application id) | in-process by default; Redis for multiple replicas ([Storage](/docs/guides/storage)) |
| Collected claims store | claims Veriqa collected and declined `Optional` claims, by tenant and `sub`, if you turned it on | `Veriqa:CollectedClaims:Store:Enabled` or `UseEfCoreCollectedClaimsStore` ([Storage](/docs/guides/storage#collected-claims-store)) |
| DataProtection key ring | the keys protecting the relying-party expectations | `Veriqa:DataProtection:RedisConnectionString` or `:KeysDirectory` |
### Channel identities: nothing is stored by default
The port that would persist a channel identity — channel user id, phone, email, display name, as an
upsert with neither TTL nor deletion — is `IChannelIdentityRepository`, and **Veriqa ships no
implementation of it and registers none.** Sign-in works without one: the resolved identity travels
with the transaction and is gone with it. Keeping that data indefinitely is an act you perform
deliberately, by registering an implementation of your own; see
[Storage](/docs/guides/storage#channel-identities-nothing-is-stored-out-of-the-box).
## Retention
| What | Ships as | Where the number comes from |
| - | - | - |
| A live transaction | 300 s to confirm | `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:TransactionTtlSeconds` (60–1800) |
| A dead transaction (completed, failed, expired) | readable for a further 600 s, then deleted | `CompletedRetentionSeconds` (60–3600); the sweep runs every `CleanupIntervalSeconds` (60 s) |
| Audit records | 90 days | `Veriqa:Logging:RetentionDays`; the sweep runs hourly in batches of 500 |
| Email action tokens, push correlations, prompt coordinates | until their own `ExpiresAt` | the entity itself |
| Processed-message records (inbound mail dedup) | 24 hours | `ProcessedMessageRetention` |
| Access / refresh tokens, authorization codes | valid for 1 h / 14 d / 5 min; the record is deleted once it is no longer valid and more than 24 h old | `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:*LifetimeSeconds`; deletion — `TokenPruneThresholdSeconds`, checked every `TokenPruneIntervalSeconds` (1 h) |
| Channel identities, if you register the port | **forever** | the contract has no TTL and no deletion — it is yours to bound |
| Collected claims, if you turn the store on | **forever** unless you set a retention | `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:CollectedClaims:RetentionDays`, counted from the last sign-in that read them; deletion by `sub` — [Storage](/docs/guides/storage#deleting-by-sub) |
In short: **the transaction store empties itself within about fifteen minutes** of a
sign-in, and the audit trail is the only Veriqa store that keeps anything for days. Everything with
an indefinite lifetime is something you added — a channel identity repository, the collected claims
store, or tokens with a lifetime you chose.
<Warning>
**The OpenIddict database is pruned by the auth server.** A background job deletes token and
authorization records that are no longer valid (expired or revoked) and were created more than
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:TokenPruneThresholdSeconds` ago (24 h by default), every
`TokenPruneIntervalSeconds` (1 h), on every store provider. Valid records are never deleted.
Until a record is pruned, its payload — including an avatar image for clients with `avatar` — stays
in the database, so a lower threshold shortens how long that data is kept.
</Warning>
### The audit trail is off until you ask for it, twice
Two independent switches, and both are needed:
1. The satellite is opt-in — a host that never calls `AddVeriqaAuditTrail` has no trail at all.
2. `Veriqa:Logging:Mode` ships as `System`, and records are written **only** in `Audit`. `Disabled`
and `System` are the same thing to the receiver: write nothing.
Retention, once records exist, is not a third switch: the sweep is registered automatically for
either built-in sink and deletes anything older than `RetentionDays`. `ConfigureRetention` only
tunes how often the sweep runs and how large its batches are — it does not turn retention on, and
skipping the call does not leave records unbounded. A retention of zero or less is refused at
startup rather than read as "keep nothing".
The one case where nothing sweeps: **a custom sink you registered with `UseSink<TSink>()`.** Records
then live in your store, the built-in sweep is not registered, and the host says so at startup.
Bounding that store is up to you.
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"Logging": {
"Mode": "Audit",
"RetentionDays": 90
}
}
}
```
### What an audit record actually contains
A closed set of attributes, fixed in the schema — one column per attribute, no free-form payload:
the timestamp, the actor, the action code, the target (the transaction id), the outcome and its
reason code, plus the transaction type, channel type, correlation id, tenant, `client_id`, UI locale
and time zone, the channel's own safe details and its declared inbound verification level.
**The actor is masked.** For an action the user performed in a channel it is
`{channel}:{masked id}` — at most the last two characters of the channel user id stay readable. The
unmasked value never leaves the transaction store.
**No IP, no User-Agent, no geolocation, no display name, no email** reaches an audit record. The
initiator context lives in the transaction and dies with it.
The single exception you can switch on is the parameters of the confirmed operation — the declared
action kind and its slot values. Those are your application's domain data and may be anything, so
they are off by default and copied into the record only when you ask
([Hardening](/docs/guides/hardening#logging-and-audit)).
## Encryption
| What | Encrypted by Veriqa? |
| - | - |
| Relying-party expectations (the email/phone your application says it expects) | **Yes** — ASP.NET Core Data Protection, an isolated purpose string, values readable across key rotation while the old key is in the ring |
| Everything else in the transaction store — identity snapshots, initiator context, OIDC request context | **No.** Written as ordinary columns / Redis values |
| Audit records | **No** |
| OpenIddict tokens | Access and refresh tokens reach the client as opaque identifiers; the token kept in the record payload of the OpenIddict database is encrypted by OpenIddict with your encryption certificate. The `id_token` is signed, not encrypted |
| The database files, the Redis dump, the backups | **No** — that is your storage layer: transparent encryption, volume encryption and an encrypted DB connection are set up by your operator |
There is no application-level encryption of stored personal data beyond that one protected field,
and no key management of its own. If your threat model requires personal data encrypted at rest,
that requirement is met at the storage layer you operate — encrypted volumes, TDE, an encrypted
connection to the database — not by a setting in Veriqa.
Secrets — `client_secret`, bot tokens, SMTP credentials — belong in environment variables or a
secret store, never in config files in the repository. Passwords are never written to a log: where
one has to be compared, the comparison is over a SHA-256 hash.
## Keys
Three kinds of key material, three different homes.
**Token signing and encryption certificates.** In `Development` the product uses OpenIddict's
development certificates. Outside `Development` it loads X.509 certificates you supply, by path or
base64 (`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:SigningCertificate*` / `EncryptionCertificate*`), and refuses to
start without them.
<Warning>
**Replacing a certificate is a session-invalidating operation.** The configuration accepts exactly
one signing and one encryption certificate, so JWKS carries a single signing key and old and new
never overlap. Tokens signed with the previous key stop validating the moment you swap it. Plan
key replacement as a maintenance event, not as a background rotation — the same warning appears in
[hardening](/docs/guides/hardening#issuer-and-certificates).
</Warning>
**The DataProtection key ring.** Redis takes priority
(`Veriqa:DataProtection:RedisConnectionString`), then a directory
(`Veriqa:DataProtection:KeysDirectory`); **with neither set, the keys live in memory and are lost on
restart.** That is fine for development and wrong everywhere else — after a restart the protected
expectations of live transactions can no longer be read. Data Protection rotates its own keys, and
values written under an earlier key stay readable while that key is still in the ring, so a ring on
durable storage makes rotation a non-event.
**Channel and application secrets** — bot tokens, webhook secret tokens, `client_secret`, SMTP
credentials. Rotating them is a channel-side and client-side operation; nothing in Veriqa caches
them past a configuration reload.
## What leaves your perimeter
Only what you configured a channel for. Per confirmation, the outbound message carries:
* the **name of the application** that started the sign-in;
* the **browser**, **OS** and **region** of the initiator, where those are known and displayed;
* a **link or buttons** to confirm, and how long the request is valid.
It does not carry the IP address, the raw `User-Agent`, the user's own profile data, or anything
your application declared about the transaction.
Where it goes depends on the channel: `api.telegram.org` for Telegram, `platform-api.max.ru` for
MAX, `graph.facebook.com` for the WhatsApp Cloud API, and your own SMTP server for Email. In the
other direction, each channel returns the sender's profile — the fields in the inventory table
above. The messenger sees the message content and the recipient because that is what delivering a
message means; the Email channel sees whatever your SMTP relay sees.
**The external event bus.** If you wire the RabbitMQ publisher, transaction events leave the process
carrying the safe attribution only, including the masked channel identity. The parameters of a
confirmed operation are explicitly excluded from serialization and never reach the bus, whatever the
audit configuration says.
## Logs
Application logs are not an audit trail and are not designed to be evidence. What matters for this
page is what they must never contain, and what the code does about it: identifiers are written as a
**16-character non-reversible fingerprint** (the leading bytes of a SHA-256) rather than as
themselves, so an operator can still stitch the steps of one sign-in together without the log
holding the identity. Tokens, secrets and the initiator's IP are not logged at all.
That is the shipped behavior of Veriqa's own log statements. Your host, your reverse proxy and your
platform's request logging are outside it — an access log in front of the auth server records client
IPs by default, and bounding *that* is part of the same deployment step that configures
`ForwardedHeaders:KnownProxies`.
## What is left for you to decide
Nothing on this list has a right answer the product can pick for you.
* Whether to keep the initiator context at all, and whether to add a GeoIP database.
* Whether to enable the audit trail, at what retention, and whether records should carry the
parameters of confirmed operations.
* Whether to persist channel identities — and, if so, how they get deleted.
* Whether to turn on the collected claims store, and with what retention.
* How long expired and revoked token records stay in the OpenIddict database before pruning.
* Where the DataProtection key ring lives.
* Encryption at rest, backups and their retention, at the storage layer.
* How a deletion request from a user is executed across your stores. Veriqa deletes its transaction
rows on its own schedule and its audit rows on retention; the collected claims store you reach by
`sub` (endpoint or host call); anything you added is yours to reach.
## Next steps
<Card title="Production hardening" icon="shield-check" href="/docs/guides/hardening">
The checklist to run before going live.
</Card>
<Card title="Storage" icon="database" href="/docs/guides/storage">
Which store holds what, and how to wire each one.
</Card>
<Card title="Known limitations" icon="triangle-exclamation" href="/docs/reference/limitations">
What the product does not do.
</Card>
# You already have a bot
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/existing-bot
Your product already runs a bot in the messenger your users sign in through. The ways to use it together with Veriqa: which one to choose, who owns the bot token and the incoming events, what changes on your side, and what works today versus what is planned.
You run a bot of your own — orders, support, notifications — and want sign-in and confirmation
through Veriqa in the same messenger. There are several ways to combine the two. Three of them work
today; three more are planned. This page compares them and points to the page that documents each.
<Warning>
**Do not put the token of a bot that is already running into the settings of a built-in adapter.**
A built-in adapter that registers the webhook itself — MAX, Telegram and Viber — registers its own
webhook for that token when the application starts and removes it when the application stops. In
Telegram and Viber your bot's webhook is taken over, and the bot stops receiving its events; after
a shutdown the token is left with no webhook at all. The MAX adapter subscribes its own address
with the platform at startup and removes that subscription at shutdown.
When it applies: MAX and Telegram — in `UpdateMode: Webhook`, which is the default; Viber — always.
In `Polling` mode the MAX adapter subscribes no webhook but fetches the updates itself, with the bot
token. In `Polling` mode the Telegram adapter registers no webhook, but another limit applies —
**one poller per bot**, see the [Telegram section of the channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#telegram).
To share one bot between your code and Veriqa, use one of the two shared-bot options below — in
both of them the incoming events are received by your side, not by a built-in adapter.
</Warning>
## Which one to choose
| Option | In short | Status |
| - | - | - |
| [Two bots](#two-bots) | Veriqa runs a sign-in bot of its own; after the sign-in it shows a button that opens your bot, and the button's address carries a single-use handle your server exchanges for the identity of the user who signed in. You keep the link | Works today |
| [A shared bot through an external HTTP adapter](#a-shared-bot-through-an-external-http-adapter) | A service of yours owns the incoming events, hands the Veriqa ones to Veriqa and the rest to your bot | Works today |
| [A shared bot in process, with your own .NET adapter](#a-shared-bot-in-process-with-your-own-net-adapter) | Your own adapter splits the events with `OwnsInboundEvent` | Works today |
| [A built-in adapter that leaves the bot's transport alone](#planned) | The token of a running bot, put into the settings, keeps its webhook | Planned |
| [A gateway for the built-in adapter](#planned) | Veriqa receives the incoming events, handles its own and delivers the rest to your bot; a bot on polling changes only the API address | Planned |
| [Confirmation by your own bot](#planned) | Your bot shows the question itself and reports the decision in one call — for bots built on no-code platforms | Planned |
Choosing at a glance:
* **You can publish a second bot, and a separate sign-in bot is fine for your users** — two bots.
Nothing changes in the bot you already run, apart from handling one start parameter.
* **Users must stay in one bot, and you are willing to run one more service** — the external HTTP
adapter, in any language.
* **Users must stay in one bot, and your host is .NET** — your own adapter in process.
## Who owns the token and the incoming events
| Option | Bot token | Incoming events are received by |
| - | - | - |
| Two bots | Two tokens: the sign-in bot's is in the Veriqa settings, your bot's stays with you | Each bot receives its own |
| A shared bot through an external HTTP adapter | One token, held by your adapter service. Veriqa never asks for it | Your adapter service; it posts the Veriqa events to Veriqa |
| A shared bot in process, with your own .NET adapter | One token, held by your code in the host | Your code; it passes the Veriqa events to the adapter |
## Two bots
**When to choose.** A separate bot for sign-in is acceptable, and you want as few changes as
possible to the bot you already have.
**What you do.** Put the handle placeholder into the address of the button the sign-in bot shows
after the sign-in; your bot receives the handle as its start parameter; your server exchanges it for
the identity of the user and stores the link "the user of my bot ↔ `sub`" on your side. Veriqa keeps
no link.
**Known limitations:**
* The sign-in completes without the button being pressed. If switching to your bot is mandatory,
your application is what enforces it.
* The handle is single-use and short-lived.
* With several replicas the handle needs a shared store.
* Your bot can start a conversation only with a user who has already opened it.
* The button can be forwarded, and whoever presses it brings the handle to your bot: check who
pressed the button. Where there is nothing to compare with, the link goes to whoever presses it
first.
Details, the request and the response, and the recipe for a mandatory switch —
[Two bots: handing the user over to your bot](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#two-bots-handing-the-user-over-to-your-bot).
## A shared bot through an external HTTP adapter
**When to choose.** One bot for both sign-in and your own scenarios, and either you are not tied to
.NET, or you run the standard Veriqa image and do not want to rebuild it.
**What you do.** Run an external adapter — a service of yours — next to Veriqa and register it as an
HTTP channel through configuration. The adapter receives the platform's events, posts the Veriqa ones to
Veriqa and forwards the rest to your bot. The reference adapter for Telegram in Python,
`samples/python/custom-channel-telegram/`, does exactly that: `TELEGRAM_BOT_FORWARD_URL` names the
address your bot listens on, and the routing table in its README says which update goes where.
**Known limitations:**
* It is a separate service to run and to protect.
* The channel has a type of its own, different from the built-in one: `telegram-http` in the
reference adapter, not `telegram`.
* In the reference adapter an update that could not be forwarded is only written to the log — there
is no queue and no retry.
* In the reference adapter a bot with a forward address passes the shared contact on to your bot as
well, so the phone number on request is declared only for a bot without one.
Details — [An HTTP channel adapter in any language](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#an-http-channel-adapter-in-any-language)
and its [reference adapters](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#reference-adapters).
## A shared bot in process, with your own .NET adapter
**When to choose.** One bot, your host is .NET, and you do not want another service or another hop.
**What you do.** Write a channel adapter of your own and keep the transport of the bot in your code:
it receives every event and asks the adapter's `OwnsInboundEvent` whether the event belongs to
Veriqa. The Veriqa events go to Veriqa, everything else to your bot.
**Known limitations:**
* .NET only.
* `OwnsInboundEvent` is a cheap substring check and can err in one direction only: override it with
a precise check of your wire format if a false positive costs you something.
* If the adapter declares the phone number on request, `OwnsInboundEvent` has to be overridden,
keeping the marker check `CallbackDataPrefixes.ContainsAnyMarker`: the default body recognizes the
button markers, but a shared contact carries none.
* A phone number step button that sends plain text carries no marker at all, so its press
reaches your bot, not Veriqa: an optional number is then skipped when its window runs out, and a
required one waits until the transaction expires. A button with a payload — marked with
`CallbackDataPrefixes.PhoneSkip` or `CallbackDataPrefixes.PhoneCancel` — is recognized by the
marker check. See [phone number on request](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#phone-number-on-request);
the built-in Telegram adapter has the same limitation —
[phone number in Telegram](/docs/guides/phone-number#telegram).
Details — [Build your own channel adapter](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter) and
[phone number on request](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#phone-number-on-request).
## Planned
None of the three is available yet; each removes one of the limitations above.
* **A built-in adapter that leaves the bot's transport alone.** You will be able to put the token of
a bot that is already running into the settings of a built-in adapter without the adapter taking
over its webhook.
* **A gateway for the built-in adapter.** Veriqa will receive the incoming events of the shared bot,
handle its own and deliver the rest to your bot — with the built-in channel and no adapter to
write. A bot that uses polling will only change the API address it calls.
* **Confirmation by your own bot.** Your bot will show the confirmation question itself and report
the user's decision to Veriqa in one call. It is meant for bots built on no-code platforms, where
nothing can be placed in front of the bot.
<Card title="Supported channels" icon="comments" href="/docs/guides/supported-channels">
Which channels ship with Veriqa and what each of them returns.
</Card>
# Production hardening
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/hardening
The checklist to run before shipping a Veriqa integration to production.
This is a checklist of the things teams most often miss before going live. It is **not** a
full deployment guide — it focuses on the easy-to-skip items. Checklist state is stored
locally in your browser; use the browser's print-to-PDF if you want a copy.
<Note>
**What the product collects, stores and keeps** — the inventory, the collection defaults, the
retention periods and what leaves your perimeter — is on one page of its own:
[Security and data handling](/docs/guides/data-handling). This checklist is about the decisions you
make; that page is about the facts you make them on.
</Note>
### Issuer and certificates
* [ ] Stable HTTPS issuer, current JWKS, a planned key replacement procedure.
The issuer must be a stable HTTPS address — it lands in the `iss` claim and in discovery.
Clients must trust keys via discovery / JWKS, never pinned static keys: then replacing a key
needs no change on their side. Outside `Development` the signing and encryption certificates are
required in both delivery modes, embedded and self-hosted — without them the host does not start
(keys: [configuration reference](/docs/reference/configuration#server)).
<Warning>
**Zero-downtime rotation is not supported.** The configuration accepts **one** signing
certificate and **one** encryption certificate, so JWKS carries a single signing key — old and
new keys never overlap. Replacing the certificate invalidates live tokens signed with the
previous key; the same warning appears in the
[self-hosted quickstart](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#3-provide-the-token-certificates).
Plan key replacement as an operation that invalidates sessions, not as a background task.
</Warning>
### Client secrets and storage
* [ ] `client_secret` and channel tokens — out of the repo, via the environment, encrypted and rotated.
Secrets (client `client_secret`, bot tokens, channel API keys) are passed only through
environment variables / a secret store — not config files, not git. Encrypt at rest and rotate.
### OIDC PKCE and state
* [ ] PKCE (`S256`) required for public clients; validate `state` and `nonce`.
PKCE with the `S256` method is mandatory for public clients. `state` guards against CSRF on the
redirect, `nonce` binds the `id_token` to the session. Veriqa additionally checks a one-time
browser nonce in the callback — do not disable these checks.
### Redirect URIs
* [ ] Exact-match allowlist; no wildcards in production; `https` only (except loopback in dev).
The redirect URI is matched exactly. No wildcards in production; `http` only for loopback
addresses (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `[::1]`) during development.
### Scopes and claims
* [ ] Minimal scope set; `openid` required; do not request unnecessary PII.
Request the minimum: `openid` is required, the rest as needed. Do not request `email` unless
needed; do not store PII beyond necessity. `/userinfo` returns only the claims permitted by
scopes and configuration.
### Rate limiting and anti-abuse
* [ ] Core limits sized for the traffic of each route; a per-IP limiter on the reverse proxy / WAF.
The core throttles every public surface with **one shared bucket per route** — `authorize`,
`token`, the callback, polling, webhooks, SignalR, the Email start page, the confirmation pages
(defaults in [configuration](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqa-ratelimit)). On top of that it counts
sign-in attempts **per user** (channel identity), so a confirmation cannot be brute-forced, and it
gives each relying party **its own budget** on the server-to-server confirmation entry point. Size the
shared buckets for the total traffic of the route: they protect availability, not one visitor from
another.
What the core does **not** do is key any limit by client IP or block addresses. A
per-IP limit catches the one thing the other two keys cannot see — a **horizontal spray**, many
accounts tried from one address, each staying under its own per-user limit — and that layer belongs
at the edge you already run: `limit_req` on NGINX, a rate rule on your WAF, fail2ban on the `429`s
in the access log. The same deployment step configures `ForwardedHeaders:KnownProxies` (see
[self-hosted, step 6](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#6-put-it-behind-a-reverse-proxy)): the edge sees the
real client address, the core only trusts what the edge forwards. An installation without an edge
limiter is open to the spray, so put one in place before going live.
### Refresh token rotation
* [ ] Enable rotation and revocation; react to reuse.
Enable refresh-token rotation and revocation. On reuse (replay), revoke the whole token family.
### Logging and audit
* [ ] Never log tokens / secrets / PII; enable transaction auditing.
Tokens, secrets and personal data never reach logs. Enable the transaction audit trail — it
makes sign-ins and confirmations traceable.
The trail is written from transaction events — created, confirmed, completed, failed,
expired — and from channel security events. Every record carries the timestamp, the actor,
the event code (`action`), the target and the outcome (`result`).
<Note>
**Two known limitations of the trail** — account for them when you plan reporting and
incident analysis.
**Token issuance is not audited.** Neither the initial issuance via authorization code nor
refresh-token rotation creates an audit record: the trail is written from transaction
events, and token issuance does not travel through them and is not tied to a transaction —
even less so rotation, which happens outside the transaction lifecycle altogether. Do not
build proof of token delivery on the audit trail: issuance and rotation are controlled by
token revocation and family revocation on replay (see
[Refresh token rotation](#refresh-token-rotation)).
**The outcome of a channel security record is uninformative.** For records produced by
channel security events the outcome field is always the same — failure — for any channel
code. A failure in such a row does not mean something broke: the meaning is carried by the
code in the `action` field, and the codes are listed in the documentation of the specific
channel. Filter and analyze these records by `action`, not by outcome.
</Note>
**Parameters of the confirmed operation — opt-in.** By default the records of a confirmation
transaction do not say *what exactly* was confirmed: the declared action kind and its slot values are business data
of your application and may contain personal data. If the trail has to answer "which operation,
with which parameters, was confirmed", turn it on deliberately:
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
services.AddVeriqaAuditTrail(audit =>
{
audit.UseInMemorySink();
audit.ConfigureRecord(record => record.IncludeConfirmationParameters = true);
});
```
Once on, the parameters are copied **into the record itself** rather than referenced through the
transaction: a completed transaction is swept within minutes, while the record lives for the
whole retention period. **Every** audit record of such a transaction gets them — not the
confirmation alone, but the creation, the completion, the failure and the expiry too: the
question "which operation was this" is asked of those as well. They never leave the process —
the external event bus does not carry them.
### Inbound verification level of a channel
* [ ] `InboundVerification` is declared for every channel section — and declared deliberately.
Every channel section must carry `InboundVerification`: a deployment with an enabled shipped
channel and no value does not start. The startup check walks the very set of
channels the core builds its enabled list from: all shipped channels are in it, a channel of a
third-party adapter plugged in with a bare `AddChannel` call is not — you have to check its section
manually. Look not at whether the key is there but at **what it says**: the value must match
the mode the channel actually runs in (the table is in [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels)). A
mismatch here is silent — a channel in webhook mode declaring `outbound_fetch` starts without any
warning.
`none` is a **deliberate choice, never a default**: it says "the authenticity of an incoming event
is not verified", i.e. the confirmation endpoint of that channel accepts a request from anyone. Set
it only if you have genuinely accepted that risk, and record the decision where your other risk
decisions live.
### Channel availability
* [ ] Define behavior when a channel is unavailable.
Decide up front what happens when a channel is down: offer an alternative channel or show a
clear error — never leave the user stuck in an unfinished transaction.
### Localization and accessibility
* [ ] WCAG 2.2 AA; locale files for your audience's languages.
Sign-in and confirmation pages are designed to meet WCAG 2.2 AA. The standalone host built from
`build/docker/Dockerfile` ships English, Russian and Chinese translations; in the embedded mode the locale
catalog is supplied by your host, and without it the page is shown in English (see
[Localization](/docs/guides/customization#localization)). No formal accessibility audit with a
published report has been carried out — if your regulations require one, plan it on your side.
### Versioning and migrations
* [ ] SemVer SDK; relational stores via migrations, not auto-create.
Follow SemVer and plan minor / major upgrades. Initialize relational stores with migrations
(schema history), not auto-create.
### Operational essentials
* [ ] Health probe, encrypted DB channel, secret storage, external JS on the sign-in page off.
A host health probe, an encrypted database connection, secrets in a secret store. External JS on
the auth page is disabled by default — enable it only deliberately (see
[customization](/docs/guides/customization#external-css)).
## Next steps
<Card title="OIDC + Veriqa explained" icon="key" href="/docs/concepts/oidc-explainer">
Understand exactly where Veriqa sits in the OIDC flow.
</Card>
# Observability
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/observability
Metrics, traces, logs and health endpoints Veriqa exposes, and how to export them with OpenTelemetry.
Veriqa is instrumented with the standard .NET primitives — `System.Diagnostics.Metrics` and
`System.Diagnostics.ActivitySource` — and exports nothing by itself. The components own their
instruments; the host subscribes to them and decides where the data goes. The names on this page
are a public contract: build dashboards and alerts on them.
| Signal | Name to subscribe to |
| - | - |
| Metrics (meters) | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter` |
| Traces (activity sources) | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter` |
## Turning the export on
<Tabs>
<Tab title="Self-hosted image">
The image already subscribes to both meters and both activity sources, together with the
ASP.NET Core, `HttpClient` and .NET runtime instrumentation. The export starts when the
standard OpenTelemetry variable names a collector:
```bash theme={null}
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://otel-collector:4317
```
Without the variable nothing is exported. With it, metrics, traces and logs all go over OTLP;
the other standard `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_*` variables (protocol, headers) and `OTEL_SERVICE_NAME`
are read by the OpenTelemetry SDK as usual.
The image has no scrape endpoint of its own — there is no `/metrics`. For Prometheus, point the
image at an OpenTelemetry Collector and let the collector expose or push the metrics.
</Tab>
<Tab title="Embedded in your host">
`AddVeriqaAuthServer` registers the instruments and nothing else: your host owns the
OpenTelemetry pipeline. Add the two names to it — the constants live in the MIT-licensed
`Veriqa.Core.Contracts` package:
```csharp theme={null}
using OpenTelemetry.Metrics;
using OpenTelemetry.Trace;
using Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Constants;
using Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Constants;
builder.Services.AddOpenTelemetry()
.WithMetrics(metrics => metrics
.AddMeter(TransactionTelemetry.MeterName)
.AddMeter(ChannelTelemetry.MeterName))
.WithTracing(tracing => tracing
.AddSource(TransactionTelemetry.ActivitySourceName)
.AddSource(ChannelTelemetry.ActivitySourceName));
```
Exporters, sampling and the ASP.NET Core instrumentation are yours to choose. A host with no
OpenTelemetry pipeline pays nothing for the instruments and gets no data.
</Tab>
</Tabs>
## Metrics
### Transactions — meter `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine`
| Metric | Type | Unit | Tags |
| - | - | - | - |
| `veriqa.transaction.initiated` | counter | — | `veriqa.transaction.type` |
| `veriqa.transaction.terminated` | counter | — | `veriqa.transaction.outcome`, `channel_type` |
| `veriqa.transaction.duration` | histogram | `s` | `veriqa.transaction.outcome` |
* **`initiated`** counts transactions that entered the lifecycle; **`terminated`** counts the ones
that reached a terminal state, once each — a repeated terminal transition is not counted twice.
* **`duration`** is the lifetime from creation to the terminal state. With a user in the loop it is
dominated by how long the person takes to answer, not by the server.
* The sign-in funnel is `initiated` against `terminated` with the outcome `completed`; the refusal
share is the share of the other outcomes, `superseded` aside — that one is a repeated attempt, not
a refusal, and is kept apart from `failed` so that retries do not raise the share of failures.
| Tag | Values |
| - | - |
| `veriqa.transaction.type` | `login` — a sign-in; `confirmation` — a [server-to-server confirmation](/docs/reference/confirmation-api) |
| `veriqa.transaction.outcome` | `completed` — confirmed and finished; `declined` — the user refused; `expired` — no answer within the TTL; `failed` — a failure that is not the user's refusal; `superseded` — a sign-in closed because the same user [started a newer one](/docs/concepts/auth-flow#starting-the-sign-in-again): in events and the audit trail it is a failed transaction with the reason `superseded_by_new_sign_in` |
| `channel_type` | The type of the channel that answered, else of the channel that was asked; `unknown` when the transaction ended with no channel involved — typically an expiry before anyone answered |
<Note>
`completed` is deliberately not `confirmed`. The outcome shown to the user in the messenger is
"confirmed"; the engine records `completed` one step later, when the identity is resolved and
stored. A sign-in confirmed in the channel can therefore still end as `failed`.
</Note>
### Channels — meter `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter`
| Metric | Type | Tags | What it counts |
| - | - | - | - |
| `veriqa.channel.notice.failures` | counter | `channel_type`, `error_code`, `notice_kind` | Messages the channel failed to deliver to the user |
| `veriqa.channel.start.unserved` | counter | `channel_type` | Sign-in start events the core could not serve: the transaction they name is gone, its window has closed, or it no longer accepts the event |
| `veriqa.channel.event.foreign_transaction` | counter | `channel_type` | Channel events naming a transaction that belongs to a tenant other than the owner of the channel registration they arrived through |
* **`notice.failures`** is the one to alert on first: a growing series means users are not getting
the confirmation prompt (`notice_kind` = `message`) or the final outcome (`notice_kind` =
`outcome`). `error_code` is the adapter's error code, always from a code registry.
* **`start.unserved`** makes a silence visible. The user opened a stale link or scanned an old QR,
and a channel with no reply text configured answers nothing — the counter still moves.
* **`event.foreign_transaction`**: the sender gets exactly the same answer as for an unknown
transaction, so the answer reveals nothing. A sustained rate is someone trying identifiers that
are not theirs.
<Note>
**No identifiers in metric tags.** Tags never carry a transaction, session or channel-user
identifier, a recipient or message text. Every tag is a closed set, so the number of time series
is bounded by your channels and the values above.
</Note>
## Traces
| Span | Source | Opened when |
| - | - | - |
| `veriqa.transaction.create` | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine` | A transaction is created — the root of the sign-in trace |
| `veriqa.channel.prompt.send` | `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter` | The confirmation prompt is sent to the messenger |
| `veriqa.channel.inbound` | `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter` | A channel event arrives over the webhook route |
| `veriqa.transaction.complete` | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine` | The transaction is finalized from channel data: confirm, resolve the identity, complete |
| Span attribute | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `veriqa.transaction.id` | Identifier of the transaction the span acts on |
| `veriqa.transaction.type` | Transaction type, on `veriqa.transaction.create` |
| `veriqa.transaction.trace_id` | Trace identifier of the trace that created the transaction, on `veriqa.channel.inbound` |
| `channel_type` | Channel type, on the channel spans |
| `error_code` | Error code of the failure, on a span with the status `Error` |
**A sign-in is two traces, not one.** The user answers any amount of time after the prompt, and the
messenger propagates no trace context, so the inbound event opens a trace of its own. The two are
stitched by an attribute: `veriqa.transaction.trace_id` on the inbound span holds the trace
identifier of the trace that created the transaction. To get from the answer to the sign-in
request, search your backend by that value.
* For a sign-in the stored value is the trace identifier of the `/connect/authorize` request. If
your application propagates `traceparent`, that is your application's own trace.
* For a server-to-server confirmation it is the `correlation_id` you passed in the request.
* The same value is written to the `CorrelationId` field of the audit record, so the audit trail
and the traces are joined by it too.
* A host without tracing stores no value for a sign-in — no identifier is invented in its place —
and the inbound span is then left without the attribute.
<Note>
**Reading span status.** A span is marked `Error` for a failure that ends inside the operation it
covers, with the reason in `error_code`. An unset status means "no failure ended here", not "the
operation succeeded" — the outcome of the transaction is in the metrics and the audit trail.
</Note>
In `Polling` mode there is no inbound HTTP request and no `veriqa.channel.inbound` span; the
`veriqa.transaction.complete` span is still opened.
## Logs
In the self-hosted image logs follow the same switch as the other signals: with
`OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` set they are exported over OTLP, with the formatted message and the
logging scopes included. Log records written inside a span carry its trace and span identifiers, so
a log line leads to its trace.
What is and is not written to logs — and at which level — is covered in
[Security and data handling](/docs/guides/data-handling#logs).
## Health endpoints
These are the endpoints of the self-hosted image.
| Endpoint | Answers |
| - | - |
| `/health/live` | Liveness — the process is up |
| `/health/ready` | Readiness — configured dependencies answer. The probe for your orchestrator |
| `/health/channels` | Per-channel state. Always `200` — read the body, not the status code |
| `/health` | Every registered check at once |
| `/alive` | The process-level check alone |
Channels are deliberately absent from readiness: an unreachable messenger must not take a working
replica out of rotation. What `/health/channels` does and does not tell you is described in the
[self-hosted quickstart](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#8-verify).
# Phone number
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/phone-number
How Veriqa gets the user's phone number in each channel: the mechanism, whether the number is proven to be the user's, what the platform limits, and which part is Veriqa's work and which is yours.
Veriqa takes a phone number **only from the channel**: the messenger hands it over, the user never
types it. The sign-in page has no phone field, and a number typed into the chat as a message is not
accepted. Your application receives it as the standard `phone_number` claim in E.164 format, next to
`phone_number_verified`.
## When Veriqa asks for the number
Veriqa asks only when your application needs the number and the channel has not already given it.
The need is the requirement level of the `phone_number` claim:
| Level | Where it comes from |
| - | - |
| `Required` | `RequirePhone` or `Level: Required` in [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims`](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqascopesclaims), `RequirePhone` or `ClaimLevels` of the [client entry](/docs/reference/configuration#clients), or `essential: true` on `phone_number` in the request's `claims` parameter |
| `Optional` | `Level: Optional`, or `phone_number` in the request's `claims` parameter without `essential` |
| `IfAvailable` (default) | nothing is asked: the number is issued only if the channel gave it on its own |
A requirement counts only when the sign-in asks for the `phone` scope. With a `Required` number the
sign-in page offers only the channels able to provide one; if none is left, `/connect/authorize`
answers `400 no_channel_for_required_phone` ([troubleshooting](/docs/guides/troubleshooting)).
The request comes once the user has confirmed the sign-in — in the chat or with "Yes" on the
confirmation page in the browser. The bot sends it to the chat the user signed in from: a short text,
a button that shares the number and a second button whose meaning depends on the level. The texts
are shown in the user's language.
The text of the request is a [message](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqamessagetemplates) whose kind
follows the level: `phone-number-request` for an `Optional` number, `phone-number-request-required`
for a `Required` one. For either the product ships `Share your phone number` — and a wording of its
own for [Instagram](#instagram) and for [Messenger](#messenger) — and you may reword it for a tenant,
for one application or for one channel — the last at
`Veriqa:MessageTemplates:{kind}:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:{channel}:Templates`.
The labels of the buttons are not part of that message: they are localizable strings, translated
through the locale files.
<Note>
A wording stated for one kind does not apply to the other. If you reworded
`phone-number-request` and ask for a `Required` number, state your wording under
`phone-number-request-required` as well — otherwise the user gets the shipped text of that kind.
</Note>
| Level | Second button | No answer |
| - | - | - |
| `Optional` | **Skip** — the sign-in goes on without the number | the step is skipped when the window `ClaimCompletion.PhoneOptionalWindow` runs out |
| `Required` | **Cancel sign-in** — the sign-in fails and your application receives `error=access_denied` | the transaction waits until it expires: no platform tells the bot that the user declined to share |
The window is 60 seconds by default. Change it with `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:PhoneOptionalWindow`, or
for one application with the `ClaimCompletionPhoneOptionalWindow` member of its client entry (see
[keys in the declaration catalog](/docs/reference/configuration#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog)). The
window never runs past the transaction: the step is skipped at least 5 seconds before the
transaction expires.
When the shared number completes the sign-in, the chat shows the usual receipt of a confirmed
sign-in; **Cancel sign-in** shows the receipt of a declined one.
## What your application receives
* `phone_number` — in E.164: `+` and digits. A number a channel hands over in any other form counts as
absent: it is not issued, and the step waits as if the user had not answered.
* `phone_number_verified` — a JSON boolean: `true` only when the channel proves that the number
belongs to the user who sent it, otherwise `false`.
* Both claims go out only under a granted `phone` scope.
A contact that fails the channel's ownership check — somebody else's contact card, a forwarded
contact, a missing or wrong signature — is not accepted, and the bot asks again. A request that cannot
be delivered to the chat even after retries changes nothing: the step waits as it does with no
answer.
## Channel by channel
The "Who" column shows whose code gets the number: Veriqa's channel adapter, or your own integration with the
platform. Channels whose adapter is not shipped yet show what the platform's API allows.
| Channel | How the number is obtained | Proven to be the user's | Who | Official sources |
| - | - | - | - | - |
| Telegram | the `request_contact` button of a reply keyboard; private chats only | yes — the contact's `user_id` is the sender, and the message is not forwarded | Veriqa | [Bot API: KeyboardButton](https://core.telegram.org/bots/api#keyboardbutton), [Log In With Telegram](https://core.telegram.org/bots/telegram-login) |
| MAX | the `request_contact` button; the number comes in the contact's `vcf_info`. **Webhook mode only** | yes — the contact's `hash` matches HMAC-SHA256 of `vcf_info` keyed with the bot token | Veriqa | [keyboard](https://dev.max.ru/docs-api/use-cases/sending-messages/keyboard), [attachments](https://dev.max.ru/docs-api/use-cases/sending-messages/another-attachments) |
| WhatsApp | automatically — the sender's number (`from` / `wa_id`) of a message, while WhatsApp sends it; without it, the `request_contact_info` interactive message | yes — a number from the message itself, or a contact sent from the request (`origin = contact_request`) | Veriqa | [Business-scoped user IDs](https://developers.facebook.com/documentation/business-messaging/whatsapp/business-scoped-user-ids/) |
| Viber | the `share-phone` keyboard button; the number comes as a contact message. Viber clients with API level 3 and later | no | Veriqa | [keyboards](https://developers.viber.com/docs/tools/keyboards/), [REST Bot API](https://developers.viber.com/docs/api/rest-bot-api/) |
| Messenger | the `user_phone_number` quick reply — the number from the user's profile. **Only when the profile has a number** | no | Veriqa | [quick replies](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/messenger-platform/send-messages/quick-replies) |
| Instagram | the `user_phone_number` quick reply — the number from the user's Instagram profile. **Mobile app only, and only when the profile has a number** | no | Veriqa | [quick replies](https://developers.facebook.com/documentation/business-messaging/instagram-messaging/features/quick-replies) |
| Slack | the `profile.phone` profile field, free text | no; a value that is not E.164 is not issued | Veriqa, once the adapter ships | [users.info](https://docs.slack.dev/reference/methods/users.info) |
| Microsoft Teams | Microsoft Graph `mobilePhone`, the `User.Read.All` permission with admin consent | no | Veriqa, once the adapter ships | [Graph user](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/resources/user) |
| LINE | only LINE Login or LIFF with the `phone` scope (LINE Profile+, companies in Japan, on application) | — | you | [LINE Profile+](https://developers.line.biz/en/docs/partner-docs/line-profile-plus/) |
| KakaoTalk | Kakao Login or Kakao Sync, the `phone_number` consent item, a Biz App and review | — | you | [Kakao Login](https://developers.kakao.com/docs/en/kakaologin/utilize) |
| WeChat | the mini program `getPhoneNumber`, a verified business entity, paid | — | you | [getPhoneNumber](https://developers.weixin.qq.com/miniprogram/dev/framework/open-ability/getPhoneNumber.html) |
| Zalo | the mini app `getPhoneNumber` plus a server-side token exchange | — | you | [getPhoneNumber](https://docs.zaloplatforms.com/docs/MA/api/user/user-information/getPhoneNumber) |
| Discord | none | — | — | [User](https://docs.discord.com/developers/resources/user) |
| Threema | none | — | — | [Threema Gateway](https://gateway.threema.ch/en/developer/api) |
| Email | none | — | — | — |
| A channel connected over HTTP | whichever way its registration declares: on request, automatically, or both | as the registration declares | your external adapter | [the phone number of an HTTP channel](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#the-phone-number) |
### Telegram
The bot sends a reply keyboard: the share button on top, the second button below it; the keyboard
hides after a tap, and the message that reports the outcome of the sign-in removes it for good.
A sign-in that expires with the request still waiting is reported as a new message for the same
reason: only a new message removes the keyboard.
Veriqa accepts only the user's own contact: the `user_id` of the contact must be
the sender, and a forwarded contact or a card from the address book is rejected.
Telegram's website login ([Log In With Telegram](https://core.telegram.org/bots/telegram-login)) can
return the phone number as well — that is your own integration with Telegram, outside Veriqa.
<Warning>
If you route the bot's updates yourself — one bot shared by your code and Veriqa, and your code
decides which update goes to Veriqa with `OwnsInboundEvent` (see
[phone number on request](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#phone-number-on-request)) —
the **Skip** and **Cancel sign-in** buttons reach your bot, not Veriqa: in Telegram they are plain
text buttons with no marker to recognize. The shared contact itself is recognized. An `Optional`
number is then skipped by the window, and a `Required` one waits until the transaction expires.
The other ways to share a bot are compared in [You already have a bot](/docs/guides/existing-bot).
</Warning>
### MAX
The bot sends the share button and a callback button with the second action. The number is taken
from `vcf_info` only when the contact's `hash` signature matches — computed with the bot token of the
tenant that received the contact. When the sign-in ends — confirmed, declined, failed or expired —
the buttons are removed from the request message, and the outcome arrives as a new message below it.
The phone number is requested **only in webhook mode**. With `UpdateMode: Polling` the MAX adapter
declares no phone number and asks nothing: the signature is read from the raw webhook body, which
polling does not have, so every contact would be rejected. A `Required` number then leaves MAX out
of the sign-in page.
### WhatsApp
Veriqa identifies a WhatsApp user by the business-scoped user ID (BSUID), not by the number. While
WhatsApp sends the number with a message, the token carries `phone_number` with
`phone_number_verified: true`, and nothing is asked.
A user who has turned on a WhatsApp username may hide the number, and their messages come without
it. When your application asks for the number of such a user, the request is sent, addressed by the
BSUID: the `request_contact_info` interactive message, followed by a separate message with the second
button — the request carries no buttons of its own. A contact card the user sends manually
(`origin = other`) is rejected. The shipped Meta Cloud API provider sends the request, the Twilio
provider does not; a WhatsApp provider of your own (`IWhatsAppProvider`) sends it only if it
implements `SendContactRequestAsync` — otherwise the request is not delivered and the step waits as
it does with no answer.
### Instagram
The account sends one message: the text of the request with two quick-reply buttons under it. The
first is drawn by Instagram and shares the phone number of the user's Instagram profile; the second
carries the second action of the step. Instagram does not say that it has checked the number, so the
token carries `phone_number` with `phone_number_verified: false`. A number the user types into the
chat is not accepted — only the one the button sends.
<Warning>
**Not every user sees the button.** Instagram shows the button that shares the number only in its
mobile app and only to a user whose profile has a phone number; on a computer it shows no quick
replies at all — the second button included
([Meta: quick replies](https://developers.facebook.com/documentation/business-messaging/instagram-messaging/features/quick-replies)).
The channel still counts as able to provide a number, so a `Required` number keeps Instagram in
the sign-in page. A user who gets no button cannot share the number: an `Optional` number is
skipped when its window runs out, and with a `Required` one the sign-in waits until the transaction
expires or the user cancels it. There is no other way to hand the number over in this channel.
</Warning>
Because of that the product words the request for Instagram itself, telling the user what to do
without a number in the profile:
| Level | Address | Shipped text |
| - | - | - |
| `Optional` | `phone-number-request:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:instagram` | `Share your phone number by tapping the button. If your profile has no phone number, tap Skip.` |
| `Required` | `phone-number-request-required:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:instagram` | `Share your phone number. If your profile has no phone number, you will need to add one and sign in again, or sign in via a messenger where your phone number is set.` |
A wording of yours at the same address replaces the shipped one; keep the hint in it.
### Messenger
The Page sends the same message as an Instagram account does: the text of the request with two
quick-reply buttons under it — the one Messenger draws, which shares the phone number of the user's
profile, and the one for the second action of the step. Messenger does not say that it has checked
the number, so the token carries `phone_number` with `phone_number_verified: false`. A number the
user types into the chat is not accepted — only the one the button sends.
<Warning>
**Not every user sees the button.** Messenger shows the button that shares the number only to a
user whose profile has a phone number
([Meta: quick replies](https://developers.facebook.com/docs/messenger-platform/send-messages/quick-replies)).
The channel still counts as able to provide a number, so a `Required` number keeps Messenger in
the sign-in page. A user who gets no button cannot share the number: an `Optional` number is
skipped when its window runs out, and with a `Required` one the sign-in waits until the transaction
expires or the user cancels it.
</Warning>
The product words the request for Messenger itself, with the same two texts as for
[Instagram](#instagram): the one for an `Optional` number at
`phone-number-request:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:messenger`, the one for a `Required` number at
`phone-number-request-required:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:messenger`. A wording of yours at the
same address replaces the shipped one; keep the hint in it.
### Viber
The bot sends the text of the request with two buttons under it: the `share-phone` button of the
platform, which shares the phone number of the user's Viber account, and the button for the second
action of the step. The number arrives as a contact message. Viber does not say whether a contact
came from that button or was picked from the address book, and it does not state that the number
belongs to the sender — so the token carries `phone_number` with `phone_number_verified: false`,
and the channel never rejects a contact as somebody else's. A number the user types into the chat
is not accepted — only a contact is.
The `share-phone` button needs a Viber client with API level 3 or later; the request message
tells the platform so, and an older client does not get it. The step has not been run against the
live platform — see [Viber](/docs/guides/channels#viber).
### A channel connected over HTTP
A channel whose adapter is an [external service](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#an-http-channel-adapter-in-any-language)
gives the number in the same two ways, and its registration says which — with
`Http:Capabilities:PhoneNumber`:
* **on request** (`OnRequest`) — Veriqa sends your adapter the request with the captions of both
buttons; the adapter shows them the way its platform does and posts the shared number, or the
second action, back as an event;
* **automatically** (`Automatic`) — the adapter puts the number into the identity of the events it
posts, and nothing is asked.
A channel that declares neither gives no number and is left out of a sign-in that requires one.
`phone_number_verified` is `true` only when both hold: the registration declares `Proof: Proven`, and
the number came on request or the event itself states it verified. A registration without `Proven`
never yields `true` — Veriqa lowers what the adapter states and writes a warning. The number is
always in E.164: your adapter converts it to that form, Veriqa does not repair it.
### LINE, KakaoTalk, WeChat and Zalo — your integration
These platforms give the phone number only to their own login or mini-app, which you register and
the platform approves — not to a bot. Veriqa does not get the number there. If your application
needs it from these users, obtain it in your own code through the platform's login and keep it on
your side.
### Discord and Threema
Neither platform gives a bot the user's phone number.
## Limitations
* The window of an `Optional` number is kept in the memory of the instance that sent the request.
If that instance stops before the window runs out, the step is not skipped, and the transaction
waits until it expires.
* The record that ties a chat to its waiting request is in-process by default. With more than one
replica, move it to Redis together with the other channel stores
([channel stores](/docs/guides/storage#channel-stores-multiple-replicas)) — otherwise a number that
arrives at another replica finds no request.
* When one chat has two sign-ins waiting for a number, the number goes to the one whose request came
last; the other waits for its window or until it expires. In Telegram the message that ends either
of them removes the reply keyboard, whichever request it belongs to: the keyboard is one per
chat. The request of the sign-in still waiting is then left without its buttons.
* The buttons of the request are removed by the message that ends the sign-in — the receipt of
its outcome (confirmed, declined or failed) or the notice that it expired — where the platform
allows it; the channel sections above say how. Until that message they stay in the chat — also
while a web step follows the phone step — and in WhatsApp, where a delivered message cannot
be changed, they are not removed at all. Veriqa keeps the reference to the request with the
record of the chat the sign-in was started from, one of the
[channel stores](/docs/guides/storage#channel-stores-multiple-replicas): when that record is lost,
the request stays and the expiry is not reported. A number shared from them after the step is
over finds no waiting request and is not accepted, and the bot does not answer it; a tap on the
second button is then an ordinary message to the bot.
# Behind a reverse proxy
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/reverse-proxy
Which paths a reverse proxy in front of Veriqa has to pass, what the WebSocket of the sign-in page needs, and a ready NGINX configuration.
A self-hosted Veriqa speaks HTTP and expects TLS to end at a proxy in front of it. This page lists
what that proxy has to pass through. Trusting the proxy on the Veriqa side — the `ForwardedHeaders`
section — is covered in
[self-hosted, step 6](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#6-put-it-behind-a-reverse-proxy).
## Give Veriqa a host name of its own
The simplest and recommended layout is a dedicated host name — `auth.your-domain.com` — that sends
every request to Veriqa. Nothing has to be listed, nothing collides with your application, and
a path added by a later release works without touching the proxy. That address is also the
`issuer` your applications validate tokens against: an instance has one issuer, so applications on
different domains — a staging site and a production one, for example — all point at the same
address rather than each proxying Veriqa under its own domain.
If you mount Veriqa on your application's host name instead, you have two options. Pass every
path of the table below: Veriqa then serves them from the root of the host name, so `/_content/`
and `/hubs/` are taken on it. Or keep the root for your application and put the whole of Veriqa
[under a path prefix](#under-a-path-prefix).
## Paths
| Path prefix | Who calls it | What it is |
| - | - | - |
| `/.well-known/` | your application | Discovery document and signing keys |
| `/connect/` | browser and your application | The OIDC endpoints and the sign-in page with its actions |
| `/auth/` | browser | Pages outside the OIDC path: the confirmation page, the page that collects a missing phone number, email or profile field on the device that confirmed the sign-in, and the pages of the Email channel that email links lead to |
| `/hubs/` | browser, WebSocket | Live status of the sign-in page and of the page that collects missing details (SignalR) |
| `/api/transaction/` | browser and your application | Status polling when the WebSocket is not available; creating a confirmation transaction and reading its result |
| `/_content/` | browser | Static files of the sign-in page |
| `/api/channels/` | messaging platforms | Channel webhooks — must be reachable from the internet in `Webhook` mode |
| `/r/` | browser | Short links of the hop mode — only when it is on; the prefix is `Veriqa:HopMode:HopPath` |
| `/api/link-handle/` | your application | Exchange of a [link handle](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#two-bots-handing-the-user-over-to-your-bot) for the identity of the signed-in user — only when a post-completion button carries `{handle}` |
| `/api/collected-claims` | your application | Deletion of collected claims — only with a [collected claims store](/docs/guides/storage#collected-claims-store) |
`/health/live`, `/health/ready` and `/health/channels` are for your own monitoring and need not be
published.
<Warning>
A list limited to `/.well-known/`, `/connect/`, `/hubs/`, `/api/transaction/` and `/_content/` is
enough for a plain sign-in and looks complete. It stops being enough the day you ask for a phone
number or an email, enable the Email channel or switch a bot to `Webhook`: those pages and
webhooks live under `/auth/` and `/api/channels/`.
</Warning>
## WebSocket
The sign-in page learns that the user has confirmed through the `/hubs/auth` hub. The proxy must
let the connection upgrade — pass the `Upgrade` and `Connection` headers and use HTTP/1.1 towards
Veriqa — and must not cut an idle connection sooner than a sign-in may last. When the upgrade does
not get through, the page falls back to polling `/api/transaction/{id}/status`: the sign-in still
completes, with a delay.
## NGINX
```nginx theme={null}
# http context
map $http_upgrade $connection_upgrade {
default upgrade;
'' close;
}
server {
listen 443 ssl;
http2 on;
server_name auth.your-domain.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/server.crt;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/server.key;
# Sign-in requests carry cookies; the 8k default answers 400 on a longer header
large_client_header_buffers 4 32k;
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
proxy_http_version 1.1;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
# WebSocket of the sign-in page
proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
proxy_set_header Connection $connection_upgrade;
proxy_read_timeout 300s;
}
}
```
When Veriqa shares the host name with your application, keep the body of the `location` block and
repeat it for each prefix of the table instead of `/`:
```nginx theme={null}
location ~ ^/(\.well-known|connect|auth|hubs|api/transaction|api/channels|_content)/ {
# the same proxy_* directives as above
}
```
The repository contains a complete configuration with TLS settings and an HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect:
`samples/docker-compose/nginx.conf` ([samples](/docs/samples)).
## Under a path prefix
With a path prefix every address of Veriqa starts with it —
`https://app.your-domain.com/auth/veriqa/connect/token` — and the root paths of the host name stay
with your application. Set the prefix on the Veriqa host and repeat it in every public address you
configure:
| Key | Value |
| - | - |
| `Veriqa:PathBase` | `/auth/veriqa` |
| `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:Issuer` | `https://app.your-domain.com/auth/veriqa` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Email:PublicBaseUrl`, `WebhookBaseUrl` of a channel in `Webhook` mode | the same address, with the prefix |
`Veriqa:PathBase` starts with `/`, does not end with `/` and may have several segments. It is
written as plain text: no `?`, `#`, `%`, `\`, whitespace, and no `.` or `..` segment. Any other
value stops the host at startup; an empty one means the root. The prefix applies whichever
way the proxy forwards the path — use one of the two blocks:
```nginx theme={null}
# The path is passed as it is: Veriqa receives /auth/veriqa/connect/token
location /auth/veriqa/ {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
# the same proxy_* directives as above
}
# The prefix is trimmed: Veriqa receives /connect/token
location /auth/veriqa/ {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080/;
# the same proxy_* directives as above
}
```
`https://app.your-domain.com/auth/veriqa/.well-known/openid-configuration` then returns the `issuer`
and every endpoint with the prefix. A client that reads the metadata by RFC 8414 asks for it at the
root of the host name, with the path of the issuer appended. Map that address:
```nginx theme={null}
location = /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/auth/veriqa {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080/auth/veriqa/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
```
This mapping is verified for a proxy that passes the path as it is. With a proxy that trims the
prefix the target is the same address without `/auth/veriqa`; that variant has not been verified.
What to keep in mind:
* **A prefix that a path of Veriqa itself starts with** — `/auth`, `/api`, `/connect`, `/hubs`,
`/_content`, `/health`, or the path of hop links (`/r` by default, `Veriqa:HopMode:HopPath`) —
works only when the proxy passes the path as it is. Behind a trimming proxy such a prefix returns
`404`. `/auth/veriqa` is not one of them.
* **Requests that reach an instance directly go without the prefix** — a health probe asks
`http://127.0.0.1:8080/health/live`. Veriqa cannot tell such a request from one the proxy
trimmed and serves both, so closing the root of the instance from the outside is the job of the
proxy.
* **Several instances.** The proxy has to keep a browser on one instance (session affinity,
`ip_hash` in NGINX): without it the hub of the sign-in page does not connect. The Email channel
has a limit of its own — the multi-instance caveat in
[Channel setup, Email](/docs/guides/channels#email). Neither depends on the prefix.
* **Verified under a prefix:** sign-in by Email in both modes with its inbound webhook, the
messenger webhook (`Webhook` mode), the [phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number) request, confirming
an email address by a code or by a message the user sends during
[claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment), the tokens and `userinfo`, the form that collects
a missing profile field, and a confirmation transaction created by your server. The messenger
part was checked on Telegram only.
`Veriqa:PathBase` is a setting of the shipped host. When Veriqa is embedded in your ASP.NET Core
application, the prefix is the `UsePathBase` of that application, and discovery carries it.
## Other proxies
Traefik, Caddy and IIS need the same three things: every path of the table, the `X-Forwarded-Proto`
and `X-Forwarded-For` headers, and the WebSocket upgrade. Traefik and Caddy pass the upgrade
without configuration; in IIS the WebSocket Protocol feature has to be installed. Under a path
prefix, only the prefix needs to be passed instead of the paths in the table — see
[Under a path prefix](#under-a-path-prefix).
## Check
* `https://auth.your-domain.com/.well-known/openid-configuration` returns `https` URLs on your host
name. `http` URLs or `invalid_request` mean the proxy is not trusted —
[self-hosted, step 6](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#6-put-it-behind-a-reverse-proxy).
* On the sign-in page the browser's network tab shows `/hubs/auth` answered with `101 Switching
Protocols`.
* `Request Header Or Cookie Too Large` — raise `large_client_header_buffers`.
# Integration scenarios
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/scenarios
Six applied Veriqa scenarios — a page each — plus what they share: the same authorize request and the modes that do not exist.
Veriqa covers several applied scenarios, and each has its own page. What they share is the
mechanism: the same authorize request, with the difference living entirely in the parameters you
send and what you do with the result.
<Note>
**Scenarios have no API of their own.** Veriqa has no "scenario" parameter and no separate
transaction type. That is why the recipes are given at the HTTP level — they work the same way
on .NET, Node, Java and Python.
</Note>
## The scenarios
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Passwordless sign-in" icon="qrcode" href="/docs/scenarios/passwordless-login">
A QR code on screen, confirmation in a messenger, registration in the same step.
</Card>
<Card title="Sign-in with channel linking" icon="link" href="/docs/scenarios/channel-linking">
One action, two results: the user signs in and the product gains a live channel.
</Card>
<Card title="Second factor and step-up" icon="shield-halved" href="/docs/scenarios/step-up">
A fresh confirmation before a sensitive operation, and the `auth_time` check.
</Card>
<Card title="Replacing SMS codes" icon="comment-sms" href="/docs/scenarios/sms-replacement">
The same flow with no per-message charge and with full authentication.
</Card>
<Card title="Leads without CAPTCHA" icon="file-signature" href="/docs/scenarios/lead-capture">
A verified contact and a live channel instead of a hand-typed address.
</Card>
<Card title="Account recovery" icon="key" href="/docs/scenarios/account-recovery">
A linked channel instead of a chain of emails and codes.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
Confirming an operation **without creating a session** is a special case of the leads scenario; the
mechanics are on [Confirmed form submission](/docs/integrations/confirmed-form).
## What you can pass to authorize
| Parameter | Effect |
| - | - |
| `acr_values=channel:telegram` | Narrow the choice to a specific channel; several values separated by spaces let the user pick from those listed |
| `scope=channel` | Issue `channel_type` and `channel_user_id` — see [channel linking](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking) |
| `scope=profile` / `email` / `phone` | The corresponding claims, by standard OIDC rules |
| `ui_locales` | The language of the sign-in window |
## What Veriqa does not have for this
So you do not go looking for something that does not exist:
* **no "scenario" parameter** in the authorize request — Veriqa has no notion of scenario
types;
* **there is a separate transaction entry point, but it is not about these scenarios.**
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation` creates a confirmation transaction (the application
authenticates with client credentials and receives a `transaction_id` and an entry point for the user),
yet what it distinguishes is the declared action key and its typed slots, not scenarios. The
scenarios on this page are built with a repeat authorize and work without it;
* **no server-side freshness check** — the acceptable `auth_time` window is yours to set and
verify;
* **no client SDK or widget** — "your own button" is a link carrying the right parameters.
## Next
<CardGroup>
<Card title="OIDC + Veriqa explained" icon="key" href="/docs/concepts/oidc-explainer">
Where Veriqa sits inside the standard flow.
</Card>
<Card title="Channel setup" icon="comments" href="/docs/guides/channels">
Telegram, WhatsApp, other channels and Email.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Storage
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/storage
Transaction store (InMemory / EF Core / Redis), the OpenIddict database (PostgreSQL / SQL Server) and plugging in another database.
Veriqa has two independent stores:
* **Transaction store** — the state of sign-in / confirmation transactions (Transaction Engine).
* **OpenIddict database** — the OIDC server's clients and tokens.
A third one is optional and off by default: the
[collected claims store](#collected-claims-store), which remembers the claims Veriqa collected
during a sign-in.
## Transaction store
Configured in `ConfigureTransactionEngine`. Pick **one** store.
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
authServer.ConfigureTransactionEngine(te =>
{
// Development / tests — in memory:
te.UseInMemoryStore();
// Production — EF Core (the provider and connection string belong to the host):
// te.UseEfCoreStore(ef => ef.UseNpgsql(connectionString,
// npgsql => npgsql.MigrationsAssembly("Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.PostgreSql")));
// …or on SQL Server:
// te.UseEfCoreStore(ef => ef.UseSqlServer(connectionString,
// sql => sql.MigrationsAssembly("Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.SqlServer")));
// Redis (native TTL expiry):
// te.UseRedisStore(redis =>
// {
// redis.Configuration = "localhost:6379";
// redis.KeyPrefix = "veriqa:tx:";
// });
});
```
| Store | Method | When |
| - | - | - |
| InMemory | `UseInMemoryStore()` | Development, tests and a [single-instance connector](#single-instance-connector-without-a-database) (state is lost on restart). |
| EF Core | `UseEfCoreStore(ef => …)` | Production on a relational DB (PostgreSQL, SQL Server). |
| Redis | `UseRedisStore(o => …)` | When you want a fast external store with native TTL. |
<Note>
`UseEfCoreStore` itself ships in a satellite package — the core does not drag EF Core in
transitively. The EF Core provider (`UseNpgsql`, `UseSqlServer`) and its NuGet package belong to
the host application — the core is provider-agnostic. The migrations assembly named in
`MigrationsAssembly(...)` ships as one more package — without it the schema is never created:
```bash theme={null}
dotnet add package Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.EntityFrameworkCore
dotnet add package Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.PostgreSql # or …Migrations.SqlServer
```
</Note>
Migrations ship as one package per store and provider; the package name is also the value for
`MigrationsAssembly(...)`:
| Store | PostgreSQL | SQL Server |
| - | - | - |
| Transactions and the collected claims store | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.PostgreSql` | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.SqlServer` |
| OpenIddict | `Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.Migrations.PostgreSql` | `Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.Migrations.SqlServer` |
| Audit trail | `Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail.Migrations.PostgreSql` | `Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail.Migrations.SqlServer` |
The audit trail keeps its migration history in a table of its own, so that it can share a database
with the transaction store: next to `MigrationsAssembly(...)` in `UseEfCoreSink`, pass
`MigrationsHistoryTable(AuditMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable)`.
Redis parameters (`RedisTransactionStoreOptions`):
* `Configuration` — the connection string (for example, `localhost:6379`).
* `KeyPrefix` — the transaction key prefix (default `veriqa:tx:`).
**On the standalone image** the store is chosen by keys, not code: `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:Provider`
is `PostgreSQL`, `SqlServer` or `Redis`, and `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:ConnectionString` holds the
connection string of that store. On `Redis` it goes into `Configuration`, and
`Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:KeyPrefix` sets `KeyPrefix`. Without a connection string the store stays
in memory whatever the provider says. A Redis store lends nothing to the audit sink (see
[Audit sink](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#audit-sink)) and cannot hold the
[collected claims store](#collected-claims-store); readiness gets a `redis-transactions` check, and a
Redis unreachable at startup stops the container (unless the connection string sets
`abortConnect=false`: then the container starts and only readiness reports the outage).
### A new sign-in closes the earlier ones
When a user starts a sign-in again and reaches the channel with the same account, the earlier
sign-ins of that account to the same application that are still waiting for an answer are
closed — see [Starting the sign-in again](/docs/concepts/auth-flow#starting-the-sign-in-again). The transaction store
is what finds them, so the upgrade touches each store in its own way:
* **InMemory** — nothing to do.
* **EF Core** — the migration `AddSignInSubjectFingerprint` adds one nullable column with a
non-unique index to the transactions table. It ships in both migration packages and is applied
like any other migration. Sign-ins written before it carry no fingerprint: they are not closed by
a newer one and live until they expire.
* **Redis** — next to the transactions, under the same `KeyPrefix`, the store keeps one set of
transaction identifiers per tenant, application and channel account. The key holds a hash, never
the user's identifier in the channel, and the set expires on its own.
* **A store of your own** — `ITransactionStore` has a new member, `GetPendingSignInsAsync`, and it
has no default implementation: your store stops compiling until it implements it. The member's
obligations are described in the README of the `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine` package, section
"Obligations of GetPendingSignInsAsync".
## Channel stores: multiple replicas
The channel layer keeps several stores of its own. By default they are **in-process** — enough for
a single replica, but not for two:
| Port | What it holds | What breaks on a second replica |
| - | - | - |
| `IEmailActionTokenStore` | Email Pull action tokens (magic link) | a link opened on another replica finds no token — the sign-in never completes |
| `IEmailPushCorrelationStore` | Email Push correlations and inbound-email deduplication | the email is not matched to its transaction; redelivery is not filtered out |
| `IChannelPromptMessageStore` | the chat a transaction was started from, with the references to the in-channel prompt and to the [phone number request](/docs/guides/phone-number) sent into it | when the TTL expiry or a cancel on the sign-in page lands on another replica, the chat is not told: the prompt keeps its buttons and the phone number request stays |
| `IPhoneRequestCorrelationStore` | which transaction the last [phone number request](/docs/guides/phone-number) in a chat belongs to | a shared number that lands on another replica finds no request — the sign-in does not get it |
| `ILinkHandleStore` | fingerprints of the [link handles](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#two-bots-handing-the-user-over-to-your-bot) put into post-completion buttons, each with its transaction, application and expiry | a handle presented to another replica is not found — the exchange answers `404` |
| `IChannelStartCodeStore` | the short codes a sign-in is [started by](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#start-by-a-code-—-when-the-link-cannot-be-relied-on) in a channel that declares it, each with its transaction and expiry | a code shown by one replica is not found by the replica that receives the message — the sign-in does not start |
| store of the email completion (internal to the Email adapter) | codes and links of the emails that confirm an email address on the web step of the claims completion, and the counters of those emails | a code sent by one replica is refused by another; the email limits are counted per replica |
If you run more than one replica, wire the Redis implementations of all these stores with a single
call on the channel adapter builder:
```bash theme={null}
dotnet add package Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Redis
```
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
authServer.AddChannelAdapters(adapters =>
{
adapters.AddEmail();
adapters.UseRedisChannelStores(redis =>
{
// Empty — reuse an IConnectionMultiplexer already registered in the container
// (for example, by the transaction engine satellite).
redis.Configuration = "localhost:6379";
});
});
```
Call order does not matter: the satellite registers the stores unconditionally and wins over
the in-process defaults either way. Without a `UseRedisChannelStores` call everything stays
in-process — the default implementations are never replaced behind your back.
Parameters (`RedisChannelStoreOptions`):
* `Configuration` — the connection string. **Leave it empty** to deliberately reuse an
`IConnectionMultiplexer` registered in the container by someone else. Setting it while such a
registration exists is refused: the host stops at startup with a configuration error naming both
connections by their endpoints, logical database, TLS settings and sentinel master name
(credentials are never printed) — otherwise the configured string would be silently ignored and
the channel stores would land in someone else's Redis. The check
runs when the host starts, so the order of the two registrations does not matter.
* `PromptKeyPrefix` — prompt coordinate key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:prompt:`).
* `EmailActionTokenKeyPrefix` — action token key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:email:token:`).
* `EmailPushCorrelationKeyPrefix` — push correlation key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:email:corr:`).
* `ProcessedMessageKeyPrefix` — processed-message key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:email:msg:`).
* `EmailClaimCompletionKeyPrefix` — key prefix of the email completion store (default
`veriqa:ch:email:claim:`). Addresses and channel accounts in its keys are SHA-256 fingerprints,
and codes and link tokens are kept only as fingerprints.
* `PhoneRequestCorrelationKeyPrefix` — phone number request key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:phone:`).
The rest of the key is a SHA-256 hash of the chat, so the channel user identifier is not stored
in plain text.
* `LinkHandleKeyPrefix` — link handle key prefix (default `veriqa:ch:link:`). The rest of the key is a
SHA-256 fingerprint of the handle; the handle itself is never stored.
* `StartCodeKeyPrefix` — key prefix of the short codes a sign-in is started by (default
`veriqa:ch:code:`). The rest of the key is a SHA-256 hash; the code itself is never part of a key.
* `ProcessedMessageRetention` — how long a "message processed" record is kept (default 24 hours).
<Note>
Record lifetimes come from the entities themselves: a token and a correlation live exactly until
their own `ExpiresAt`, and prompt coordinates until the longest possible transaction has expired
plus the margin in which the expiry event is published (the coordinates are consumed by that
event, and the background cleanup sweep publishes it after the transaction is gone). The single
exception is `ProcessedMessageRetention` — a processed-message record has no owning entity.
</Note>
<Warning>
Validate the Redis channel stores in your host once you turn them on. There is no fallback to the
in-process stores: an unreachable Redis fails the operation instead of silently falling back to
stores that break on a second replica.
</Warning>
**On the standalone image** the stores are switched on by one key,
`Veriqa:ChannelStores:Redis:ConnectionString`; without it they stay in process. The parameters above
are keys of the same section under the same names — `Veriqa:ChannelStores:Redis:LinkHandleKeyPrefix`,
`Veriqa:ChannelStores:Redis:ProcessedMessageRetention` (`hh:mm:ss`) and so on; the connection string
is `ConnectionString`, not `Configuration`. With the transaction store on `Redis` both share a single
connection: set the same connection string in both keys. A different one stops startup with a
message naming the two keys. Readiness gets a `redis-channel-stores` check unless the same Redis is
already probed by another check, and a Redis unreachable at startup stops the container (unless the
connection string sets `abortConnect=false`: then the container starts and only readiness reports the
outage).
```bash theme={null}
-e Veriqa__ChannelStores__Redis__ConnectionString="redis:6379"
```
## Channel identities: nothing is stored out of the box
The `IChannelIdentityRepository` port (transaction engine) persists a channel identity — channel
user id, phone, email, display name — as an upsert keyed by the triple (`TenantId`, `ChannelType`,
`ChannelUserId`). The contract provides neither deletion nor TTL: a record is kept indefinitely.
**Veriqa ships no implementation of this port** and registers none. Without a registration of your
own nothing is stored, and the sign-in still works: the resolved identity snapshot travels with the
transaction. Keeping that data (PII, kept indefinitely) is your decision — register an
implementation and every sign-in becomes an upsert:
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
builder.Services.AddSingleton<IChannelIdentityRepository, MyChannelIdentityRepository>();
```
The lifetime is yours to choose: the resolver asks for the port once per operation from a scope of
its own, so a `Scoped` implementation over a `DbContext` is as safe as a `Singleton` one. A
reference in-memory implementation lives in the `samples/dotnet/inproc/login` sample.
The full picture of what is kept where and for how long — this port included — is in
[Security and data handling](/docs/guides/data-handling#retention).
## Collected claims store
When a sign-in lacks a claim the application requires, Veriqa collects it itself — a phone number
requested in the channel, an email confirmed by a code or a link, a field of its form (see
[Claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment)). Without a store all of that lives only as long as
the transaction, and the next sign-in asks again. The collected claims store keeps it keyed by
the tenant and the `sub`: what Veriqa collected, the `Optional` claims the user declined, the time of
the last sign-in that read the records and the `sub` an application received when its claims mapper
changed it. Values the channel itself supplies are not stored.
**Nothing is stored until you turn it on.** On the standalone server that is one key,
`Veriqa:CollectedClaims:Store:Enabled`:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"CollectedClaims": {
"Store": { "Enabled": true }
}
}
}
```
The store then lives in the transaction store's database — the same provider, connection string and
migrations assembly — with a migration history table of its own. `Enabled: true` without
`Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:ConnectionString` stops startup with a message naming both keys, and
so does `Enabled: true` with `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:Provider` = `Redis`: Redis has no
relational database to keep the store in.
In the embedded mode the store is a registration of its own, and its database is yours to choose:
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
authServer.ConfigureTransactionEngine(te =>
{
te.UseEfCoreStore(ef => ef.UseNpgsql(connectionString,
npgsql => npgsql.MigrationsAssembly("Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.PostgreSql")));
te.UseEfCoreCollectedClaimsStore(ef => ef.UseNpgsql(connectionString, npgsql => npgsql
.MigrationsAssembly("Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.PostgreSql")
.MigrationsHistoryTable(CollectedClaimsMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable)));
});
```
The migrations ship in the transaction store's migration packages as a second context,
`CollectedClaimsDbContext`, and are applied at startup like the transaction store's. Keep
`MigrationsHistoryTable(CollectedClaimsMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable)` — the store may
share a database with the transactions, and a shared history table would mix the two sets of
migrations. Your own implementation of `ICollectedClaimsStore` is plugged in with
`te.UseCollectedClaimsStore<TStore>()` and gets everything below — the endpoint, the host call and
the retention sweep — exactly as the EF Core one does.
<Warning>
The store is **one per tenant, shared by all its applications**: a value collected for one
application is issued to another of the same tenant when it passes that application's rules, and a deletion made at the request of one
application erases the records for all of them.
</Warning>
### Deleting by `sub`
When a user deletes their account or asks for their data to be erased, you, as the data
controller, delete everything the store keeps about them — all their records and the subjects
issued to applications. One operation has two entry points; both are idempotent, so a
`sub` with nothing stored is a success.
**The server endpoint** — for an application that does not embed Veriqa as a .NET library:
```http theme={null}
DELETE /api/collected-claims?sub=<sub>[&client_id=<application>]
Authorization: Bearer <client credentials token>
```
The route exists only when a collected claims store is registered. The caller is a server client
with `AllowClientCredentials` and `AllowCollectedClaimsDeletion` (see
[Clients](/docs/reference/configuration#clients); the flag without `AllowClientCredentials` stops
startup), and its token comes from `grant_type=client_credentials` — as for the
[confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api#2-get-a-token). `sub` is passed in the form the
application received it: the form of the application that `client_id` names, or of the calling
client when the parameter is absent. The subjects issued to that application are searched within the caller's tenant; a
`sub` not found among them is taken as the core one. The endpoint has no rate limit of its own —
grant the flag to one of your own server clients only.
| Condition | Response |
| - | - |
| deleted, or nothing was stored | `204 No Content` |
| no token, or an invalid one | `401` |
| a user's token, or a client without `AllowCollectedClaimsDeletion` | `403` |
| `sub` missing, empty or stated twice; `client_id` empty or stated twice | `400` problem, `title` = `oidc_request_invalid` |
| the store or the tenant resolution failed | `503` problem, `title` = `collected_claims_store_unavailable`. A failed tenant resolution deletes nothing. When `sub` stands for several core subjects, those deleted before the store failed stay deleted and recorded in the audit trail; repeating the request completes the deletion |
**The host call** — for an application that embeds Veriqa:
```csharp theme={null}
// tenantId: null — the implicit tenant of a self-hosted installation.
// applicationId: the client_id the subject was issued to; null — subject is the core sub.
await deletion.DeleteBySubjectAsync(tenantId: null, applicationId: "shop", subject: sub);
```
`ICollectedClaimsDeletion` is registered together with the store; without a store it is not in the
container.
Each deletion writes a `CollectedClaimsDeleted` record to the [audit trail](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#audit-sink)
when the trail is on: the actor is the calling client for the endpoint and `system` for the host
call and the sweep; the target is the masked core `sub`; the metadata carry the tenant, the client
and the basis — `endpoint`, `host_call` or `retention`. Claim values never reach the record. With
the trail off the deletion works and writes nothing. After a deletion the next sign-in of that user
works like the first one: Veriqa asks again for what is missing, a previously declined `Optional`
claim included.
### Deleting unused records
Records of a `sub` nobody has signed in with for a given number of days can be deleted
automatically. The clock starts at the last sign-in that read the records, not at the time a value
was collected. Off by default:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"ClaimCompletion": {
"CollectedClaims": { "RetentionDays": 365 }
}
}
}
```
`0` turns it off; a negative value stops startup. At the tenant level the member
`ClaimCompletionCollectedClaimsRetentionDays` replaces the global value, so the sweep can run for one
tenant only (`ClaimCompletion.CollectedClaimsRetentionDays` in the
[declaration catalog](/docs/reference/configuration#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog)). The sweep runs at
startup and then hourly, in batches of 100; a sign-in that reads the records between the selection
and the deletion keeps them. Each deleted `sub` gets an audit record with the basis `retention`.
## OpenIddict database
The OIDC server's clients and tokens are stored separately and configured with the
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Database` section:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Database": {
"Provider": "PostgreSQL",
"ConnectionString": "Host=…;Database=…;Username=…;Password=…"
}
}
}
}
```
| Provider | Purpose |
| - | - |
| `InMemory` | Development, tests and a [single-instance connector](#single-instance-connector-without-a-database). No `ConnectionString` needed. |
| `PostgreSQL` | Production provider. `ConnectionString` required. |
| `SqlServer` | Production provider. `ConnectionString` required. |
<Warning>
**This choice has no default.** An empty section is not "`InMemory` by default", it is a choice
nobody made: outside the `Development` environment the application fails to start (the startup
check refuses and names the fix); in `Development` it starts with a `Warning`. In the embedded
mode the section does not select the provider — there the choice is made in the host's code:
`authServer.UseOpenIddictDatabase(ef => ef.UseNpgsql(connectionString))` for a relational
provider, or `authServer.UseInMemoryOpenIddictStore()` for the volatile one.
</Warning>
<Warning>
In production, initialize the relational DB with **migrations**, not schema auto-creation — that
keeps a schema history and predictable upgrades (see [Hardening](/docs/guides/hardening)).
</Warning>
## Single-instance connector without a database
When Veriqa is attached to another identity provider — [Keycloak](/docs/integrations/apps#keycloak) or
your own — it takes part in the sign-in and in nothing after it: the authorization request, the
confirmation in the channel, the code exchange and the userinfo call right after it. The session and
its refresh tokens then belong to that provider, and Veriqa keeps no user accounts either (see
[Channel identities](#channel-identities-nothing-is-stored-out-of-the-box)). Such a deployment can
run as a single instance with every store in memory.
In self-hosted mode:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Database": { "Provider": "InMemory" }
}
}
}
```
* leave `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:ConnectionString` unset — the transactions stay in memory;
* leave `Veriqa:Logging:Mode` at its default, or at anything other than `Audit`;
* declare the client without `AllowRefreshTokens` (off by default) and without `offline_access`.
In the embedded mode the same choice is `authServer.UseInMemoryOpenIddictStore()` plus
`te.UseInMemoryStore()`. The host starts with a `Warning` that the OpenIddict store is volatile —
for this setup that is expected.
What a restart costs:
| What | After a restart |
| - | - |
| Sign-ins in progress | Fail; the user starts the sign-in again |
| Sessions in your identity provider | Unaffected — they never lived in Veriqa |
| Access tokens issued before the restart | Rejected: an access token is an opaque reference to a record in the OpenIddict store, and the record is gone — irrelevant when your provider calls userinfo right after the code exchange |
| Refresh tokens | None — the client does not get them |
A deploy, an image update and a container restart are all restarts: each of them costs the first row.
<Warning>
**Pick a database instead when:**
* Veriqa is the only identity provider of an application that keeps sessions with refresh tokens
(`AllowRefreshTokens`) — its users sign in again after every restart;
* you run more than one instance — each one has stores of its own (see
[Running more than one instance](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#running-more-than-one-instance));
* `Veriqa:Logging:Mode` is `Audit` — an in-memory trail keeps the host from starting outside
`Development` (see [Audit sink](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted#audit-sink)).
</Warning>
## Another database or a model change
The standalone image ships PostgreSQL and SQL Server (and Redis for the transaction store). Anything
else is a choice your own host makes
in the embedded mode — no change to Veriqa is needed.
### Your own migrations assembly
The four EF Core contexts are public: `TransactionDbContext`
(`Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Store.EfCore`), `CollectedClaimsDbContext`
(`Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.CollectedClaims.EfCore`), `AuditDbContext`
(`Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail.Store.EfCore`) and `OpenIddictDbContext` (`Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.Data`). They are anchors for migrations, not a
data access API — their tables stay internal. For a database Veriqa ships no migrations for:
1. Create a class library that references your EF Core provider, `Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design`
and the package holding the context.
2. Add an `IDesignTimeDbContextFactory<T>` for each context — `dotnet ef` builds the context through it.
3. Run `dotnet ef migrations add Initial --project <your library> --context <context>`, and name the
library in `MigrationsAssembly(...)` at runtime.
```csharp TransactionDbContextDesignTimeFactory.cs theme={null}
public sealed class TransactionDbContextDesignTimeFactory
: IDesignTimeDbContextFactory<TransactionDbContext>
{
public TransactionDbContext CreateDbContext(string[] args)
{
var options = new DbContextOptionsBuilder<TransactionDbContext>()
// UseXxx — your EF Core provider.
.UseXxx(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("TRANSACTION_DB_CONNECTION_STRING"),
db => db.MigrationsAssembly(typeof(TransactionDbContextDesignTimeFactory).Assembly.GetName().Name))
// Only if you customize the model — the same replacement as at runtime (see below).
.ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, VeriqaModelCustomizer>()
.Options;
return new TransactionDbContext(options);
}
}
```
For `AuditDbContext`, add `MigrationsHistoryTable(AuditMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable)` next
to `MigrationsAssembly(...)` — in the factory and at runtime alike; for `CollectedClaimsDbContext`,
`MigrationsHistoryTable(CollectedClaimsMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable)` in the same way.
### Changing the model
A schema, a collation, a column type — change the model with the standard EF Core
`IModelCustomizer`, not by editing Veriqa's contexts. Derive from `RelationalModelCustomizer`:
```csharp VeriqaModelCustomizer.cs theme={null}
public sealed class VeriqaModelCustomizer(ModelCustomizerDependencies dependencies)
: RelationalModelCustomizer(dependencies)
{
public override void Customize(ModelBuilder modelBuilder, DbContext context)
{
// Runs the context's OnModelCreating: Veriqa's entities and configuration.
base.Customize(modelBuilder, context);
// Your changes on top — for example, a schema of its own:
modelBuilder.HasDefaultSchema("veriqa");
}
}
```
Plug it in with `ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, …>()` inside the same delegate that picks the
provider:
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
authServer.ConfigureTransactionEngine(te =>
te.UseEfCoreStore(ef => ef
.UseXxx(connectionString, db => db.MigrationsAssembly("MyCompany.Veriqa.Migrations"))
.ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, VeriqaModelCustomizer>()));
authServer.UseOpenIddictDatabase(ef => ef
.UseXxx(connectionString, db => db.MigrationsAssembly("MyCompany.Veriqa.Migrations"))
.ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, VeriqaModelCustomizer>());
services.AddVeriqaAuditTrail(audit =>
audit.UseEfCoreSink(ef => ef
.UseXxx(connectionString, db =>
{
db.MigrationsAssembly("MyCompany.Veriqa.Migrations");
db.MigrationsHistoryTable(AuditMigrationDefaults.MigrationsHistoryTable);
})
.ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, VeriqaModelCustomizer>()));
```
For the OpenIddict database, Veriqa applies its own OpenIddict setup before calling your delegate,
so the replacement you make there is the one that stays. A changed model no longer matches the
shipped migrations, even on PostgreSQL or SQL Server — generate your own assembly for it as described
above.
<Warning>
**The design-time factory must make the same replacement.** `dotnet ef` builds the model through
the factory, the application through your delegate. If `ReplaceService<IModelCustomizer, …>()` is
missing on either side, the migration describes one model and the application runs another.
</Warning>
<Warning>
**Keep the `base.Customize` call.** It is what runs the context's `OnModelCreating`. Without it the
model has neither the OpenIddict entities nor Veriqa's own configuration of its tables.
</Warning>
## Publishing transaction events
In-process delivery to `ITransactionEventHandler` (see
[Configuration](/docs/guides/customization#transaction-event-handler)) is part of the engine and
needs no call of its own: the audit trail, the real-time sign-in push and the prompt cleanup
receive events in every deployment. Publishing events **out of the process** is a separate,
additive choice of a transport — also made in `ConfigureTransactionEngine`:
```csharp Program.cs theme={null}
authServer.ConfigureTransactionEngine(te =>
{
te.UseEfCoreStore(ef => ef.UseNpgsql(connectionString));
// Optional — parameters of the in-process dispatch (queue capacity):
// te.UseChannelsPublisher(ch => ch.Capacity = 1000);
// Outward — RabbitMQ (for distributed systems and external consumers).
// Additive: the in-process handlers keep receiving their events.
// te.UseRabbitMqPublisher(mq =>
// {
// mq.ConnectionString = "amqp://user:pass@host:5672/";
// mq.ExchangeName = "veriqa.transactions";
// });
});
```
`RabbitMqEventPublisherOptions`: `ConnectionString` (required, `amqp://…`), `ExchangeName`
(default `veriqa.transactions`), plus queue and reconnection parameters (`QueueCapacity`,
`MaxReconnectAttempts`, `ReconnectBaseDelaySeconds`).
**On the standalone image** the publisher is switched on by `Veriqa:Events:RabbitMq:ConnectionString`;
the other parameters are keys of the same section under the same names
(`Veriqa:Events:RabbitMq:ExchangeName` and so on). Without the connection string there is no
publisher. With it, readiness gets a `rabbitmq-events` check, and a broker unreachable at startup
stops the container.
Reliability of what leaves the process is the reliability of the chosen bus — no more and no less.
Veriqa builds no delivery guarantee of its own on top of the transport: with the in-process channel
an event can be lost on a crash, and with a message queue delivery is exactly as reliable as that
queue makes it.
## Next steps
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Production hardening" icon="shield-check" href="/docs/guides/hardening">
Migrations, secrets, key rotation.
</Card>
<Card title="Configuration & customization" icon="sliders" href="/docs/guides/customization">
Channels, design, localization, extension points.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Supported channels
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/supported-channels
Which messengers and mail Veriqa signs users in through, today and next: the claims each channel adds, whether it asks for confirmation in the chat, and whether the user sends a secret message.
<Note>
The same catalog is on [veriqa.app/channels](https://veriqa.app/channels). The two are kept in
sync, and a difference between them is a defect, not two opinions.
</Note>
The user confirms a sign-in in a messenger or a mailbox they already use — with nothing extra to
install. Your application receives ordinary OpenID Connect tokens whichever channel was used.
Every channel issues the base claims `channel_type`, `channel_user_id` and `name` — a card lists
what the channel adds on top. For channels not shipped yet it shows what the platform's API allows.
Besides the claims, a channel's description uses two terms: secret message and confirmation in the
channel.
## Secret message
A secret message is the message with the sign-in code that the user sends to the channel themselves
after tapping the link or scanning the QR code. Veriqa fills it in, the messenger shows it pre-filled, and
the user only taps Send. Not every channel needs one.
Examples:
* Telegram and MAX: not needed — the messenger opens the bot and hands it the code on its own.
* WhatsApp: needed, for stronger security — the pre-filled message goes out with one tap.
* Email: the same with a pre-filled letter — the **one-tap email** (`Push` mode) — or optionally a
classic magic link.
## Confirmation in the channel
Confirmation in the channel is a feature where the bot asks right in the chat whether to let the
sign-in through — which app and from which device — with Confirm and Decline buttons. It can be
switched to automatic mode, and then the sign-in goes through without an extra request: the
`LoginConfirmation.Mode` key in the [configuration reference](/docs/reference/configuration).
Examples:
* Telegram: the question comes as soon as the user opens the link.
* WhatsApp: the question comes in reply to the secret message.
* Email: no question in the channel — optionally it is asked on a page in the browser.
## Built in
These ship with Veriqa — enable the ones you need in configuration.
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Telegram">
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `locale`, `picture`
**Phone number:** `phone_number` and `phone_number_verified` on request — the user shares the
number with a button in the chat ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number))
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="WhatsApp">
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `preferred_username` (if the user has turned on a
WhatsApp username)
**Phone number:** `phone_number` and `phone_number_verified` automatically when WhatsApp sends the
number with the message; when the user hides it behind a username — on request, the user shares
the number with a button in the chat ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number))
**User identifier:** `sub` and `channel_user_id` carry the business-scoped user ID (BSUID) —
unique per Meta business portfolio and new when the user changes the number;
`preferred_username` is a hint, not the identity
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** needed — one tap
</Card>
<Card title="WhatsApp through Twilio">
The same WhatsApp channel, delivered through a Twilio account instead of the Meta WhatsApp
Business Platform — one configuration key picks the provider
([delivery through Twilio](/docs/guides/channels#delivery-through-twilio)).
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `preferred_username` (if the user has turned on a
WhatsApp username)
**Phone number:** `phone_number` and `phone_number_verified` automatically when WhatsApp sends the
number with the message; a number hidden behind a username is not asked for — the request with a
button in the chat is sent by the Meta Cloud API provider only ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number))
**User identifier:** `sub` and `channel_user_id` carry the business-scoped user ID (BSUID), as with
the Meta provider; `preferred_username` is a hint, not the identity
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes — two quick-reply buttons
**Secret message:** needed — one tap
</Card>
<Card title="MAX">
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `locale`, `picture`
**Phone number:** `phone_number` and `phone_number_verified` on request — the user shares the
number with a button in the chat; webhook mode only ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number))
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="Instagram">
The user confirms in Instagram Direct, in a conversation with your Instagram professional account.
Signing in users outside your own team needs access granted by Meta
([channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#instagram)).
**Claims on top of the base:** `preferred_username`, `picture`
**Phone number:** `phone_number` on request, with `phone_number_verified: false` — the user shares
the number of their Instagram profile with a button in the chat; the button shows only in the
Instagram mobile app and only if the profile has a number ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number#instagram))
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="Messenger">
The user confirms in Messenger, in a conversation with your Facebook Page. Signing in users
outside your own team needs access granted by Meta
([channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#messenger)).
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `family_name`, `picture`, `locale` — when Meta
lets the app read the user's profile
**Phone number:** `phone_number` on request, with `phone_number_verified: false` — the user shares
the number of their profile with a button in the chat; the button shows only if the profile has a
number ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number#messenger))
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="WeChat">
The user scans the QR code with WeChat and confirms in the chat with your Official Account. The
channel needs a verified Service Account ([channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#wechat)).
**Claims on top of the base:** none — only the base ones; `name` holds the OpenID
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="Viber">
The user confirms in Viber, in a conversation with your bot. The adapter has been run only
against a mock of the Bot API and has not been verified on the live Viber platform. Since
February 5, 2024, Viber issues new bots on commercial terms only — get the bot and its token from
Viber before a deployment ([channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#viber)).
**Claims on top of the base:** `picture`, `locale`
**Phone number:** `phone_number` on request, with `phone_number_verified: false` — the user shares
the number with a button in the chat ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number#viber))
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes
**Secret message:** not needed
</Card>
<Card title="Email">
**Claims on top of the base:** `email`, `email_verified`, `preferred_username`, `veriqa_channel`, `veriqa_email_mode`
**Confirmation in the channel:** no — optionally in the browser
**Secret message:** needed — one tap, or a classic magic link
**Two modes:** the **one-tap email** (the user sends a pre-filled letter, so nothing has to be
delivered to them and no link can be spent by a mail gateway) and the classic **magic link**,
which is on by default. What each one gives you —
[choosing between them](/docs/guides/channels#which-mode-to-choose).
**Receiving the one-tap email:** through the webhook of an inbound mail provider, or without
one — Veriqa reads an ordinary mailbox itself
([one-tap email over IMAP](/docs/guides/channels#one-tap-email-over-imap)).
</Card>
</CardGroup>
## Any channel over HTTP
Connect a channel Veriqa does not ship — your own bot, a corporate messenger, a
regional platform — as an external service in any language. Veriqa talks to it over HTTP, and the
platform's keys stay with your service. It is also one way to bring a bot you already run into the
Veriqa flow — without publishing a new one; the other ways are compared in
[You already have a bot](/docs/guides/existing-bot).
* **Claims on top of the base:** whatever your adapter returns
* **Confirmation in the channel:** declared by the adapter
* **Secret message:** declared by the adapter
<CardGroup>
<Card title="WhatsApp through Baileys">
A working reference adapter in Node that links a WhatsApp number as a companion device, the way
WhatsApp Web does — no Meta Business account and no provider. Meant for debugging WhatsApp
scenarios, for small teams and for your own use.
**Risk:** it runs on an unofficial WhatsApp Web client, and WhatsApp may ban the linked number —
link a separate number you can afford to lose.
**Claims on top of the base:** `phone_number`, `given_name`
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes — a poll with two options
**Secret message:** needed — one tap
The sample: `samples/node/custom-channel-whatsapp-baileys/`.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
How to write one, with reference adapters in Python and Node —
[An HTTP channel adapter in any language](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#an-http-channel-adapter-in-any-language).
## Pseudo-channels: Google, Apple and Huawei
A sign-in at an identity provider, wrapped into the shape of a channel. The screen shows a QR code,
the user signs in to their Google, Apple or Huawei account on their own phone and confirms on a page
there, and the sign-in completes on the screen. This is not a delivery channel: there is no chat or
mailbox behind it, so no message can be sent to the user "in the channel", and the question "is it
you signing in?" is asked by a page on the phone. A pseudo-channel works under
[hop mode](/docs/concepts/hop-mode).
Where it helps: signing in with Google on a device with no keyboard, such as a TV; on an operating
system outside Google's ecosystem and in a native app; confirming actions; and wherever typing a
Google or Apple password is risky — on a shared or someone else's computer, for instance. A user who
has none of the messengers can sign in too, with the account their phone already has.
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Google">
**Claims on top of the base:** `email`, `email_verified`, `given_name`, `family_name`, `picture`, `locale`
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes — on a page on the phone
**Secret message:** not needed
**Delivery:** a sample .NET assembly in the host process — `samples/dotnet/pseudo-channels`
</Card>
<Card title="Apple">
**Claims on top of the base:** `email`, `email_verified`
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes — on a page on the phone
**Secret message:** not needed
**Delivery:** a sample .NET assembly in the host process — `samples/dotnet/pseudo-channels`
</Card>
<Card title="Huawei">
**Claims on top of the base:** `email`, `email_verified`, `locale`
**Confirmation in the channel:** yes — on a page on the phone
**Secret message:** not needed
**Delivery:** upcoming — a separate service next to Veriqa, connected as an HTTP channel, together
with Google and Apple; see [Coming next](/docs/releases/next)
</Card>
</CardGroup>
## Separate adapters: the `channel-adapters` repository
Adapters for LINE, Slack, Microsoft Teams, Discord, Zalo, KakaoTalk and Threema are already
implemented, but they live outside the core, in the `channel-adapters` repository (see the
[source code](https://veriqa.app/source)). Each one is a separate .NET assembly,
`Veriqa.ChannelAdapter.<Channel>`, built on the core contracts package. The host that embeds Veriqa
registers it together with a channel declaration for the core (`CoreChannelDeclaration`); without the
declaration the sign-in page does not offer the channel. The README of each adapter covers the
sign-in flow, the platform setup and a minimal host; the ones run live also have a section on what
the live platform revealed.
"Live run" means a sign-in on the real platform with a real bot or app; "against an API stand-in"
means a full sign-in against a local double of the platform API, written from its documentation.
<CardGroup>
<Card title="LINE">
**Claims on top of the base:** `picture`, `locale`
**Start:** a `line.me` link with the text pre-filled
**Tested:** against an API stand-in
</Card>
<Card title="Slack">
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `email`, `picture`, `locale`
**Start:** the `/veriqa <code>` command in Slack
**Tested:** live run — both confirm and decline
</Card>
<Card title="Microsoft Teams">
**Claims on top of the base:** `given_name`, `family_name`, `preferred_username`, `email`
**Start:** a deep link to a chat with the bot
**Tested:** against an API stand-in
</Card>
<Card title="Discord">
**Claims on top of the base:** `preferred_username`, `picture`, `locale`
**Start:** a QR code or a link to the OAuth2 authorization page, or the `/veriqa code:<code>`
command; the bot has to share a server with the user
**Tested:** live run — both confirm and decline, with claims from the real profile
</Card>
<Card title="Zalo">
**Claims on top of the base:** `picture`
**Start:** the text `auth_<code>` sent to the bot
**Tested:** against an API stand-in
</Card>
<Card title="KakaoTalk">
**Claims on top of the base:** `email`
**Phone number:** not through the bot — only with your own Kakao Login or Kakao Sync integration
([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number))
**Start:** the text `auth_<code>` sent to the bot
**Tested:** against an API stand-in
</Card>
<Card title="Threema">
**Claims on top of the base:** none — only the base ones
**Start:** a `threema.id` link
**Tested:** against an API stand-in
</Card>
</CardGroup>
Slack, Zalo and KakaoTalk have no link that carries the transaction to the bot, so the sign-in page
does not offer them by itself yet: the user gets the sign-in code some other way.
The same repository has relays for Instagram and Messenger through the SendPulse and UChat chatbots:
inside the host process, or as a separate service connected as an HTTP channel.
# Troubleshooting
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/guides/troubleshooting
A catalog of integration failures: the symptom, the cause and what to do.
Look up a symptom by its error text — most of them mean something other than what they
appear to say.
## Failures at `/connect/authorize` and `/connect/token`
| Symptom | Cause and what to do |
| - | - |
| `invalid_request` · `ID2029` — `The mandatory 'code_challenge' parameter is missing` | PKCE is mandatory for this client because it is registered as public. Either add PKCE or make the client confidential — off-the-shelf CMS plugins usually need the latter. |
| `invalid_request` · `ID2054` | The same thing, in newer wording. |
| `invalid_request` · `ID2032` — `The specified 'code_challenge_method' is not supported` | `code_challenge_method=plain` was sent. Only `S256` is supported. **The same `ID2032` covers several "not supported" refusals — go by `error` and `error_description`, not by the number.** |
| `unsupported_response_type` · `ID2032` — `The specified 'response_type' is not supported` | The client is asking for the implicit flow (`response_type=token` or `id_token`). Veriqa accepts `code` only: implicit was removed in OAuth 2.1 as unsafe. The classic case is Odoo's stock `auth_oauth` module; what to install instead is on the [Veriqa in business systems](/docs/integrations/apps) page. |
| `invalid_target` · `ID2190` — `One of the specified 'resource' parameters is invalid` | The client sends a `resource` parameter (RFC 8707 resource indicators). Veriqa registers none, so **any** value is rejected. Moodle's `auth_oidc` plugin, written for Microsoft Entra ID, behaves this way — see [Veriqa in business systems](/docs/integrations/apps). For a client that cannot be told to stop, enable the per-client quirk [`drop-resource-parameter`](/docs/guides/client-compatibility). |
| `invalid_request` · `ID2087` — `Multiple client credentials cannot be specified` | The client sends its credentials **both** in an `Authorization: Basic` header **and** in the body, while RFC 6749 §2.3.1 allows one method. A Joomla classic: clear the "In Header" checkbox. |
| The token endpoint rejects a CMS plugin's request | An extra `scope` in the `grant_type=authorization_code` request. The explanation and two ways to fix it are on the [WordPress](/docs/integrations/wordpress) page. |
| `invalid_grant` · `ID2001` | The authorization code is corrupted or expired. |
| `400` · `ID2083` — `This server only accepts HTTPS requests` | The issuer is served over `http`. Note that a `redirect_uri` over `http` is still accepted — this symptom is about the issuer address specifically. |
| `access_denied` at the `redirect_uri` | The user declined the confirmation or pressed **Cancel sign-in**, or Veriqa refused the sign-in by a rule of its own: a claim the client requires could not be obtained from the user, or the user exceeded the limit of sign-in requests. Not an integration error; an immediate retry of the same request gets the same response. An ASP.NET Core client on `AddOpenIdConnect` responds to it with an HTTP 500 unless `AccessDeniedPath` is set — see [step 5 of the .NET quickstart](/docs/quickstart/dotnet#5-wire-up-the-client-application). The callback of the [Node.js](/docs/quickstart/node#5-handle-the-return) and [Python](/docs/quickstart/python#4-define-the-sign-in-routes) quickstarts catches the library's error for it; Spring `oauth2Login()` sends the user to `/login?error` by itself. |
| `server_error` at the `redirect_uri` | The sign-in started and then failed on the Veriqa side: the channel could not carry the confirmation out, the user's identity could not be resolved, or the sign-in could not be finalized. The response carries `error`, `state` and `iss` and no `error_description`; the reason is in the Veriqa log and in the audit trail, under the transaction. Handle it as a failed sign-in and offer to start again. An ASP.NET Core client on `AddOpenIdConnect` raises `OnRemoteFailure` for it and answers with an HTTP 500 unless that event is handled — `AccessDeniedPath` covers `access_denied` only; see [step 5 of the .NET quickstart](/docs/quickstart/dotnet#5-wire-up-the-client-application). |
## Failures during confirmation
| Symptom | Cause and what to do |
| - | - |
| `503 channel_display_failed` | No channel is enabled. |
| `400 no_channel_for_required_phone` at `/connect/authorize` | The phone number is required, and none of the channels available to the request can provide it — `acr_values` may have narrowed them. The requirement comes from `RequirePhone` or `Level: Required` on `phone_number` in `Veriqa:ScopesClaims`, from `RequirePhone` or `ClaimLevels` of the client entry, or from `essential: true` on `phone_number` in the request's `claims` parameter. If no registered channel can meet a configured requirement, a warning about it was already logged at startup. Enable a channel that provides the phone number, or lift the requirement. |
| `400` · `browser_nonce_mismatch` — `Browser nonce does not match` at `/connect/authorize/callback` | A **different** transaction was confirmed: the authorize page was reloaded, and the one-time browser cookie belongs to the latest load. This is the built-in protection against confirming someone else's session. Retry the sign-in without reloading the page. |
| `500` · `email_delivery_failed` at `/auth/email/start`, on **every other** attempt | A known limitation: on an SMTP server without authentication the sender reconnects over an already open connection, so every second attempt fails. A repeat request goes through. |
| `429` at `/auth/email/start` | The Email channel's rate limit after several requests in a row. Pause between requests when debugging. |
## Symptoms on the application side
| Symptom | Cause and what to do |
| - | - |
| A silent `Login failed! Please try again.` in TYPO3 while the Veriqa logs are **green** | The user has no group: `usersDefaultGroup` is unset. The reason is logged at INFO and invisible under TYPO3's default logger — see [TYPO3](/docs/integrations/typo3). |
| `No email address provided by <provider>` in Drupal | The channel returned no email, and Drupal requires one on **every** sign-in. The fix is on the [Drupal](/docs/integrations/drupal) page. |
| WordPress returns to `wp-login.php?login-error=invalid_request` | The same extra `scope` in the code exchange — see [WordPress](/docs/integrations/wordpress). |
| In Bitrix every sign-in signs the user in as the administrator | A `CUser::GetList` filter written in D7 syntax is silently dropped and the first user is picked. The details are on the [Bitrix](/docs/integrations/bitrix) page. |
| In Moodle, "Error in OpenID Connect. Please check logs for more information." | Moodle never reached Veriqa: its outbound-request protection fired — by address (`curlsecurityblockedhosts`) **or by port** (`curlsecurityallowedport`, only 443 and 80 by default). The real cause (`The URL is blocked.`) shows up only after the plugin's `debugmode` is switched on. The port restriction applies on a public address too — see [Veriqa in business systems](/docs/integrations/apps). |
| In Moodle, "The given username contains invalid characters" | Moodle builds the username from the Veriqa `sub`, which looks like `telegram:1234` — a colon is not allowed in logins. Request the `profile` scope, so the name comes from `preferred_username`, or enable `extendedusernamechars`. |
| In Odoo the provider button is there, but sign-in fails with a generic access-denied error | The OIDC module is missing the `python-jose` library: its import is wrapped in a silent branch that only writes to the debug log. The module installs and looks healthy regardless. |
| In Odoo a bare error page opens instead of returning to the site | The stock `auth_oauth` module is configured, and it only speaks the implicit flow. See the `unsupported_response_type` row above. |
## Log entries at startup
| Symptom | Cause and what to do |
| - | - |
| On the **first** start against an empty PostgreSQL database, an `Error` in the category `Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Database.Command`: `Failed executing DbCommand … SELECT "MigrationId", "ProductVersion" FROM "__EFMigrationsHistory"`, and in the PostgreSQL log `relation "__EFMigrationsHistory" does not exist`. When the audit trail is kept in a database too — on the standalone server it shares the transaction database by default — a second such entry follows for its own history table, `__AuditTrailMigrationsHistory`. With the [collected claims store](/docs/guides/storage#collected-claims-store) turned on, one more follows for `__CollectedClaimsMigrationsHistory` — also on the first start after turning the store on against a database already in use | **Normal behavior, nothing to fix.** Before applying [migrations](/docs/guides/storage) EF Core reads its migration history table; on an empty database that table does not exist yet, and EF Core logs the refusal at `Error` level. It then creates the table and applies the migrations — the start continues and the health checks turn green. On the next starts against the same database these entries are gone. If one repeats on **every** start, or the start does not finish, that is a real failure: check the connection string and the database user's rights. |
<Note>
The plugin's own log on the application side is often more useful than Veriqa's: a failure that happens
**after** a successful code exchange looks like a normal sign-in in the Veriqa logs. If Veriqa is all
green and the user is still not signed in, the cause is almost certainly on the CMS side.
</Note>
# Veriqa in business systems
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/apps
How to connect Veriqa to GitLab, Keycloak, Grafana, Nextcloud, Discourse, Odoo and Moodle — what works, where the barrier is, how it is cleared, and what remains untested.
Beyond CMS engines, Veriqa connects to the systems an employee signs in to every day:
DevOps, monitoring, file storage, a forum, an ERP, an LMS, and another identity provider. The OIDC
client is **free** everywhere, but not always built in: GitLab, Keycloak, Grafana, Nextcloud and
Discourse ship one, while Odoo and Moodle need a module installed from outside the distribution.
## What was verified
| System | Mechanism | What works |
| - | - | - |
| GitLab CE 19.3.1 | omniauth `openid_connect` | sign-in, JIT provisioning, linking by `sub` |
| Keycloak 26.7.2 | identity brokering | sign-in, user creation, linking by `sub` |
| Grafana OSS 13.0.2 | Generic OAuth | sign-in, user creation |
| Nextcloud 31.0.14 | `user_oidc` 8.11.0 app | sign-in, user creation, JWKS signature check |
| Discourse 3.5.0 | `openid_connect`, built into core | signing in an **existing** user, linking by `sub`; account creation untested |
| Odoo 18 Community | OCA `auth_oidc` 18.0.1.1.0 | sign-in, user creation, linking by `sub`, JWKS signature check |
| Moodle 5.0.1 | `auth_oidc` 5.0.6 (Microsoft) | sign-in, user creation, linking by `sub` |
Verified on the **Email** channel, with no changes on the Veriqa side.
## GitLab
**The barrier.** Out of the box the sign-in fails: `omniauth_openid_connect` puts `scope` into the
`grant_type=authorization_code` request, where
[RFC 6749 §4.1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.3) does not define it. Veriqa
answers `invalid_request` and GitLab reports:
```
Could not authenticate you from OpenIDConnect because
"Invalid request :: the 'scope' parameter is not valid in this context."
```
**What to do.** Add one flag to the provider `args`:
```ruby theme={null}
send_scope_to_token_endpoint: false
```
**The account.** Created on first sign-in (JIT) and linked by the Veriqa `sub`. GitLab treats the
address from the `email` claim as **already confirmed** and sends no verification mail of its own.
<Note>
When no `email` claim arrives, GitLab does not refuse: it creates the user, grants a session and
fills in a service address of its own, shaped like
`temp-email-for-oauth-{login}@gitlab.localhost`, while prompting the user to complete the profile.
</Note>
## Keycloak
Here Veriqa is attached to **another identity provider** as an external OIDC provider: Keycloak
accepts the sign-in from Veriqa and then acts as the provider for its own applications.
**There is barely any configuration.** Keycloak imports the Veriqa discovery document and fills in
every address itself, `jwks_uri` included, and turns on signature validation on its own.
**The barrier is the last name, not the email.** The realm user profile requires `email`,
`firstName` and `lastName` by default. Veriqa emits `family_name` only when the channel supplies a
last name: a messenger takes it from the channel profile, where it is optional, and Email
never supplies one. So the first sign-in stops at the "Update Account Information" form — always on
the Email channel, and for some users on the others.
**What to do.** Realm settings → User profile: clear the required flag on `firstName` and
`lastName`.
<Warning>
Turning off the provider profile review (`update.profile.on.first.login = off`) does **not**
solve this, although it looks like it does: the user is created, but Keycloak immediately raises
the `VERIFY_PROFILE` required action carrying the same demand — the account exists, the session
does not. Only the realm user profile clears the requirement.
</Warning>
**Two completion forms in a row.** When a sign-in lacks a claim that Veriqa collects itself, Veriqa
asks the user for it on its own form before handing the sign-in back. A relying party with a profile
completion form of its own — Keycloak, and Logto as well — then shows a second form right after it.
For such an application turn the Veriqa form off with `ClaimCompletionFormEnabled: false` in its
entry of `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients` (see [Clients](/docs/reference/configuration#clients)). With the form
off, the missing claims are not issued and do not block the sign-in: the relying party asks for them
on its own form. The phone number and the email are not affected — Veriqa obtains them by paths of
their own.
## Grafana
**The barrier.** With no `email` claim Grafana does not refuse outright — it goes looking for the
address by a GitHub-compatible convention, requesting `{api_url}/emails`, which does not exist in
OpenID Connect. It gets a 404 and stops the authentication:
```
level=error msg="Error getting email address"
url=https://<issuer>/connect/userinfo/emails
error="unsuccessful response status code 404"
```
The message misleads: the cause is a missing claim, not a network failure.
**What to do.** Make sure `email` arrives. The Email channel provides it; on a channel that carries
no address (Telegram) Veriqa collects it inside the sign-in when `email` is required, or your own
code supplies one — see [Claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment).
**The account.** Created automatically, with `email`, `name` and `login` all set to the address.
<Note>
Grafana sends no `nonce` and does not verify the `id_token` signature against JWKS — it reads the
claims straight from the token body. It also tries to parse the Veriqa access token as a JWT and
logs `token is not in JWT format`: the access token is not a JWT — today it is an opaque reference
token, and at the time of the run it was a JWE — and this does not affect sign-in.
</Note>
## Nextcloud
Its barriers are in the transport rather than in the claims, and both are cleared by Nextcloud
settings.
**HTTPS only.** Over plain HTTP `user_oidc` returns a 404 page reading "You must access Nextcloud
with HTTPS to use OpenID Connect". The check passes over HTTPS, in debug mode, **or** with the
`allow_insecure_http` app setting — the last one is meant for an internal network.
**Private-address protection.** Until `allow_local_remote_servers=true` is set, Nextcloud will not
reach an issuer on a private network. It is hard to diagnose: the return leg answers 403 and the only
trace is a line in `nextcloud.log`:
```
Host <issuer-host> was not connected to because it violates local access rules
```
In production neither setting is needed: the issuer is public and served over HTTPS.
**Linking — decide before the first sign-in.** Nextcloud builds the user id in one of three ways:
| Provider setting | What lands in the uid |
| - | - |
| `uniqueUid = true` (default) | `sha256` of the provider id and `sub` — an opaque hash |
| `uniqueUid = false` | the Veriqa `sub` verbatim |
| `providerBasedId = true` | `{provider}-{sub}` |
If you intend to match Nextcloud accounts to your own by `sub`, clear `uniqueUid` **before** the
first sign-in: changing the setting later does not rename users who already exist.
<Note>
Nextcloud verifies the `id_token` signature against JWKS and does **not** call
`/connect/userinfo` at all — every claim comes from the `id_token`. Claims that Veriqa serves only
from userinfo will not reach it; enable `enrichLoginIdTokenWithUserinfo` if you need them.
</Note>
## Discourse
The `openid_connect` plugin is built into core — there is nothing to install. There are two
barriers, and both are cleared by forum settings.
**By default Discourse does not request an email.** The `openid_connect_authorize_scope`
setting contains only `openid`. For a forum that is a dead end: without an address no account is
created and the sign-in stops at the registration form. Set it to `openid email profile`.
**Private-address protection.** While the issuer sits on a private network Discourse will not
reach it: `allowed_internal_hosts` must list its host. The browser meanwhile receives a generic
`openid_connect_discovery_error` — the cause is visible only with `openid_connect_verbose_logging`
turned on. In production the barrier does not arise.
<Warning>
A failed discovery read is **cached**. After you fix the setting Discourse keeps answering with
the same error for a while, which looks as though the fix did not work. Clear the cache.
</Warning>
**What is verified and what is not.** Signing in an existing user works, the association is written
against the Veriqa `sub`, and Discourse verifies the `id_token` signature against JWKS. Creating a
new account is **not verified**: Discourse performs it in a separate request from the browser,
guarded by anti-bot checks.
## Odoo
**The module in the box will not do.** The stock `auth_oauth` only speaks the implicit flow: it
asks for `response_type=token`, sends no `nonce`, and verifies no signature. Veriqa answers
`unsupported_response_type`: the implicit flow was removed from
[OAuth 2.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1) as unsafe. From the
outside it looks like an error page instead of a return to the site.
**What to install.** The [`auth_oidc`](https://github.com/OCA/server-auth) module from the OCA
repository (the branch matching your Odoo version). In the provider settings choose
`flow = OpenID Connect (authorization code flow)` and fill in the fields that appear: Token URL,
JWKS URL and Client Secret. The JWKS URL is what lets Odoo verify the Veriqa signature — and it
does.
<Warning>
The module requires the `python-jose` library, which the official Odoo image does not carry. Its
import failure is handled silently, with only a line in the debug log, so without the library
the module installs, the sign-in button appears, and the sign-in itself fails with a generic
access-denied error. Install `python-jose` together with the module.
</Warning>
**The account.** Created automatically — free sign-up is on by default in a fresh Odoo database,
so nothing extra needs enabling. The link is written against the Veriqa `sub` in the `oauth_uid`
field and the address becomes the login. When no address arrives, Odoo makes up a synthetic login
of its own and still creates the user.
## Moodle
Moodle has no OIDC client of its own; the one in use is the
[`auth_oidc`](https://moodle.org/plugins/auth_oidc) plugin Microsoft ships for Entra ID. Sign-in
works, the user is created and the link is written against the Veriqa `sub` — but three barriers
have to be cleared, and two of them you will meet in production as well.
**The plugin sends someone else's parameter.** In every mode except "Microsoft Identity Platform"
it adds a `resource` parameter to the request, and when the setting is left empty it substitutes a
hard-coded Microsoft Graph address. Veriqa answers `invalid_target`: Veriqa registers no
[RFC 8707](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8707) resources, so **no** value passes.
There are two ways through, and the one on the Veriqa side needs no change in Moodle: enable the
per-client quirk [`drop-resource-parameter`](/docs/guides/client-compatibility) for this `client_id`
and the parameter is stripped before validation. Nothing consumes it here, so the issued token is
the one a client that never sent it would get — no resource is registered and no audience granted.
<Warning>
On the Moodle side there is exactly one way around this — set the provider type to **"Microsoft
Identity Platform"**, which drops the parameter. It works, but it deliberately mislabels the
provider in your settings: the plugin offers no generic "other provider" mode without `resource`.
The recommended route is the quirk above.
</Warning>
**Protection against private addresses — and against ports.** Moodle blocks outbound requests by
address (`curlsecurityblockedhosts`) and also by port: `curlsecurityallowedport` allows only 443
and 80 by default. Unlike the other systems, this barrier **does not go away by itself in
production** — if your issuer listens on a non-standard port, that port has to be allowed
explicitly. The diagnostics are thin: the browser shows "Error in OpenID Connect. Please check
logs", and the real cause (`The URL is blocked.`) appears only after the plugin's debug mode is
switched on.
**A colon in the identifier.** If Moodle has nothing but the Veriqa `sub` to build a username
from, sign-in stops at "The given username contains invalid characters": the `sub` looks like
`telegram:1234` or `email:address`, and Moodle does not accept a colon in logins. Two ways out:
request the `profile` scope, so the name comes from `preferred_username`, or enable
`extendedusernamechars`.
**After creation.** Moodle sends the new user to a "complete your profile" page: first and last
name are mandatory there, and a channel does not always supply them.
## The email requirement: four different behaviors
Telegram carries no address, and systems treat its absence differently. The difference is
practical: it decides whether you need a substituted address at all.
| Behavior | Systems | Substituted address needed |
| - | - | - |
| Refuses before creating the account | Grafana | yes |
| Account is created, but there is no session until an address is entered | Keycloak | no — cleared by a setting |
| Account and session exist, the system fills in an address itself | GitLab, Odoo | no |
| No address required, the field stays empty | Moodle | no |
For the same picture across CMS engines, see the [CMS integrations overview](/docs/integrations/overview).
## Local testing: every system has its own switch
When you stand the pair up on your own machine the issuer ends up on a private network, and almost
every system guards against calls there with a flag of its own:
| System | Setting |
| - | - |
| Nextcloud | `allow_local_remote_servers = true` |
| WordPress | `allow_internal_idp = 1` |
| Drupal | `allow_private_issuer` |
| Discourse | `allowed_internal_hosts` |
| Moodle | `curlsecurityblockedhosts` — plus `curlsecurityallowedport` separately |
The first four barriers disappear in production along with the public issuer. **Moodle is the
exception:** it also restricts the port, so it remains an obstacle on a public address too when the
issuer listens on something other than 443 or 80. More on local test setups in
[Local testing](/docs/integrations/local-testing).
## Not verified
* **Channels other than Email.** On Telegram the expected difference is the address requirement
(see the table above).
* **Merging with an account already present locally** — outside Discourse, every system above was
verified with a newly created user.
* **Roles, groups and permissions.** The user gets the default role; mapping groups from claims was
not tested in any of the systems.
* **Repeat sign-in and profile refresh** from the provider on subsequent sign-ins.
# 1C-Bitrix
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/bitrix
Signing in to Bitrix through Veriqa on the stock socialservices framework: why the built-in OpenID does not fit, the two mandatory settings, and the CUser::GetList trap that can sign anyone in as the administrator.
Bitrix has no OIDC client of its own, but it does have a stock social-authentication framework
that Veriqa plugs into as an ordinary provider. The button appears in the standard sign-in form,
and the platform itself handles finding, creating and linking accounts.
<Note>
Verified on "Site Management: Business" with the Telegram and Email channels: sign-in, automatic
user creation, linking in `b_socialservices_user`, and the button in the stock form.
</Note>
## What will not work
The built-in `COpenIDClient` is **OpenID 2.0**, not OpenID Connect: it has `openid.ns` and
`check_authentication`, but no `id_token`, no JWKS and no PKCE. It is fundamentally incompatible
with Veriqa. By default the sign-in form shows exactly the services of that era — Livejournal,
Rambler, Blogger, Mail.Ru OpenID.
The marketplace module `anighr.openidconnect` has not been tested: the marketplace requires a
license key.
## The path that works — a `socialservices` provider
The whole scheme fits into stock extension points:
1. a handler for the `OnAuthServicesBuildList` event returns the provider descriptor
(`ID` / `CLASS` / `NAME` / `ICON`) — after that the button shows up in the sign-in form **by
itself**, with no template changes;
2. the provider class returns the link to `/connect/authorize` and handles the return;
3. `CSocServAuth::AuthorizeUser()` takes care of finding, creating and linking — the link lands in
`b_socialservices_user`.
A ready-made OIDC example already ships with the platform: `apple.php` in the `socialservices` module.
<Warning>
Keep the callback in `/local/`, not in `/bitrix/tools/oauth/` — the `/bitrix/` directory is
overwritten by updates. The public `CSocServAuthManager::Authorize($id)` is enough for this.
</Warning>
## Two settings, without which the sign-in never completes
```
main.new_user_registration = Y
socialservices.allow_registration = Y
```
Without them `AuthorizeUser` returns `SOCSERV_REGISTRATION_DENY`, and from the outside that **does
not look like a configuration problem** — it looks like a broken sign-in. On a production site
mind the side effect: the first setting also enables Bitrix's own registration.
## The `CUser::GetList` trap — required reading
`CUser::GetList` **does not understand the D7 `'=FIELD'` syntax**: it silently drops filter keys
it does not recognize and behaves as if there were no filter at all. `Fetch()` then returns the
first row — the user with id 1, the administrator. Code that means "found an existing user and
signed them in" turns into **signing in as the administrator on every successful OIDC sign-in**.
| Call | Result for an identifier that does not exist |
| - | - |
| `CUser::GetList(['=XML_ID' => …])` | **every user** |
| `CUser::GetList(['THIS_FIELD_DOES_NOT_EXIST' => …])` | every user — identical |
| `CUser::GetList(['XML_ID' => …])` — legacy keys | 0, correct |
| `UserTable::getList(['=XML_ID' => …])` — D7 | 0, correct |
There is no hole in Bitrix here: the platform writes those keys correctly. What breaks is **mixing
dialects** in the integration code. The rule is simple: legacy keys with the legacy API, or D7
syntax with `UserTable::getList()` — never mixed. And look up "your" users through the links in
`b_socialservices_user`, not through `b_user` fields.
## Three more framework pitfalls
* **`getUrl()` is called twice** per form render (`GetFormHtml` and `GetOnClickJs`) — memoize the
`state` and PKCE generation per request, or the second call overwrites the first.
* **The core session is already open** inside the provider, so you do not need one of your own.
`session_write_close()` cuts off the Bitrix session in the middle of rendering the page.
* **`session_name()` changes for the whole process.** Open your own session without restoring the
name before `prolog_before.php`, and the core opens a session under the wrong cookie: the
sign-in "disappears" on the next request.
## Email
Bitrix requires an email **only for a new** user, and the requirement can be turned off with
`main.new_user_email_required`. That is gentler than Drupal and Joomla, where the address is
needed on every sign-in.
When the address does not arrive as a claim (Telegram does not provide one), substitute a
synthetic one using the same convention as on the other engines:
`{channel}-{id}@{channel}.veriqa.invalid`. The `.invalid` domain is reserved by
[RFC 2606](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2606) — mail to such an address goes nowhere, and the
account gets neither notifications nor password recovery. A deliberate trade-off, not a free
workaround.
On the Email channel the address arrives as a claim and no synthesis is needed.
<Note>
The ownership marker is set by the platform: an account created through the framework gets
`b_user.EXTERNAL_AUTH_ID = socservices`, put there by `CSocServAuth::AuthorizeUser` itself. Your
own provider identifier never reaches that field, so searching by it is pointless.
</Note>
## A pleasant side effect
The stock `checkOldUser` recognizes "old scheme" accounts (`EXTERNAL_AUTH_ID` plus `XML_ID`
directly in `b_user`) and moves them into the link table without creating duplicates — migrating
from an older integration happens on its own.
# Confirmed form submission
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/confirmed-form
A form on your own site whose submission the user confirms in a messenger: no session is created, no CMS plugin does this, and a server-side handler is mandatory.
The second scenario besides sign-in: the user fills in a form — a request, a question, a call-back
form — and confirms the submission in a messenger. Next to the submission you get a record saying
"this was confirmed by this subject in this channel", and **no session is created and no
account is provisioned**.
<Note>
The handler fits in about 250 lines of PHP, **with no Composer and no external dependencies**;
verified on the Telegram channel.
</Note>
## Why this is not a sign-in setting
<Warning>
**No OIDC plugin for any CMS does this.** Plugins cover signing in to an account, while Contact
Form 7, WPForms and Bitrix web forms are not tied to an account at all. "A member area" and "a
confirmed submission" are two different solutions, not two settings of one.
</Warning>
So there is no plugin and no CMS recipe here: what you need is a small server-side handler placed
next to the form.
## Why the handler must be server-side
A browser-only script cannot do it, and it runs into three walls at once:
* only the Authorization Code Flow (plus refresh) is supported — there is no implicit and no
hybrid;
* no endpoint has CORS configured;
* the access token is an opaque identifier, and introspecting it takes a confidential client with a
secret, which a browser script cannot keep.
The practical consequence for SaaS site builders (Tilda, Wix, Shopify): the scenario needs hosting
for that handler — the builder page alone is not enough.
## The flow
1. the user clicks the button under the form;
2. a redirect to `/connect/authorize` with PKCE S256, `state` and `nonce` — plus `acr_values` if a
specific channel is wanted;
3. the return to `redirect_uri`, an ordinary page of your site;
4. **the server** exchanges the code for tokens and validates `iss`, `aud`, `exp` and `nonce`;
5. the submission gets a record: "confirmed: `sub` + `channel_type`";
6. no authentication cookie is set — nobody signs in.
## About signature validation
Validating the `id_token` signature with a JWT library is **not required** here: OIDC Core
§3.1.3.7, rule 6 lets a client that obtained the token **directly from the token endpoint** rely
on TLS verification instead of checking the signature. That is why the handler needs no JWT library
and no Composer.
<Warning>
The relaxation has a price, and it is not negotiable: **TLS certificate verification must never
be switched off** (`CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` in PHP stays on). Without it, the very thing the
permission rests on disappears.
</Warning>
## Your own buttons on your own page
The two buttons under the form — "via Telegram" and "any channel" — are a parameter of the
authorize request: `acr_values=channel:telegram` narrows the choice to one channel, and without
the parameter the user picks.
<Note>
There is no widget or JS SDK for this, and none is needed: "your own button" is a link with the
right parameters, not an embeddable component.
</Note>
# Drupal
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/drupal
Signing in to Drupal 10 through Veriqa: the modules, the three verification switches, the mandatory email, and what to do when the channel does not provide one.
Drupal connects to Veriqa through stock contrib modules. Only the site side changes: the Veriqa
server and its distribution stay untouched.
<Note>
Verified: Drupal 10 + `openid_connect` 3.0.0-alpha8 + `openid_client_advanced` 1.0.0-rc8;
Telegram channel. Working: sign-in, user creation, **`id_token` signature checked against JWKS,
nonce, and PKCE S256**.
</Note>
## 1. Modules
```bash theme={null}
composer require drush/drush "drupal/openid_connect:^3.0@alpha" "drupal/openid_client_advanced:^1.0@rc"
drush en openid_connect openid_client_advanced
```
`openid_connect` 3.0.0 is an **alpha**, which is worth factoring into your planning.
`openid_client_advanced` pulls in `firebase/php-jwt`.
## 2. The client and the three switches
Configuration → People → OpenID Connect, the **advanced** plugin. Fill in `issuer_url`, the three
endpoints (`/connect/authorize`, `/connect/token`, `/connect/userinfo`) and `scopes`.
<Warning>
PKCE is disabled in `openid_connect` itself at the code level (`usesPkce()` returns FALSE).
PKCE S256, signature validation and nonce live in `openid_client_advanced`, and **all three are
off by default**. "Drupal does PKCE" is only true once you have turned them on.
</Warning>
Turn on all three: `use_pkce`, `use_nonce`, and `validate_signature` with
`allowed_algorithms: [RS256]`. The keys go in as **JWKS JSON** — the field expects the contents of
the `/.well-known/jwks` document, not a link to it.
Three more settings whose absence produces surprising behavior:
* `openid_connect.settings.user_login_display = above` — otherwise the sign-in buttons are simply
not visible on the form;
* `override_registration_settings` and `user.settings.register` — they decide whether accounts may
be created through the provider.
The `redirect_uri` is `{site address}/openid-connect/{client entity id}`.
## 3. Drupal requires an email — on every sign-in
The most important part of this recipe. `openid_connect` rejects the sign-in when the provider
returns no address: the log shows `No email address provided by <provider>`, and there is no
setting to bypass it.
<Warning>
The check sits in context building, before the account is looked up — not in registration. So an
**already registered** user without an email will not get in either: the email is required on
every sign-in, not just the first one.
</Warning>
Telegram does not hand out addresses and never will. The way out is a hook the module documents
itself (`openid_connect.api.php`) and invokes **before** that check, so the fix lives in your own
module while the contrib module and Veriqa stay untouched:
```php mymodule.module theme={null}
/**
* Implements hook_openid_connect_userinfo_alter().
*/
function mymodule_openid_connect_userinfo_alter(array &$userinfo, array $context): void {
if (!empty($userinfo['email'])) {
return;
}
// With the default resolver `sub` already carries both parts as "{channel_type}:{channel_user_id}".
$parts = explode(':', (string) ($userinfo['sub'] ?? ''), 2);
if (count($parts) !== 2) {
return;
}
[$channelType, $channelUserId] = $parts;
$local = preg_replace('/[^a-z0-9]+/i', '-', $channelType . '-' . $channelUserId);
$userinfo['email'] = strtolower($local) . '@' . strtolower($channelType) . '.veriqa.invalid';
}
```
The address comes out as `telegram-123456789@telegram.veriqa.invalid`. The `.invalid` domain is
reserved by [RFC 2606](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2606) and is guaranteed never to be
delivered to — a deliberate trade-off rather than a free workaround:
**an account with such an address gets no password resets and no notifications.** For a
production site that is a decision you still have to make, not a finished answer: ask for the email in a second
step, use progressive enrichment, or use the Email channel, where the address arrives in the
claims.
### `connect_existing_users` — the setting you cannot ignore
For a new user Drupal compares the address against existing accounts. With
`connect_existing_users` enabled it will **link the account it finds** to the identity from
Veriqa.
With synthetic addresses that is safe: they are deterministic and unique per channel and id. But
as soon as Veriqa starts returning a **real** address (the Email channel, or a resolver of your
own), signing in through Veriqa takes over the local account with that address — the classic
account takeover through an unverified email. Enabling this setting makes sense only when the IdP's
address verification is something you can rely on.
## What you get
The account is created with the name from `preferred_username` (`alice`), and `authmap` gains a
row `provider=openid_connect.veriqa, authname=telegram:123456789` — **Drupal links the identity
by the Veriqa `sub`**.
The practical consequence: for Drupal, `sub` is the account key. If the way it is composed on the
Veriqa side ever changes, previously created users stop being recognized.
## Limitations
* Verified with the **Telegram** channel; Drupal with Email, WhatsApp or the other channels has
not been tested.
* The hook above is an example, not a production-ready module: the decision about addresses
belongs to the site.
# Joomla
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/joomla
Signing in to Joomla 5 through Veriqa with the miniOrange OAuth Client: three installation pitfalls, the In Header checkbox, and the main limitation — commercial rather than technical.
Users sign in to Joomla through Veriqa with the miniOrange OAuth Client plugin. The technical side is
clean — no code changes at all. The limitation here is different: **the free version does not
create users**.
<Note>
Verified: Joomla 5 + miniOrange OAuth Client 3.2.0 (free); Telegram channel. Working: sign-in
**to an existing account**. The free build has no user auto-creation.
</Note>
<Warning>
**The main limitation is commercial.** To an unknown user the free version shows "User
Auto-Creation Not Available in Current Plugin Version" with an upgrade link. The build contains
no account-creation code at all — only a lookup of an existing account by
`email = X OR username = Y`.
So what you get for free is **a different scenario** than on WordPress and Drupal: there the
messenger covers registration from scratch, here it only signs people in to accounts an
administrator created.
</Warning>
## Installation and setup
Install miniOrange OAuth Client 3.2.0 (GPLv2, J3–J6). The zip downloads from a direct link and no
miniOrange account is needed. The open alternative `damyvv/openidconnect-joomla` is dead — last
commit in 2023, it never saw Joomla 5.
1. Install the package.
2. **Enable the `PLG_SYSTEM_MINIORANGEOAUTH` plugin** — it arrives disabled.
3. Configuration → the **Custom OpenID Connect App** provider → `client_id`, `client_secret`, the
three endpoints, scopes.
4. **Clear the "In Header" checkbox** in the "Set Client Credentials" block.
On Joomla 4+ the `redirect_uri` is a web-service route rather than a site page:
`{site}/api/index.php/v1/miniorangeoauth`. The sign-in link is the same path with
`?morequest=oauthredirect&app_name=openidconnect`.
## Three installation pitfalls
1. **The installer is misleading.** You get `Can't find XML setup file` (a warning) right next to
`Installation successful`. The installation is fine — the warning is about an intermediate
archive inside the package.
2. **The system plugin is disabled after installation.** Without it the sign-in does not work, and
the interface does not make this obvious.
3. **`ID2087` at the code exchange.** By default the plugin sends the credentials **both** in an
`Authorization: Basic` header **and** in the request body, while RFC 6749 §2.3.1 allows only
one method. Clearing "In Header" fixes it. The plugin's own message ("check your client id and
secret") points the wrong way — they are not the problem.
## Email: the requirement exists, and it is stricter than Drupal's
The plugin resolves the email **before** looking up the account, that is, on every sign-in, and
aborts in two cases: the `email_attr` mapping is unset ("Login not Allowed. Attribute Mapping is
empty"), or it is set but the attribute arrived empty
(`[MOOAUTH-008] : Email attribute is not received.`). The value's format is never checked — the
requirement is about a **non-empty value**, not about an email address.
<Warning>
**`email_attr` corrupts the account.** On every sign-in the plugin overwrites the account's
email with the mapped value, without validating the format. If you map it to `sub`,
`joom_users` ends up holding `telegram:123456789` instead of `alice@veriqa.invalid`, after which
password resets and notifications stop working.
There is **no correct value** for Telegram: it hands out no address. The supported way around
this is the paid version with attribute mapping.
</Warning>
## What the free version covers
Configuration and Logger are available. User auto-creation, attribute and role mapping, and
advanced login are not.
Verified with the **Telegram** channel; Joomla with Email, WhatsApp or the other channels has not
been tested.
# Testing the integration locally
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/local-testing
How to stand up a CMS plus Veriqa on your own machine, and which difficulties exist only locally — production is free of these particular ones.
Running the integration on a laptop before rollout is sensible. But nearly every difficulty of a
local setup is created by the setup itself, not by Veriqa.
<Note>
**Everything on this page is about local testing.** In production, where Veriqa has a real
domain and a valid certificate, none of it applies: the production setup is **simpler** than the
local one.
</Note>
## The certificate
A self-signed certificate has to be mounted inside **every** container, followed by
`update-ca-certificates` — otherwise PHP's cURL breaks the code-for-tokens exchange. In production
this step does not exist at all.
<Warning>
**The system trust store is not enough for everyone.** `update-ca-certificates` puts the CA where
PHP and Ruby look, but not every runtime reads that store. Python clients built on `requests` —
Odoo's OIDC module, for one — use their own `certifi` bundle and keep breaking the code exchange
even with the CA installed; they need
`REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE=/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt`. The rule is general: the trust store
belongs to the runtime, so check the one the client is written in, not the one the site runs on.
</Warning>
A separate trap: **antivirus software that intercepts TLS** replaces your self-signed certificate
with its own and shows an "untrusted certificate" interstitial. The "continue" link on such a page
drops the query string — that is, the whole OIDC request — so it cannot be passed either by hand
or programmatically. Server-side calls are unaffected: PHP inside the container uses the mounted
CA and never sees the problem.
A workaround that does not touch the machine's security settings: expose **two HTTPS endpoints** —
one with your own certificate for the containers, and one with a dev certificate already trusted
by the system for your own browser.
## The issuer address
Three rules:
* **the issuer must be https.** On `http://localhost:5200` the core refuses even in Development.
Note that a `redirect_uri` over `http` is still accepted — the restriction is about the issuer
address specifically;
* **the address must resolve identically** from inside the container and from the host, or the
`iss` in discovery drifts away from what the browser sees;
* **a private address is blocked by clients.** `host.docker.internal` is a private network, and
almost every system guards against calls there with a flag of its own: WordPress cuts such
requests off via `wp_safe_remote_post()` (fixed by the `allow_internal_idp` setting), Drupal via
`allow_private_issuer`, Nextcloud via `allow_local_remote_servers`, Discourse via
`allowed_internal_hosts`, Moodle via `curlsecurityblockedhosts`. In production the address is
public and none of these flags are needed.
<Warning>
**One exception that does not go away in production.** Moodle restricts outbound requests not
only by address but also **by port**: `curlsecurityallowedport` allows just 443 and 80 by
default. If your issuer listens on a non-standard port, that port has to be allowed explicitly on
the production address too.
</Warning>
## Hop mode on a local setup
[Hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode) is worth trying locally — it is the setting we
recommend for production. It adds one condition to the issuer rules above: the QR code carries a
link to the issuer address, and the **phone** opens it. A phone cannot reach `localhost` on your
machine, and it does not trust your self-signed certificate.
Put Veriqa behind an **HTTPS tunnel** — any service that gives a local port a public `https`
address with a valid certificate — and set that address as the issuer
(`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:Issuer`). The rule about one address everywhere applies here too: the
browser, the containers and the phone must all see the tunnel address, not `localhost`. Then switch
hop mode on with `Veriqa:HopMode:Enabled = true`.
In production none of this is needed: the issuer is already a public `https` address.
## Environment odds and ends
| What | Symptom |
| - | - |
| Container DNS | package mirrors may fail to resolve from inside the container; fixed by setting DNS explicitly in compose |
| Application directory permissions | in a named volume the directory belongs to root and Composer running as `www-data` cannot write to it |
| `AllowOverride None` in the `php:apache` image | TYPO3 serves its frontend through `.htaccess`: the home page opens while any human-readable URL returns a 404 from **Apache itself** — which is how you recognize it |
| Re-running `typo3 setup --create-site` | only works on a clean database; on a provisioned one it fails and no site configuration is created |
## Mail
For the Email channel it is convenient to run a local mail catcher instead of real SMTP: nothing
leaves the machine, and the link from the message is visible in its web UI.
<Warning>
On SMTP **without authentication** mail delivery works every other time: the connection is reused
incorrectly and every second attempt returns an error. A repeat request goes through. This is a
known limitation, not a consequence of your configuration — see
[Troubleshooting](/docs/guides/troubleshooting).
</Warning>
One more: the Email channel has a rate limit, so debugging with several requests in a row will
produce a `429`. Leave a pause between attempts.
## What a local setup does not verify
* **mail deliverability** — SPF, DKIM, DMARC and domain reputation mean nothing to a local
catcher;
* **vendor platform behavior** — Shopify and Wix reach Veriqa from the outside and need its
public HTTPS address, see [SaaS builders](/docs/integrations/saas-builders);
* **performance under load** — local response numbers say nothing about production.
# Veriqa in a CMS
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/overview
What exactly was verified on WordPress, Drupal, TYPO3, Joomla and Bitrix, how the engines differ on requiring an email, and the limitations.
Veriqa plugs into a CMS as an ordinary OpenID Connect provider, and CMS engines connect **with no
changes on the Veriqa side**. Everything needed lives on the integrator's side — from a six-line
file on WordPress to a `socialservices` provider on Bitrix.
## What was verified
| Engine | What works |
| - | - |
| [WordPress](/docs/integrations/wordpress) 6 + `openid-connect-generic` 3.11.3 | sign-in, user creation, signature checked against JWKS |
| [Drupal](/docs/integrations/drupal) 10 + `openid_connect` 3.0.0-alpha8 | sign-in, user creation, **JWKS signature + nonce + PKCE S256** |
| [TYPO3](/docs/integrations/typo3) 13.4.34 + `causal/oidc` 5.0.0 | sign-in, `fe_user` creation and a session, linking by `sub` |
| [Joomla](/docs/integrations/joomla) 5 + miniOrange OAuth Client 3.2.0 | sign-in **to an existing** account; auto-creation is paid |
| [Bitrix](/docs/integrations/bitrix) "Business" + a `socialservices` provider | sign-in, auto-creation, linking, button in the stock form |
Two independent clients — Drupal and WordPress — verified the Veriqa `id_token` signature against
JWKS and accepted it.
## The client must be confidential
A requirement common to all five engines: register the client **with a secret**. Veriqa lets such
a client work without PKCE, and that is what makes off-the-shelf plugins workable. A public client
without PKCE is refused, and `plain` is accepted from nobody.
## Email — where one engine's recipe stops transferring to another
Telegram does not hand out an email and never will, and the engines disagree on what to do about
that. "A CMS requires an email at registration" is wrong for three rows of this table:
| Engine | Requires an email | For whom | Where it is decided |
| - | - | - | - |
| Drupal | yes, hard | both — an existing user cannot sign in either | hardcoded, no switch |
| Joomla | yes, hard | on every sign-in | hardcoded in the plugin, format unchecked |
| Bitrix | yes by default | only for a new user | switched off by `main.new_user_email_required` |
| WordPress | no | — | the user is created with an empty address |
| TYPO3 | no | — | email is outside the default mapping |
Where the address is mandatory and the channel provides none, a synthetic address of the form
`{channel}-{id}@{channel}.veriqa.invalid` is used. The `.invalid` domain is reserved by
[RFC 2606](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2606) and is never delivered to — **an account
holding one gets no notifications and no password recovery**. That is a decision for the
integrator (ask for the address in a second step, use the Email channel), not a finished answer.
## Limitations
* **channels other than Telegram**: WordPress, Drupal, Joomla and TYPO3 were verified on Telegram
only. "CMS + Email" was verified end to end **on Bitrix only**; WhatsApp and the other channels
were not tested with any CMS;
* **a public deployment** with a real domain and a valid certificate was not tested. It removes
the local obstacles (a self-signed CA, a private issuer) — see
[Local testing](/docs/integrations/local-testing).
Systems that are not CMS engines — GitLab, Keycloak, Grafana, Nextcloud — have a page of their
own: [Veriqa in business systems](/docs/integrations/apps). SaaS site builders (Shopify, Wix) connect
through the platform's own SSO settings: see [SaaS builders](/docs/integrations/saas-builders).
# Shopify, Wix and other SaaS builders
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/saas-builders
Can Veriqa be connected to a SaaS platform as its external sign-in provider, and what it takes: the email scope, a public address and the platform's SSO settings.
Yes, it can. SaaS site builders accept an external OpenID Connect provider in their own **SSO
settings**, so no plugin is needed: Veriqa is connected as an ordinary OIDC provider.
## What it takes
1. **The `email` scope.** Shopify and Wix use the email address as the key of the customer or site
member account, so the platform needs the `email` claim. Allow `email` in the client's
`AllowedScopes`. The address comes from the Email channel — the messenger channels do not
provide an email address, so for such a client the user signs in through the Email channel. What
each channel provides is in the [channel catalog](/docs/guides/supported-channels).
2. **A public HTTPS address for Veriqa with a valid certificate.** The platform calls discovery,
token and userinfo from its own servers, so a local test setup will not do.
3. **The SSO settings on the platform side:** a `Client ID`, a `Client Secret` and Veriqa's
discovery address. The platform generates the callback URL itself — add it to the client's
allowed redirect URIs.
## Shopify
The feature is called "connect your own identity provider to customer accounts" and runs over
OIDC. Shopify's requirements for an external provider and how Veriqa meets them (checked with a
full authorization code flow on the Email channel):
| Shopify requirement | Veriqa |
| - | - |
| Discovery endpoint | present |
| JWKS endpoint | present |
| Authorization code flow only | `response_types_supported: ["code"]` |
| PKCE `S256` for public clients | supported |
| RS/ES/PS/EdDSA signatures, HS256 forbidden | `RS256` |
| `sub`, `iss`, `aud`, `nonce` in the `id_token` | all present, `nonce` matches |
| `email` in the `id_token` | arrives with the `email` scope on the Email channel |
| `email_verified` is `true` | JSON boolean `true` |
| Refresh tokens (sessions up to 90 days) | the `refresh_token` grant with the `offline_access` scope |
| Discovery / token / userinfo answer in under a second | 0.26–0.29 s on a local installation |
| RP-Initiated Logout (`end_session_endpoint`) | **not supported** |
<Warning>
Veriqa has no RP-Initiated Logout: a customer signing out of the store does not end the session
on the Veriqa side. `revocation_endpoint` (RFC 7009) revokes tokens — a different operation, and
it does not satisfy this Shopify requirement. The full list of what is and is not supported is in
[OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities).
</Warning>
<Note>
Shopify also has legacy mechanisms (Multipass, the Storefront API token flow), but its own
documentation recommends moving off them to an external IdP — do not build on them.
</Note>
## Wix
Wix accepts an external provider over OIDC as well, and also without a plugin: its SSO settings
take a `Client ID`, a `Client Secret` and a **Config URL** — Veriqa's discovery address — and the
platform pulls the rest itself.
Field mapping in Wix is configurable. If site members are identified by their email address,
request the `email` scope just as for Shopify.
## If you need a confirmed submission rather than a sign-in
If the goal is not "a member area on the platform" but "a confirmed submission", no SSO settings
are needed at all: a small server-side handler next to the form is enough, see
[Confirmed form submission](/docs/integrations/confirmed-form).
# TYPO3
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/typo3
Signing in to TYPO3 13 through Veriqa with causal/oidc: the settings.php keys, the mandatory default group, and what the extension does and does not verify.
TYPO3 connects through the `causal/oidc` extension — the most recently updated OIDC client among
the tested engines. Nothing changes on the Veriqa side.
<Note>
Verified: TYPO3 13.4.34 + `causal/oidc` 5.0.0; Telegram channel. Working: sign-in, `fe_user`
creation and a session, identity linked by the Veriqa `sub`.
</Note>
## 1. Installation
```bash theme={null}
composer create-project "typo3/cms-base-distribution:^13"
composer require causal/oidc:^5
vendor/bin/typo3 extension:setup
```
The extension needs TYPO3 12.4.33+/13.4.14+ and PHP 8.2+, and pulls in `league/oauth2-client` and
`firebase/php-jwt`.
## 2. Configuration
The settings live in `config/system/settings.php` under `EXTENSIONS.oidc`, not in the database:
| Setting | Value | Why |
| - | - | - |
| `enableFrontendAuthentication` | `1` | otherwise the authentication service is never wired up |
| `enableCodeVerifier` | `1` | enables PKCE; `S256` only |
| `oidcClientKey` / `oidcClientSecret` | from the Veriqa client | the client must be confidential |
| `oidcClientScopes` | `openid profile email` | |
| `oidcEndpointAuthorize` / `Token` / `UserInfo` | the three addresses from discovery | **`UserInfo` must not be left empty** — see below |
| `oidcRedirectUri` | any page of the site | |
| `usersStoragePid` | uid of the storage folder | otherwise there is nowhere to put `fe_users` |
| `usersDefaultGroup` | uid of an `fe_groups` record | **mandatory**, see the next section |
The `redirect_uri` is free-form in TYPO3 — unlike Drupal and Joomla, where the module dictates it.
A middleware intercepts any frontend GET carrying `code`/`state`/`error` in the query, so you can
register, for example, the site root.
<Warning>
Give the sign-in its own page. The `oidc_login` plugin redirects to the IdP **as the page
renders** — putting it on the front page sends every visitor to sign in.
</Warning>
## 3. The default group — without it the sign-in does not work
This is TYPO3's main trap, and it is dangerous twice over.
The extension **does not create a new user who ends up in no group**. Groups come either from a
`Roles` claim — **Veriqa does not issue one** — or from `usersDefaultGroup`. So you have to create
an `fe_groups` record by hand and point the setting at its uid.
The other half of the trap is diagnostics. The refusal is logged at **INFO**, while TYPO3's
default logger has its threshold at **ERROR**. From the outside it looks like this:
* the page shows a bare **"Login failed! Please try again."**;
* the TYPO3 log says nothing about the reason;
* the Veriqa logs are **all green**: token 200, userinfo 200.
The failure happens **after** a successful exchange, so the integrator looks for the problem at
the IdP while it sits on their own side. Turn on a diagnostic logger **before** the first sign-in,
not after.
## 4. What the extension verifies — and what it does not
<Warning>
The extension **does not verify the `id_token` signature** — it has no JWKS setting at all: the
identity comes from the `/connect/userinfo` response, with trust resting on TLS. That is a
legitimate choice (OIDC Core §3.1.3.7), but Veriqa's signature goes unchecked on the TYPO3 side.
</Warning>
The extension does not send `nonce` and does not check `iss` — its only replay protection is
`state` plus its own context cookie. For a strict RP that is weaker than Drupal.
**`oidcEndpointUserInfo` is mandatory.** The fallback path that reads the identity out of the
`id_token` carries an extension defect that raises a fatal error on PHP 8 instead of signing the
user in. Leaving the field empty is not an option.
## Email and the username
TYPO3, like WordPress, **does not require an email**: the default
`plugin.tx_oidc.mapping.fe_users` mapping does not map it at all. A messenger sign-in creates a
working `fe_user` without the synthetic `.invalid` addresses that Drupal and Bitrix need.
The price is the usual one: by default `username` is `<sub>`, that is `telegram:123456789`. A
human-readable name comes from overriding the mapping to `<preferred_username>`.
The identity is linked by the Veriqa `sub` — if the way it is composed on the Veriqa side ever
changes, previously created users stop being recognized.
## Limitations
Verified with the **Telegram** channel; TYPO3 with Email, WhatsApp or the other channels has not
been tested.
# WordPress
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/integrations/wordpress
Signing in to WordPress through Veriqa on the stock openid-connect-generic plugin: settings, the mandatory scope step, and what the resulting account looks like.
Users sign in to WordPress through Veriqa with the **stock** plugin — neither the Veriqa core nor its
distribution changes for a CMS. Everything needed lives on the site side: the plugin, its
settings, and one adjustment to the request shape described below.
<Note>
Verified: WordPress 6 + `openid-connect-generic` 3.11.3; Telegram channel. Working: sign-in,
automatic user creation, `id_token` signature checked against JWKS. WordPress with Email,
WhatsApp or the other channels has not been tested.
</Note>
## What you need
* a running Veriqa server reachable from the site (in production: a public HTTPS address with a
valid certificate);
* a client registered in Veriqa: `client_id`, `client_secret`, and a `redirect_uri` of the form
`https://your-site/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=openid-connect-authorize`;
* administrator access in WordPress.
The client must be **confidential** — one with a secret. Veriqa lets such a client sign in
without PKCE, and that is what makes off-the-shelf CMS plugins workable.
## 1. The plugin
Install `openid-connect-generic` (10k+ installs, actively maintained). The alternatives do not
fit: `nicko170/wp-openid` has not shipped since 2023, the Scouting plugin is pinned to someone
else's issuer, and miniOrange keeps the settings you need behind its paid edition.
## 2. Plugin settings
Take the addresses from your server's discovery document
(`https://veriqa.example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration`):
| Plugin field | Value |
| - | - |
| `endpoint_login` | `/connect/authorize` |
| `endpoint_token` | `/connect/token` |
| `endpoint_userinfo` | `/connect/userinfo` |
| `endpoint_jwks` | `/.well-known/jwks` |
| `client_id`, `client_secret` | from the client registration |
| `scope` | `openid profile email` (plus `channel` if the RP needs the typed channel claims) |
Four settings deserve to be named explicitly — they decide what the account looks like:
* **Leave `identity_key` alone.** On the default the login is human-readable (`alice`); setting
it to `sub` by hand produces a login like `telegram123456789`.
* **`nickname_key` → `preferred_username`**, **`displayname_format` → `name`**.
* **Turn `enable_logging` on**, at least while you set things up: the plugin log turns hours of
troubleshooting into minutes.
* **Leave `no_sslverify` off.** TLS verification should work; if it gets in the way, the problem
is the certificate, not the check.
## 3. Drop `scope` from the code exchange
This step is mandatory, and it is worth understanding rather than just applying.
The plugin puts `scope` into the `grant_type=authorization_code` request, where
[RFC 6749 §4.1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.3) does not provide for it:
the granted scope comes from the authorization code itself. Keycloak, Auth0 and Azure silently
ignore the extra parameter — a strict OpenIddict server rejects the request (OpenIddict issue
\#1729 is closed as *invalid*).
<Note>
Removing the parameter makes the request **conform** to the standard. It is not a way around a
check and not a weakening of your security: what gets removed is something that should not be
in the request at all.
</Note>
There are two options and they are interchangeable — **you do not need both**. Which one fits
depends on whose side you can change: the site, or the Veriqa deployment.
<CardGroup>
<Card title="The site owner fixes it" icon="wordpress">
A six-line mu-plugin on the WordPress side. The Veriqa server is untouched — the right choice
when Veriqa is not yours (the cloud, or someone else's deployment).
</Card>
<Card title="The Veriqa owner fixes it" icon="server">
The `drop-scope-on-code-exchange` compatibility quirk — a relaxation scoped to a single
`ClientId` on the server side. The right choice when there are many sites and touching each
one is not practical.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
### Option A — the mu-plugin
Drop the file into `wp-content/mu-plugins/` (create the directory if it is missing). Must-use
plugins load automatically — there is nothing to activate in the admin area.
```php wp-content/mu-plugins/veriqa-oidc-compat.php theme={null}
<?php
/**
* Plugin Name: Veriqa OIDC compatibility
* Description: Removes the scope parameter from the OpenID Connect Generic token request.
*/
declare(strict_types=1);
add_filter(
'openid-connect-generic-alter-request',
static function (array $request, string $operation): array {
if ('get-authentication-token' === $operation) {
unset($request['body']['scope']);
}
return $request;
},
10,
2
);
```
The change is surgical: `scope` is dropped only for the `get-authentication-token` operation. It
stays on token refresh, where RFC 6749 §6 does allow narrowing the scope.
### Option B — the quirk on the Veriqa side
The same parameter, removed by the server, for one client. Enabling it takes two steps, and
Veriqa logs a warning about every enabled quirk at startup:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"CompatibilityQuirksAllowApplicationOverride": true,
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "wordpress-site",
"CompatibilityQuirks": [ "drop-scope-on-code-exchange" ]
}
]
}
}
}
```
The details, the removal condition and the `wordpress-openid-connect-generic` profile are in
[Client compatibility](/docs/guides/client-compatibility).
With neither option in place the sign-in fails at the code exchange, and WordPress sends the
browser back to `wp-login.php?login-error=invalid_request&message=…`.
## What you get
The plugin log shows `login-success Successful login for: telegram123456789`; the click-to-
signed-in time is around twenty seconds, including everything the person does on their phone.
The user is created automatically.
**The account is created with an empty email** — Telegram does not hand out addresses and never
will. If your site requires one, there are two paths: use the Email channel (the address then
arrives in the claims), or have WordPress ask for it after the first sign-in.
## Limitations
* Verified with the **Telegram** channel. On the Email channel the profile looks different:
`name` repeats the address instead of carrying a human-readable name, so a recipe tuned on
Telegram produces a different-looking account.
* A dedicated "Veriqa for WordPress" plugin is not needed: the stock plugin covers the job end to
end.
* The avatar is not part of this recipe: `picture` is a `data:` image URI issued only for the
`avatar` scope and only through userinfo, and the plugin setup above does not request that scope.
# Configuration reference
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/reference/configuration
Every Veriqa configuration section, key and default in one place.
Veriqa reads the host's standard `IConfiguration`, so every setting can come from
`appsettings.json`, environment variables, user-secrets or any other provider. Everything Veriqa
owns lives under a single root key, `Veriqa`:
| Section | Contents |
| - | - |
| `Veriqa` | The auth server: OIDC, transactions, sign-in page, limits, infrastructure |
| `Veriqa:Channels` | The channel adapters: Telegram, WhatsApp, other channels, Email |
This reference answers "which setting controls it". Two neighboring questions have pages of
their own: what the specifications give you is in
[OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities), and what is missing is in
[Known limitations](/docs/reference/limitations).
In environment variables, `:` becomes `__` — `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Database:Provider` is
`Veriqa__OpenIddict__Database__Provider`.
One shell limitation is worth knowing here. A POSIX shell allows only letters, digits and `_` in a
variable name, so `export` rejects the whole name as soon as **any** segment of the path carries a
`-` or a `.`: `export Veriqa__ChannelDisplay__Hints__my-channel=...` is turned down as an invalid
identifier. Where that segment comes from makes no difference. It may be a **value** you choose —
the channel type in `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:QrCode:PixelsPerModuleByChannel:<channel type>` and in
`Veriqa:ChannelDisplay:Hints:<channel type>` (the channel type of an SPI adapter is allowed a
hyphen), or the record code in the `Veriqa:UiConfigurations:Records` catalog. It may just as well
be a **fixed key name** of the schema, which you do not choose at all — the message kind in
`Veriqa:MessageTemplates:confirmation-prompt`.
The variable name itself is perfectly legal, and the limitation is worked around with the usual
tools: Docker (`-e`), Kubernetes variables (`env:`), `launchSettings.json` and a plain
`env NAME=VALUE command` all accept such names, and .NET reads them as usual. A path whose segments
hold only letters, digits and `_` is set from an environment variable in the usual way.
**A configuration directory of its own.** One variable does not name a setting but a place to read
settings from: `VERIQA_CONFIG_DIRECTORY` points at a **directory**, and the host layers the
`appsettings.json` and `appsettings.<Environment>.json` found there over the files shipped with the
program and under the environment variables. Both files are optional; a directory that does not
exist prevents startup, an empty one is not an error. This is how an installation made by the
[OS-service installer](/docs/quickstart/os-service) keeps its configuration — `/etc/veriqa` on Linux,
`%ProgramData%\Veriqa` on Windows — where replacing the program cannot touch it.
<Note>
Configuration is validated at **startup**. An unknown enum value, a relational provider without a
connection string or an enabled channel missing its token stops the application immediately
rather than failing later on a user's first sign-in.
</Note>
## Veriqa:OpenIddict
OIDC server, its store and the registered clients.
### Database
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Provider` | — (no default) | Store for clients, authorizations and tokens: `InMemory`, `PostgreSQL` or `SqlServer` |
| `ConnectionString` | — | Required for any relational provider |
`Provider` has no default: an unset value is not "`InMemory` by default", it is a choice nobody
made. Outside the `Development` environment such a host **fails to start** (the startup check names
the fix); in `Development` it starts with a `Warning`. `InMemory` remains a valid value, but it is
set explicitly and every restart invalidates issued tokens — fine for development and for a
[single-instance connector](/docs/guides/storage#single-instance-connector-without-a-database).
In embedded mode these keys do not select the provider: there your host selects it by calling
`authServer.UseOpenIddictDatabase(...)` or `authServer.UseInMemoryOpenIddictStore()`; in
self-hosted mode the choice is set with these keys.
### Server
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Issuer` | host URL | Explicit issuer; needed when the public URL differs from the bound one |
| `AccessTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `3600` | Access token lifetime |
| `RefreshTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `1209600` | Refresh token lifetime (14 days) |
| `AuthorizationCodeLifetimeSeconds` | `300` | Authorization code lifetime |
| `EnableRefreshTokenRotation` | `true` | Issue a new refresh token on each use |
| `EnableRevocation` | `true` | Enable `/connect/revoke` |
| `TokenPruneIntervalSeconds` | `3600` | How often the background job deletes stale token and authorization records from the OpenIddict database. Must be greater than 0 and not exceed `4294967` (about 49.7 days, the longest wait a timer accepts), otherwise the host does not start |
| `TokenPruneThresholdSeconds` | `86400` | Minimum age of a token or authorization record, counted from its creation, before the job may delete it — and only once the record is no longer valid (expired or revoked). Valid records are never deleted, whatever the value. Must be greater than 0, otherwise the host does not start |
| `SigningCertificatePath` / `SigningCertificateBase64` / `SigningCertificatePassword` | — | Token signing certificate. Required outside `Development` (`Path` or `Base64`) |
| `EncryptionCertificatePath` / `EncryptionCertificateBase64` / `EncryptionCertificatePassword` | — | Token encryption certificate. Required outside `Development` (`Path` or `Base64`) |
The behavior depends on the environment, and the difference matters:
* **`Development`** — with no explicit certificates, development keys are generated. Convenient
locally, but every restart produces new keys and multiple instances do not share them.
* **Any other environment** — there are no development keys: the server **refuses to start** until
**both** certificates (signing and encryption) are configured. There is no fallback to
generation.
The shipped Docker image runs with `ASPNETCORE_ENVIRONMENT=Production`, so it follows the second
rule. If you see generated development keys in a deployed installation, the process is running in
`Development` — worth fixing before rollout.
### Clients
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients` is an array of the applications allowed to sign users in:
| Key | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `ClientId` | Client identifier. Unique within the array: two entries sharing a `ClientId` prevent startup with a validation error — otherwise everything in the second entry would silently not apply |
| `DisplayName` | Name of this application in the texts of a sign-in the user receives in the channel and in the email — what fills their `{app}` slot. If unset or blank, the `ClientId` is used instead. It does not apply to the confirmations your server creates (`POST /api/transaction/confirmation`): there `{app}` is always the `ClientId`. The sign-in page does not show it: the name beside the logo there is stated by `BrandName` |
| `AllowedRedirectUris` | Exact-match list; no wildcards, absolute URIs only |
| `AllowedScopes` | Scopes the client may request. With a non-empty [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims:Scopes`](#veriqascopesclaims) only the scopes of that catalog and `openid` — a scope outside it prevents startup: an application narrows the catalog, it does not widen it |
| `AllowRefreshTokens` | Whether `offline_access` is honored |
| `AllowClientCredentials` | Whether the client may use the Client Credentials grant — the way your server authenticates to create confirmation transactions (`POST /api/transaction/confirmation`) and read their result. Off by default. Confidential clients only (with a `ClientSecret`): enabling it on a public client prevents startup |
| `AllowIntrospection` | Whether the client may call the introspection endpoint `/connect/introspect` (RFC 7662). Off by default. Confidential clients only (with a `ClientSecret`): enabling it on a public client prevents startup. The response carries metadata only, and a client with this permission sees `sub` and `client_id` of tokens issued to other clients — grant it only to your own confidential clients. See [OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities) |
| `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant` | Whether the client may exchange a confirmed confirmation transaction it created for the `id_token` of the person who confirmed (grant `urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation`). Off by default. It is the integrator's permission: no parameter of the application's request widens what is disclosed, and the claims stay within `AllowedScopes`. Requires `AllowClientCredentials` and `openid` in `AllowedScopes` — without either, the host does not start. See [Linking from your server](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#linking-from-your-server-without-a-sign-in) |
| `AllowCollectedClaimsDeletion` | Whether the client may delete the collected claims of a subject with `DELETE /api/collected-claims` (the endpoint exists only when a collected claims store is registered). Off by default. It deletes the personal data of any subject of the client's tenant, so grant it to one of your own server clients only; the endpoint has no rate limit of its own. Requires `AllowClientCredentials` — without it, the host does not start. See [Storage](/docs/guides/storage#deleting-by-sub) |
| `TenantId` | Tenant this application belongs to. If unset or blank, the entry states no tenant and the transaction is created without one, which is how a self-hosted installation with a single tenant works. The value is read once per request, by each request that knows the client but has no transaction to take the tenant from: the sign-in and the server-to-server creation of a confirmation transaction store it on the transaction they create, and it travels on the transaction from there; the `form_post` response page is written from the HTTP request alone, without the transaction, and reads it again. The tenant is the level at which configuration keys resolve, **not** an access boundary: isolation is provided by `client_id`, which sits above the tenant |
| `RequirePhone` / `RequireEmail` | Whether this application requires `phone_number` / `email` — the same shorthand as in [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims`](#veriqascopesclaims). If unset, the global value applies. Stricter only: `false` here does not lift a requirement the global section states |
| `ClaimLevels` | Map of claim name → level (`IfAvailable`, `Optional`, `Required`) that RAISES the level the catalog row of that claim states, for this application only; a lower level changes nothing. Raising a claim Veriqa cannot complete (see `Level` in [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims`](#veriqascopesclaims)) prevents startup |
| `ClaimCompletionFormEnabled` | Whether Veriqa shows its own claims completion form to the users of this application. If unset, `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:FormEnabled` applies, and the form is on unless the global section states otherwise. `false` — a missing claim other than `phone_number` and `email` is issued only when the channel supplies it and never blocks the sign-in. Turn it off for a relying party with a profile completion form of its own — see [Keycloak](/docs/integrations/apps#keycloak) |
| `ClaimCompletionFormSurface` | Where Veriqa shows its claims completion form to the users of this application: `Auto`, `InitiatingPage`, `CrossDevicePage` or `CrossDevicePageOnly`. If unset, `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:FormSurface` applies, `Auto` unless the global section states otherwise. `Auto` shows the form on the device that confirmed the sign-in when the sign-in was confirmed on the confirmation page of an Email Pull email (that page confirms it only with `LoginConfirmation.Mode` set to `None`; otherwise the sign-in window does), or when the channel account has no identifier to show (a Telegram account without a username), and on the sign-in page otherwise. `InitiatingPage` — always the sign-in page. `CrossDevicePage` — the device that confirmed the sign-in: the confirmation page of the email, or a page opened by a link button the channel sends into the chat; when the channel cannot show a link button, the issuer is not an absolute HTTPS URL or the button is not delivered, the form falls back to the sign-in page. `CrossDevicePageOnly` — the same without the fallback: a missing required claim then fails the sign-in with `required_claim_unobtainable`, and a missing optional one is skipped |
| `ClaimCompletionEmailMethods` | Ways this application admits of obtaining a missing `email`: `Push`, `Code`, `MagicLink` and `Unverified`. If unset, the list of the tenant applies, or else `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailMethods` (`Push`, `Code`, `MagicLink` unless the global section states otherwise). Narrowing only: a method the list above does not name is dropped, and the order stays that of the list above. The first way available on the page is offered first, the others as alternatives: `Push` only on the device that confirmed the sign-in and with inbound email of the Email adapter, `Code` and `MagicLink` with its outbound email, `Unverified` always — the address is then not confirmed and `email_verified` is `false`. `Code` and `MagicLink` are not two ways the user picks between: together they stand for one way, "Confirm via email", with one button, placed where the first of the two stands in the list. The list decides what its email carries: `Code` alone — a code to enter on the page (`claim-code-mail`); `MagicLink` alone — a link to a confirmation page (`claim-link-mail`); both — one email with a code and a link (`claim-code-link-mail`), and the address is confirmed by whichever the user does first. Two emails of this kind are not sent to one sign-in sooner than `Veriqa:Channels:Email:MailResendInterval` apart. With no method available a required `email` is not enforced; when this application requires the email and no method is available on the sign-in page, the host does not start. An empty list is refused — lower the requirement of the email instead |
| `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits` | Limits of the emails sent to obtain `email`: `CodeAttempts` (attempts per code, 5), `MailsPerTransaction` (3), `MailsPerSubject` (per channel account in 24 hours, 10), `MailsPerAddress` (per recipient address in an hour, 5), `MailsPerDomain` (per recipient domain in an hour; `0` — off, the default). If unset, the value of the tenant or of `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits` applies. Stricter only: a larger value here does not lift a limit set above, and `0` does not switch off a domain limit set above |
| `CompatibilityQuirks` | Compatibility quirk keys from the closed registry — relaxations of the request form for this client. Unset by default; effective only while the gate below is open. See [Client compatibility](/docs/guides/client-compatibility) |
| `LogoUrl` | Logo of this application's sign-in page; as in the global section, shown in every preset but `Minimal`. If unset, the logo comes from the level below; with neither a logo nor a brand name at any level the page shows the product's own mark |
| `BrandName` | Brand name beside the logo of this application's sign-in page; as in the global section, shown in every preset but `Minimal`. If unset or blank, the name comes from the level below. Resolved on its own, so this entry may state the name while the logo comes from elsewhere |
| `FooterHtml` | Footer block of this application's sign-in page — your own markup at the bottom of the card. If unset or blank, the block comes from the level below: a blank value here does not switch off the block the global section states. Markup outside the admitted shape drops this client entry from the effective configuration **whole**, so every other setting of the entry then resolves from the level below — the shape and the outcomes are in [Footer block of the sign-in page](/docs/guides/customization#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page) |
| `HopInstructionHtml` | Instruction this application's sign-in page shows in place of the channel choice once the user has continued on the phone in hop mode — your own markup instead of the core's text. If unset or blank, the instruction comes from the level below. The shape and the outcome of an inadmissible value are those of `FooterHtml`: the client entry is dropped **whole** — see [Instruction after the scan](/docs/guides/customization#instruction-after-the-scan) |
| `AuthPage:Texts` | This application's wording of the built-in texts of the pages Veriqa renders: a map "built-in text → replacement", keyed by the English text of the element. A value is a replacement key that goes through the locale files, or an object of ready texts by language (`{ "en": "…", "ru": "…" }`) that bypasses them. An entry outranks the tenant's entry for the same text and yields to the `ui_config` record's; entries for other texts stated there stay in force. A text stated by its own setting (`BrandName`, `FooterHtml`, `HopInstructionHtml`, the `Title`/`Instruction` of a record) is not reworded. An entry for a text outside the open list, or a replacement whose slots differ, is not applied and is reported once — at startup and on a reload of the configuration; the client entry is not dropped for it. The forms, the rules and the open list are in [Rewording a page element for one application](/docs/guides/customization#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application) |
| `PrimaryColor` | Accent color of this application's sign-in page, `#RRGGBB`; applied only with `Preset: Branded`. If unset, the color comes from the level below |
| `LogoUrlByTheme` | This application's logos for a single theme: a map `light`/`dark` → URL. A theme without a value of its own takes the `LogoUrl` of the same entry |
| `PrimaryColorByTheme` | This application's accent colors for a single theme: a map `light`/`dark` → `#RRGGBB`. A theme without a value of its own takes the `PrimaryColor` of the same entry |
| `CustomCssPath` / `CssSriHash` | Custom stylesheet of this application's sign-in page and its SRI hash. Resolved as a pair: the entry that states the path owns the hash as well; no path — both come from the level below |
| `CustomJsPath` / `JsSriHash` | Custom script of this application's sign-in page and its SRI hash — the risky mode. Effective only while the gate [`Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:CustomJsAllowApplicationOverride`](#veriqaauthpagedesign) is open; with the gate closed the script comes from the level below and a warning is written to the log at startup. Resolved as a pair, exactly like the CSS |
| `QrCode` | The sign-in page QR code for this client: the same keys as in the [`Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:QrCode`](#veriqaauthpagedesignqrcode) section, each of them optional. If unset, the QR comes from the level below |
| `ChannelButton` | The channel buttons of this application's sign-in page: `ShowChannelButton` — `Always`, `MobileOnly` or `Never`, as in the [global section](#veriqaauthpagedesign). If unset, the value comes from the level below. A pair with the effective `ShowQrCode` that leaves a device with neither the QR nor the button is not applied: the buttons are shown on every device and a warning goes into the log — see [Allowed combinations](/docs/guides/customization#allowed-combinations-of-the-two-visibilities) |
| `ChannelLayout` | How several channels share this application's sign-in page: `Tabs` or `Grid`. If unset, the layout comes from the level below. See [Channel layout](/docs/guides/customization#channel-layout) |
| `Cancel` | The "Cancel sign-in" button of this application's sign-in window: `Enabled`, `true` or `false`. If unset, the value comes from the level below, and with no level stating it the button is on. See [Cancel button](/docs/guides/customization#cancel-button) |
Next to the clients array sits the deployment gate:
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `CompatibilityQuirksAllowApplicationOverride` | `false` | While closed no quirk takes effect, whatever the clients list |
## Veriqa:TransactionEngine
The sign-in transaction lifecycle.
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `TransactionTtlSeconds` | `300` | How long the user has to confirm |
| `ConfirmationFinalizationTimeoutSeconds` | `30` | Window to finalize after confirmation |
| `CompletedRetentionSeconds` | `600` | How long a dead transaction — completed, failed or expired — stays readable before removal |
| `CleanupIntervalSeconds` | `60` | Expired-transaction sweep interval |
| `CleanupBatchSize` | `100` | Rows per sweep |
| `CleanupErrorRetryDelaySeconds` | `10` | Retry delay after a failed sweep |
| `MaxInMemoryEntries` | `10000` | Cap for the in-memory store |
| `RejectBots` | `true` | Reject transactions started by bots |
| `RejectBotsAllowApplicationOverride` | `false` | Let the application override that decision |
### Store
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `ConnectionString` | — | Set it to switch from in-memory to a durable store: a relational connection string, or a Redis one with `Provider` = `Redis` |
| `Provider` | `PostgreSQL` | `PostgreSQL` or `SqlServer` (EF Core), or `Redis`. Without `ConnectionString` the store stays in memory whatever the value |
| `KeyPrefix` | `veriqa:tx:` | Transaction key prefix, read only on `Redis` |
See [Storage](/docs/guides/storage) for migrations and retention.
## Veriqa:ScopesClaims
Which scopes exist, which claims they carry and which claims a sign-in requires.
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Scopes` | — | Catalog of scopes, each with its `Name` and its `Claims` (keys below). If empty, the product's own scopes are registered: `openid`, `profile`, `email`, `phone`, `offline_access`, `channel`, `avatar` |
| `RequirePhone` | `false` | Require `phone_number` — a shorthand for `Level: Required` on its claim. An application may require it on its own (`RequirePhone` of the client entry) but cannot lift it. It applies to a sign-in that asks for the `phone` scope: such a sign-in is offered only the channels able to provide the phone number, and with none of them available `/connect/authorize` answers `400` `no_channel_for_required_phone` |
| `RequireEmail` | `false` | Require `email` — the same shorthand for the email |
<Warning>
A non-empty `Scopes` **replaces** the product's own set of scopes as a whole: `scopes_supported` of
discovery then lists exactly the scopes of the catalog (plus `openid`, which is always registered), and a
request for any other scope is refused with `invalid_scope`. If your clients use `offline_access`,
`channel` or `avatar`, list them in the catalog explicitly.
</Warning>
Keys of a claim in `Claims`:
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Name` | — | Claim name as it appears in the token. One claim — one row. A claim of a standard scope (`name` of `profile`, `phone_number` of `phone`, `email` of `email`, …) may stand only under that scope |
| `Level` | `IfAvailable` | Requirement level: `IfAvailable` — issued only if the channel or the store already has it; `Optional` — the user is asked and may decline; `Required` — the sign-in does not complete without it. A level above `IfAvailable` needs a claim Veriqa can complete — `phone_number`, `email` or a row with `Completion`; on any other claim it prevents startup. An application may raise the level (`ClaimLevels` of the client entry), never lower it |
| `Source` | `Channel` | `Channel` — issued by the channel; `External` — added by your claims mapper after Veriqa; `Collected` — collected by Veriqa: never issued by a channel, taken only from the store or through completion, so it requires `Completion` |
| `Completion` | — | Description of the completion field: `Label` — the field label, a localization key, must not be blank; `MaxLength` — `256` by default, must be positive, applied to `Text` only; `Format` — `Text`, `Date` or `Choice`; `Options` — the values a `Choice` field offers, in the order listed, each a pair of `Value` (what the claim receives) and `Label` (the caption, a localization key like the field label). A `Choice` field is shown as a drop-down list with an empty first entry, and a value outside the list is refused. `Options` must not be empty for `Choice`; every `Value` is non-blank, has no white space at its edges, is at most 256 characters long and is stated once; every `Label` is non-blank; `Options` on a field of another format prevents startup. Admitted on `Channel` and `Collected` claims. Prevents startup on an `External` claim, on `phone_number` and `email` (they have their own paths) and on the claims the core issues itself: `sub`, `amr`, `auth_time`, `zoneinfo`, `updated_at`, `email_verified`, `phone_number_verified`, `channel_type`, `channel_user_id`, `is_bot`, `veriqa_channel`, `veriqa_email_mode` |
## Veriqa:AuthPageDesign
Look and feel of the sign-in page — full walkthrough in
[Configuration & customization](/docs/guides/customization).
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Preset` | `Default` | Design preset; `Branded` enables `PrimaryColor` |
| `Theme` | `Auto` | `Auto`, `Light` or `Dark` |
| `LogoUrl` | — | Your logo, in every preset but `Minimal`. With neither `LogoUrl` nor `BrandName` stated the page shows the product's own mark |
| `BrandName` | — | Brand name beside the logo, in every preset but `Minimal`. Unlike the logo it is cut by no theme — one name for both |
| `FooterHtml` | — | Footer block of the sign-in page: your own markup (legal links, a note, a contact) at the bottom of the card, in every preset. Markup outside the admitted shape prevents startup — the shape is in [Footer block of the sign-in page](/docs/guides/customization#footer-block-of-the-sign-in-page) |
| `HopInstructionHtml` | — | Instruction the sign-in page shows in place of the channel choice once the user has continued on the phone in hop mode: your own markup, in the shape of `FooterHtml`. If unset, the core's own text is shown. Markup outside the admitted shape prevents startup — see [Instruction after the scan](/docs/guides/customization#instruction-after-the-scan) |
| `PrimaryColor` | — | Accent color, `#RRGGBB`; applied only with `Preset: Branded` |
| `LogoUrlByTheme` | — | Logo for a single theme: a map `light`/`dark` → URL. A theme without a value of its own takes `LogoUrl` |
| `PrimaryColorByTheme` | — | Accent color for a single theme: a map `light`/`dark` → `#RRGGBB`. A theme without a value of its own takes `PrimaryColor` |
| `CustomCssPath` / `CustomJsPath` | — | External assets; a custom CSS path overrides the preset |
| `CssSriHash` / `JsSriHash` | — | Subresource Integrity hashes for those assets. A hash is resolved together with its path — both always come from the same level |
| `CustomJsAllowApplicationOverride` | `false` | Gate for the risky mode: lets a client entry (`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`) state its own `CustomJsPath`/`JsSriHash`. Without it only this section supplies the script |
| `ChannelButton:ShowChannelButton` | `Always` | On which devices the button that leads into a channel ("Open in …", "Send confirmation email") is shown: `Always` — on every device; `MobileOnly` — on a phone only; `Never` — nowhere, the QR is the only way in. A pair with `ShowQrCode` that leaves a device with neither the QR nor the button is not applied: the buttons are shown on every device and a warning goes into the log — see [Channel button visibility](/docs/guides/customization#channel-button-visibility) |
| `ChannelLayout` | `Tabs` | How several channels share a page that shows a QR for each of them: `Tabs` — one at a time behind tabs; `Grid` — all at once, side by side. A page of one channel, a page laid out as channel buttons and a page with one QR code for all its channels — with or without the "Any channel" tab — are the same under either value — see [Channel layout](/docs/guides/customization#channel-layout) |
| `Cancel:Enabled` | `true` | Whether the sign-in window offers the "Cancel sign-in" button, which ends the sign-in and returns the user to the application with `error=access_denied`. On by default — see [Cancel button](/docs/guides/customization#cancel-button) |
`ChannelButton`, `ChannelLayout` and `Cancel` are stated on the same ownership levels as the
[`QrCode`](#veriqaauthpagedesignqrcode) section below — the `ui_config` record → the client
(`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients[]`) → this global section — and the nearest level that states a key wins
it on its own.
### Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:QrCode
The QR code on the sign-in page: whether to show it and at which resolution to draw it.
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `ShowQrCode` | `DesktopOnly` | Whether the QR is shown: `Always` — on every device; `DesktopOnly` — everywhere but a phone, which gets the channel buttons instead; `Never` — only the channel buttons, on any device |
| `PixelsPerModule` | `6` | QR resolution — pixels per module; allowed range `5`…`35` |
| `PixelsPerModuleByChannel` | — | Map "channel type → resolution" **of the same level**, read before that level's `PixelsPerModule`; a channel absent from the map takes the `PixelsPerModule` of the same level |
The section is stated on three ownership levels, and the nearest level that states it wins: the
`ui_config` record → the client (`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients[].QrCode`) → this global section.
Showing the QR and its resolution are two different settings, and a level wins each of them on its
own: a client that states only `ShowQrCode` keeps the global resolution.
The resolution itself is ONE setting stated per channel: `PixelsPerModuleByChannel` and
`PixelsPerModule` are two entries of the same level, and a level exhausts both of them before the
lookup moves on to the level below. What that means in practice: a client that
states only `PixelsPerModule` wins the resolution **for every** channel — the per-channel map of the
global section is never reached. To keep a channel's own resolution, name it in the map of the same
level that states `PixelsPerModule`.
An example. The global section states `PixelsPerModule: 6` and a `PixelsPerModuleByChannel` entry
`telegram: 14`, while the `app-client` client states only `PixelsPerModule: 8`:
| Channel | Resolution for `app-client` |
| - | - |
| `telegram` | `8` — the client has no map, so its `PixelsPerModule` wins and the global section's map is never read |
| `whatsapp` | `8` — for the same reason |
A `PixelsPerModule` outside the range on the client or `ui_config` level does not apply — the
resolution comes from the level below and the host still starts. Such a value is reported by ONE
warning in the log per configuration snapshot: the whole catalog of values (the global section, the
client entries, the `ui_config` records) is checked at startup and on every configuration reload,
rather than on every request. In the global section such a value remains a deployment error and
prevents startup.
## Veriqa:Localization and Veriqa:ChannelDisplay
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Localization:DefaultLanguage` | `en` | Sign-in page language when the user has no preference |
| `ChannelDisplay:Mode` | `Multichannel` | How channels are presented |
| `ChannelDisplay:ChannelOrder` | — | Explicit ordering of channel buttons |
| `ChannelDisplay:Hints` | — | Map of channel type to hint text. The hint renders inside its own channel's panel, so with tabs only the selected channel shows one, and with [channel buttons](/docs/guides/customization#channel-buttons) it stands under the button of its own channel. The key is the channel type (`whatsapp`, `telegram`, your SPI channel) and its case does not matter; a channel absent from the map, or one with blank text, gets no hint. The text may carry inline markup — `span`, `strong`, `em`, `a`, `br`; a value outside that shape is shown as plain text, with a warning in the log — see [Markup in the title, the instruction and a channel hint](/docs/guides/customization#markup-in-the-title-the-instruction-and-a-channel-hint) |
## Veriqa:RateLimit
Per-endpoint limits, each a permit count over a window in seconds. Defaults:
| Endpoint group | Permits / window |
| - | - |
| `Authorize` | 60 / 60s |
| `Token` | 20 / 60s |
| `Callback` | 60 / 60s |
| `Polling` | 600 / 60s |
| `Webhook` | 100 / 60s |
| `SignalR` | 30 / 60s |
| `EmailStart` | 5 / 60s |
| `UserAuth` | 5 / 60s (`UserAuthQueueLimit` 0, `UserAuthMaxPartitions` 50000) |
Webhook limits deserve attention when you scale: they apply per instance, and a channel provider
that retries aggressively can trip them.
## Veriqa:InitiatorContext
Context about the device that started the transaction, shown to the user before they confirm —
see [Initiator context](/docs/concepts/initiator-context).
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Enabled` | `true` | Collect initiator context at all |
| `CollectIpAddress` | `true` | Collect the IP address |
| `CollectUserAgent` | `true` | Collect the user agent |
| `CollectGeoLocation` | `true` | Resolve geolocation |
| `StoreRawUserAgent` | `false` | Persist the raw UA string |
| `DisplayFields` | see concept page | Which fields the confirmation message shows |
| `AnomalyDetection:Enabled` | `false` | Flag unusual sign-in context |
| `GeoIp:Provider` / `GeoIp:DatabasePath` | offline | GeoIP source |
<Warning>
The offline GeoIP path expects a **GeoLite2** database, which Veriqa does not ship. Download it
from MaxMind yourself and accept their EULA — the library is Apache-2.0, the license sits on the
data. The standalone image already carries the library: mount the database and set
`GeoIp:DatabasePath` to switch it on. In your own host it arrives in the satellite package
`Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.MaxMind` (`builder.Services.AddMaxMindGeoIp()`).
</Warning>
## Veriqa:HopMode
Hop mode puts a short one-time link to your Veriqa server into the QR code instead of the channel link.
Two of its settings are set node-wide and may be overridden for a single channel:
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Veriqa:HopMode:Enabled` | `false` | Hop mode on for every channel |
| `Veriqa:HopMode:RedirectStyle` | `Interstitial` | How the hop link leads to the channel: `Interstitial` or `Direct`. The Email channel with the emailed link on answers in its own way — see below |
| `Veriqa:Channels:{Channel}:HopEnabled` | not set | Overrides `Veriqa:HopMode:Enabled` for this channel |
| `Veriqa:Channels:{Channel}:HopRedirectStyle` | not set | Overrides `Veriqa:HopMode:RedirectStyle` for this channel |
A channel value, when set, wins over the node-wide one; an absent or empty channel value inherits it.
The remaining `HopMode.*` keys and their defaults are listed in
[Keys in the declaration catalog](#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog), where `HopMode.Enabled` and
`HopMode.RedirectStyle` show "not declared": their defaults are the values above.
**One QR code for the whole transaction.** `Veriqa:HopMode:QrMode` decides what a sign-in window or a
confirmation page with several channels shows while hop mode is on for at least one of them:
| Value | The page shows |
| - | - |
| `PerChannel` | Tabs, each channel with its own QR code. Default. |
| `Unified` | One QR code for the whole transaction and the channel buttons beside it, no tabs; the channel is picked on the phone that scans it. |
| `UnifiedWithChannels` | Both: the first tab, "Any channel", holds the one QR code and the buttons of every channel; a tab per channel follows with that channel's own QR code and its button. |
A page of one channel, a page under `ShowQrCode: Never` and a phone under `DesktopOnly` show no tabs
whatever the value.
In a desktop window wide enough for it, a page with the single QR code uses two columns — the QR code
on the left, the channel buttons on the right; a narrower window, and a page that shows no channel buttons
on the desktop ([`ShowChannelButton`](/docs/guides/customization#channel-button-visibility): `MobileOnly` or `Never`), keep one column.
`Veriqa:HopMode:ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab` (default `true`) decides, under `UnifiedWithChannels`,
whether the "Any channel" tab shows the channel buttons beside the one QR code. With `false` that tab holds
the QR code alone and its instruction asks only to scan it; the tab of each channel keeps its button. A
phone under `ShowQrCode: DesktopOnly` shows no QR code, so it shows the buttons of every channel whatever
the value. Under `PerChannel` and `Unified` the key has no effect.
<Tip>
**We recommend switching hop mode on.** It gives the best user experience: a lighter QR code that
any phone camera reads at once, a "scanned" signal on the desktop page as soon as the phone opens
the link, and a launch page where a direct jump into the messenger app is unreliable. It stays off
by default for one reason: every hop link is built on `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:Issuer`, so with
hop on the issuer has to be stated as an absolute `https` address, or the server does not start.
The phone also has to reach that address — to try hop mode on your own machine, put Veriqa behind
an HTTPS tunnel, see [Testing the integration locally](/docs/integrations/local-testing#hop-mode-on-a-local-setup).
Why hop mode is better is covered in [Hop mode](/docs/concepts/hop-mode).
</Tip>
**The Email channel under hop mode.** The target of the Email channel is an email the phone itself
opens — as it is without hop mode. While the sign-in by an
emailed link is on (`PullEnabled`), the phone gets one page — the address field and the button that
opens the email — under either `RedirectStyle`, and the page never opens the mail client by itself.
With the emailed link off, Email follows `RedirectStyle` like any other channel: `Interstitial` gives
the launch page, which opens the email by itself and keeps a button in case it did not open; `Direct`
redirects straight to the email (`302` to `mailto:`), and that redirect tells the sign-in page that
the email is open in the mail app. See
[Email under hop mode](/docs/guides/channels#email-under-hop-mode).
### Hop mode for one application
The same members can be stated inside the entry of an OIDC client (`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`), and
they then apply to that application only:
| Member of the client entry | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `HopMode:Enabled` | Hop mode for this application, for every channel |
| `HopMode:RedirectStyle` | How the hop link leads to the channel for this application |
| `HopMode:QrMode` | `PerChannel`, `Unified` or `UnifiedWithChannels` for this application |
| `HopMode:ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab` | Whether the "Any channel" tab shows the channel buttons for this application |
| `Channels:{Channel}:HopEnabled` | Overrides `HopMode:Enabled` of the entry for this channel |
| `Channels:{Channel}:HopRedirectStyle` | Overrides `HopMode:RedirectStyle` of the entry for this channel |
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "portal",
"HopMode": { "Enabled": true },
"Channels": {
"Email": { "HopEnabled": false }
}
}
]
}
}
}
```
For each channel the value is taken in this order: the channel value of the client entry → the
general value of the client entry → the node (its channel value, then the node-wide one). A client
entry that states nothing inherits the node. A value that cannot be read — `"HopEnabled": "maybe"`,
or a style name other than `Interstitial` / `Direct` — is skipped with a warning in the log, and the
next value in that order applies. A style stated as a number that names neither of the two is skipped
the same way, but without the warning. The other hop settings — what is collected about the
scanning device, `TokenLifetime` and `HopPath` — are set for the node only.
The endpoint behind the hop link (`HopPath`) exists only when hop mode is on at startup for a channel
that is enabled on the node — node-wide, for that channel, or in at least one client entry. Client
entries are read once at startup: if hop mode was off everywhere and you turn it on in a client
entry, restart the host. Whenever hop mode is on, `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:Issuer` has to be an
absolute `https` URL — in a client entry as well as on the node.
## Infrastructure
Flat keys read by the host, mostly relevant when you run more than one instance or behind a proxy:
| Key | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `Veriqa:SignalR:RedisConnectionString` | SignalR backplane; unset means single-instance |
| `Veriqa:DataProtection:RedisConnectionString` | DataProtection keys in Redis |
| `Veriqa:DataProtection:KeysDirectory` | DataProtection keys on disk (a shared volume) |
| `Veriqa:ChannelStores:Redis:ConnectionString` | Channel stores in Redis, shared by every instance; unset means in-process stores. With the transaction store on `Redis` it must equal `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:ConnectionString`, otherwise the host does not start. See [Storage](/docs/guides/storage#channel-stores-multiple-replicas) |
| `Veriqa:ChannelStores:Redis:*` | The other parameters of the channel stores under their own names: `PromptKeyPrefix`, `EmailActionTokenKeyPrefix`, `EmailPushCorrelationKeyPrefix`, `ProcessedMessageKeyPrefix`, `EmailClaimCompletionKeyPrefix`, `PhoneRequestCorrelationKeyPrefix`, `LinkHandleKeyPrefix`, `StartCodeKeyPrefix`, `ProcessedMessageRetention` (`hh:mm:ss`) |
| `Veriqa:Events:RabbitMq:ConnectionString` | Switches the RabbitMQ event publisher on; unset means no publishing. The other keys of the section: `ExchangeName`, `QueueCapacity`, `MaxReconnectAttempts`, `ReconnectBaseDelaySeconds`. See [Storage](/docs/guides/storage#publishing-transaction-events) |
| `Veriqa:CollectedClaims:Store:Enabled` | Collected claims store, `false` by default: `true` keeps the claims Veriqa collected in the transaction store database and requires `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:ConnectionString` — without it the host does not start. It does not combine with `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:Store:Provider` = `Redis`: Redis has no relational database to hold the claims, and the host does not start either. See [Storage](/docs/guides/storage#collected-claims-store) |
| `ForwardedHeaders:KnownProxies` / `:KnownIPNetworks` | Trusted proxies behind TLS termination |
| `Veriqa:PathBase` | Path prefix the host is deployed under, for example `/auth/veriqa`; unset means the root of the host name. Starts with `/`, does not end with `/`, and has no `?`, `#`, `%`, `\`, whitespace or `.` / `..` segment — another form stops the host at startup. See [Behind a reverse proxy](/docs/guides/reverse-proxy#under-a-path-prefix) |
With neither DataProtection option set, keys live in memory and are lost on restart — fine for
development, broken for a scaled deployment.
<Note>
**Redis licensing.** Redis server ≥ 7.4 ships under RSALv2/SSPL (8.x additionally offers AGPL).
That does not affect Veriqa's license, but if it affects your policy, **Valkey** (BSD) is a
drop-in alternative.
</Note>
## Veriqa:Channels
Every channel lives under `Veriqa:Channels:{Channel}` and activates only with `"Enabled": true`. Full
setup with the provider-side steps is in [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels).
| Section | Key settings |
| - | - |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Telegram` | `BotToken`, `UpdateMode`, `WebhookBaseUrl`, `WebhookSecretToken`, `BotUsername` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Max` | `BotToken`, `UpdateMode`, `WebhookBaseUrl`, `WebhookSecretToken`, `BotPublicName` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:WhatsApp` | `Provider`, `BusinessPhoneNumber`, `MetaCloudApi:*`, `Twilio:*` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Instagram` | `AppSecret`, `WebhookVerifyToken`, `AccessToken`, `AccountId`, `Username`, `GraphApiBaseUrl`, `GraphApiVersion`, `UnaddressedReplyEnabled` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Messenger` | `PageId`, `PageName`, `PageAccessToken`, `AppSecret`, `WebhookVerifyToken`, `GraphApiBaseUrl`, `GraphApiVersion`, `UnaddressedReplyEnabled`, `DeepLinkByPageId` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:WeChat` | `AppId`, `AppSecret`, `Token`, `ApiBaseUrl` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Viber` | `AuthToken`, `BotUri`, `SenderName`, `WebhookBaseUrl`, `ApiBaseUrl` |
| `Veriqa:Channels:Email` | `PublicBaseUrl`, `PullEnabled`, `PushEnabled`, `TokenTtl`, `MailResendInterval`, `Outbound:*`, `Inbound:*` |
Two more keys go into the section of **any** channel, a channel of a third-party adapter included:
`SpareStartCodeEnabled` (`bool`, defaults to `true`) switches the spare start code the sign-in page
offers for a channel that keeps a working link, and `BotName` (text, not set by default) states the
name the user sees the chat under — it wins over the name the channel reports. Both are keys of the
core with the channel as a dimension, `Channels.SpareStartCodeEnabled` and `Channels.BotName` in the
[catalog](#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog), stated in the configuration of the host or for a tenant.
What they change on the pages: [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels#settings-every-chat-channel-shares).
### InboundVerification — a required key of every channel section
`Veriqa:Channels:{Channel}:InboundVerification` declares **how the authenticity of an incoming event
of that channel is verified**. The value comes from a closed dictionary:
| Value | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `signature` | The request body is signed with a platform key (HMAC and the like) |
| `shared_secret` | The incoming request presents a shared secret (a header, a token) |
| `outbound_fetch` | There are no incoming requests — Veriqa fetches the events with an outgoing request of its own |
| `none` | The authenticity of an incoming event is not verified |
<Warning>
**The key is required for every enabled channel.** A deployment where a channel declared at core
level is enabled (`"Enabled": true`) and the value is missing or outside the dictionary **does not
start**: the message names the channel type, the address of the key and all
four admitted tokens. State the value in the sections of disabled channels too — then flipping
`Enabled` to `true` does not break startup. The startup check walks exactly the set of channels
the core builds its enabled list from: all shipped channels are in it, a channel plugged in
through the SPI with a bare `AddChannel` call is not — the key of its section is needed as well,
but a missing value does not prevent startup, see
[Your own channel adapter](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter).
</Warning>
**You** declare the fact, not the adapter and not the core: Veriqa only sees that a check ran and
passed, never what the check was — and deriving the value from the channel type would leave a
third-party channel with nothing to describe it. The value for every built-in channel and mode is in
[Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels). A channel that fetches its updates itself
(`UpdateMode: Polling`) while declaring anything other than `outbound_fetch` produces a `Warning` at
startup; startup continues.
The declared value reaches the audit record as an attribute of its own, so the audit log shows what a
confirmation was protected by.
### OutcomeNotice — where the receipt of an outcome appears
`Veriqa:Channels:OutcomeNotice:DisplayIntent` (key `Channels.OutcomeNotice.DisplayIntent`) says
**how you want the receipt of a terminal outcome to appear** in the conversation. It is stated over
three levels — core, tenant and application — and each of them overrides the one below it freely: the
global section sets the intent of the whole installation, a tenant states its own with the member
`OutcomeNoticeDisplayIntent` of its record, and a single application with the member of the same name
in its OIDC client entry. A `ui_config` record states no intent. Whatever level answers, the value
covers the outcome as a whole — a confirmation, a decline and an expiry are all shown the same way.
| Value | What it asks for |
| - | - |
| `ReplacePrompt` | The receipt takes the place of the message that asked the question: the conversation keeps one message, and the buttons go away with the text they belonged to |
| `NewMessage` | The receipt arrives as a message of its own; the question stays in the conversation with its wording untouched, and its buttons are taken away where the platform can do that without rewriting the text |
The shipped value is `ReplacePrompt` — what the channels did before the setting existed, so a
deployment that states nothing sees no change. An unreadable value is read as nothing stated and
answers `ReplacePrompt` too; startup is not interrupted.
<Note>
**This is an intent, not a guarantee.** Telegram and MAX honor it. WhatsApp, Instagram, Messenger, WeChat and Viber always send a new
message, and Email shows no outcome receipt at all — as they ship today. An adapter that does not
honor the intent is not failing: nothing is logged as an error and the result of the delivery does
not change. With `NewMessage` the receipt arrives as its own message and the buttons of the
question are taken away as part of the same delivery, where the platform can change a message's
buttons without rewriting its text; the wording of the question is never rewritten. Failing to take
the buttons away is not a failure of the delivery either — and where a button does survive, pressing
it only earns another receipt, because a terminal transaction cannot be replayed.
</Note>
## Veriqa:CompletionBehavior
What a channel does **after a sign-in is completed**. It is one action, stated for every channel at
once or for a channel of its own, and — for the actions that show buttons — what those buttons are.
| Key | Default | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `Action` | `None` | The action for every channel that has no entry in `ActionByChannel` of the same level: `None` — nothing is sent after the sign-in; `WelcomeMessage` — the user receives a welcome message in the channel they signed in through; `Menu` — a message with a list of buttons; `Redirect` — a message with one button that opens a link |
| `ActionByChannel` | — | Map "channel type → action" **of the same level**, read before that level's `Action`; the channel type is matched case-insensitively. A channel absent from the map takes the `Action` of the same level |
| `MenuItems` | `[]` | The buttons of `Menu` for every channel that has no entry in `MenuItemsByChannel` of the same level, in display order. Each item is `{ "Text": "…", "Action": "…" }`. An empty list states nothing |
| `MenuItemsByChannel` | — | Map "channel type → items" **of the same level**, read before that level's `MenuItems`; the channel type is matched case-insensitively |
| `RedirectUrl` | not set | The address of the `Redirect` button for every channel that has no entry in `RedirectUrlByChannel` of the same level: an absolute URL written as `scheme://…`. May carry the `{handle}` placeholder — [a link handle](#menu-and-redirect-a-message-with-buttons) |
| `RedirectUrlByChannel` | — | Map "channel type → address" **of the same level**, read before that level's `RedirectUrl`; the channel type is matched case-insensitively |
| `RedirectButtonText` | `Open` | The label of the `Redirect` button — one for every channel |
The action is stated on three ownership levels, and the nearest level that states it wins: the client
→ the tenant → this global section. Above the global section the same members sit in the
`CompletionBehavior` section of the level's own record — for an application that is
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients[].CompletionBehavior:Action` and `…:ActionByChannel`. A `ui_config` record
states no action: this is behavior, not presentation. The shipped value is `None`, so a deployment
that states nothing sees no change. A value the setting does not accept never interrupts startup,
and how far it reaches depends on its shape. A text that is not one of the names of the setting —
in `Action` or in an entry of `ActionByChannel` — leaves the whole level unstated: neither member of
that level is read, and the action comes from the level below. A number that names no action
discards only the entry it stands in: with `Action: "WelcomeMessage"` and
`ActionByChannel: { "telegram": 7 }` on one level, `telegram` takes that level's `WelcomeMessage`.
The action is ONE setting stated per channel: `ActionByChannel` and `Action` are two entries of the
same level, and a level exhausts both of them before the lookup moves on to the level
below. So a client that states only `Action` wins the action **for every** channel — the per-channel
map of the global section is never reached. To keep a channel's own action, name it in the map of the
same level that states `Action`.
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"CompletionBehavior": {
"Action": "None",
"ActionByChannel": { "telegram": "WelcomeMessage" }
}
}
}
```
Here a sign-in through `telegram` is followed by a welcome message, and a sign-in through any other
channel by nothing.
**What a channel performs is a fact of the channel**, not of your configuration:
| Channel type | Actions the channel performs |
| - | - |
| `telegram`, `max` | `None`, `WelcomeMessage`, `Menu`, `Redirect` |
| `whatsapp` | `None`, `WelcomeMessage` |
| `email` | `None` |
| a channel that declares nothing — a custom SPI adapter, a channel connected over HTTP | `None` |
An action the channel does not perform is never handed to it. It is replaced by the channel's own
default — `None` for every channel in the table — and the replacement is loud: a `Warning` in the
log and an audit event `channel_completion_behavior_clamped` whose details read
`requested=<action>; applied=<action>`. The sign-in itself completes as usual. The audit record
names the tenant and the client of the sign-in — the levels the action may have been stated on —
and, as its actor, the masked channel user. It carries the failure outcome, as every channel event
does, although the sign-in succeeded. `None`
is never replaced: doing nothing is honored on every channel, silently.
### Menu and Redirect: a message with buttons
`Menu` and `Redirect` send one message: a text with buttons under it. `Redirect` is a single button
that opens a link; `Menu` is a list of buttons, one in a row, in the order you state them. The
channels that perform them are in the table above; on any other channel the action is replaced, as
described there.
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"CompletionBehavior": {
"Action": "None",
"ActionByChannel": { "telegram": "Menu" },
"MenuItems": [
{ "Text": "Open the app", "Action": "https://app.example.com/home" },
{ "Text": "My orders", "Action": "orders" }
]
}
}
}
```
Here a sign-in through `telegram` is followed by a menu of two buttons: the first opens a link, the
second is handed to your code. A redirect needs the address only — the label ships as `Open`:
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"CompletionBehavior": {
"ActionByChannel": { "telegram": "Redirect" },
"RedirectUrl": "https://app.example.com/home"
}
}
}
```
**The items and the address are stated like the action.** `MenuItems` and `RedirectUrl` live on the
same three levels, each next to its own per-channel map, and a level exhausts its map and its plain
member before the level below is read — so a client that states only `RedirectUrl` wins the address
for every channel. `RedirectButtonText` is one value per level, with no per-channel map. A
`ui_config` record states none of them.
**The labels are translated, the address is not touched.** `Text` of an item and
`RedirectButtonText` are looked up in the locale files of your host in the language of the
recipient; a label no file carries is shown as you wrote it. The address is sent exactly as stated:
nothing about the user is substituted into it. The text above the buttons is a message of its own —
the kind `post-login-menu` or `post-login-redirect`, worded and overridden like any other message:
[Veriqa:MessageTemplates](#veriqamessagetemplates).
**What makes an item a link.** An `Action` written as an absolute URL with `scheme://` in front —
`https://…`, `tg://…` — becomes a link button. Any other value is **callback data**: the button
sends it back when pressed. The rule is the same one `RedirectUrl` is checked by. An address without
`//` — `mailto:…`, `tel:…` — is therefore read as callback data, not as a link. A value with a space
or a line break at either edge is not accepted at all — neither as `RedirectUrl` nor as an `Action`:
it is reported like any other value outside the setting's domain, and an item written that way takes
its whole list with it. Whether a scheme is
allowed on a button is the platform's decision: an address it refuses fails the send, and the message
does not go out.
**A link can carry a link handle.** Write `{handle}` — in exactly this case — into `RedirectUrl`, an
entry of `RedirectUrlByChannel` or the `Action` of a link item, for example
`https://t.me/shop_bot?start={handle}`. When the message is sent, every `{handle}` in its addresses is
replaced by one single-use value of 22 characters `[0-9A-Za-z]`; your server exchanges it for the
identity of the user who signed in —
[Two bots](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#two-bots-handing-the-user-over-to-your-bot). One message carries
one handle, valid for `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:CompletedRetentionSeconds` from the moment it is
issued. An address without the placeholder is sent as written and no handle is issued; there is no
separate setting to switch this on. In callback data `{handle}` is not replaced — the value goes out
as written. If the handle cannot be issued — the sign-in belongs to no client, or the handle store
refused the record — the buttons that ask for it are not sent and a `Warning` is written: `Redirect`
sends nothing, `Menu` goes out without those items. The sign-in is not affected.
**A callback item is handed to your code.** The press reaches the built-in channel adapter — the bot
is yours and Veriqa runs in the same process — and is passed to the handler you register:
```csharp theme={null}
builder.Services.AddScoped<IMenuItemPressHandler, OrdersMenuHandler>();
public sealed class OrdersMenuHandler : IMenuItemPressHandler
{
public Task HandleAsync(MenuItemPress press, CancellationToken cancellationToken = default)
{
// press.ChannelType, press.ChannelUserId, press.TenantId (null — the default tenant),
// press.Value — the value the pressed button carried: the Action of the item
// as it was stated when the message was sent. Check it before acting on it.
return Task.CompletedTask;
}
}
```
`IMenuItemPressHandler` and `MenuItemPress` come with the `Veriqa.Core.Contracts` package. The handler
returns nothing: the press is already answered to the platform, and what it means is up to you.
The event names no sign-in — the menu is shown after the sign-in is over. The handler is created
when an item is pressed, in the scope of that event, and for no other event of the channel. An
exception — thrown by its constructor or by `HandleAsync` — is logged and affects neither the user
nor any sign-in.
**Return quickly.** `HandleAsync` is awaited while the event is being processed. Until it returns
the platform is not told that the event was received: a webhook left unanswered is delivered again, and your
handler gets the same press twice; in polling mode the events of other users wait behind it. Put
anything slow into a background queue of your own and return.
**Treat `press.Value` as untrusted input.** A button outlives the configuration that drew it: an item
you removed from `MenuItems` can still be pressed in an old message, and Veriqa does not check the
value against the items configured today. Check the value, and what this user may do, in your
handler.
**Without a registered handler callback items are not drawn.** A `Warning` names how many were left
out; the link items of the same menu are still sent. A press of a button sent before a restart that
dropped the handler is left without processing.
**When nothing is sent.** `Menu` with no items stated for the channel, `Menu` whose every item was
left out, and `Redirect` with no address stated each write a `Warning` and send nothing; the sign-in
completes as usual. A value the setting does not accept never interrupts startup and leaves its
entry unstated, so the value comes from the next entry or the level below: a `RedirectUrl` that is
not a URL, and a list in which any item has a blank `Text` or `Action` — one such item takes the
whole list of that entry out. An empty list states nothing either: to switch a menu off on a level
above, state the `Action`, not an empty list.
**The platform's budget is checked before the send**, by the limits the platform itself names:
| Channel type | Checked before the send | What happens over the limit |
| - | - | - |
| `telegram` | the payload of a callback button — 64 bytes in UTF-8, **the marker `vq_menu_` included**, which leaves 56 bytes for your `Action` | that button is left out with a `Warning`; the rest are sent |
| `max` | the address of a link button — 2048 characters. The platform names no limit for the payload of a callback button, so nothing is checked beforehand | a link button over the limit is left out with a `Warning`. A callback value the platform refuses fails the send: **the whole message does not go out**, not one button |
A message none of whose buttons can be drawn is not sent.
How a post-completion message behaves — the welcome message and a message with buttons alike:
* It follows **every** completed sign-in of a channel that performs the action — confirmed in the channel,
confirmed on the web page, or completed by the steps that collect missing claims. A confirmation
your server creates is not a sign-in and is followed by nothing.
* It arrives as a message of its own, **after** the outcome receipt, and never replaces it.
* A failure to send it is logged and does not change the result of the sign-in.
* The text of the welcome is the message kind `post-login-welcome` — worded, localized and overridden
like any other message: [Veriqa:MessageTemplates](#veriqamessagetemplates).
* Delivery is not recorded on the transaction. An event repeated in order earns no second message;
the same event processed twice at the same moment may, as the product ships today.
In the [catalog table](#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog) the key `CompletionBehavior.Action` shows
`not declared` in the Default column: the shipped `None` is applied where no level states the action,
the same way as the shipped resolution of `AuthPageDesign.QrCode.PixelsPerModule`.
`CompletionBehavior.MenuItems` and `CompletionBehavior.RedirectUrl` show `not declared` for a plainer
reason: the product ships no menu and no address.
## Veriqa:MessageTemplates
Everything the user reads in the messenger and in email is a **message**. One message is **two**
settings rather than one text: the **contract** declares which slots the message has, and the
**template** carries the wordings that use those slots. Hence two addresses — one pair per message,
not one line per text:
| Setting | Address on the `Core` level |
| - | - |
| Contract | `Veriqa:MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction type}]:[ByAction:{action type}]:Contract` |
| Template | `Veriqa:MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction type}]:[ByAction:{action type}]:[BySurface:{surface}]:[ByChannel:{channel}]:Templates` |
The bracketed groups are optional: a wording that does not narrow along an axis drops that group
whole — which is how one address serves every step of the lookup, from the most specific
(`{kind, transaction type, action type, surface, channel}`) down to the broadest (`{kind}`). The kind
never drops out: "the text of **which** message" is the question itself.
One group is not independent: `ByAction` is read **only under `ByType`**. No step of the lookup names
an action type without its transaction type, so a wording at `{kind}:ByAction:{action type}` would
never be reached — the host refuses to start on it, saying the address is "narrowed by a combination
of axes no step of its ladder addresses". A confirmation's action type is therefore worded at
`{kind}:ByType:confirmation:ByAction:{action type}`.
The kinds the product ships:
| Kind | What it is |
| - | - |
| `confirmation-prompt` | the sign-in confirmation request a channel shows to the user |
| `sign-in-mail` | the Email channel's sign-in email: its subject and its body |
| `claim-code-mail` | the email with a code that confirms an email address the user entered on the web step of the claims completion |
| `claim-link-mail` | the email with a link that confirms an email address the user entered on the web step of the claims completion |
| `claim-code-link-mail` | the email with both a code and a link, sent when the list of ways names `Code` and `MagicLink` together; the address is confirmed by whichever the user does first |
| `deeplink-prefill` | the pre-filled message the user sends themselves (WhatsApp, Email Push) |
| `phone-number-request` | the text of the request for a phone number the user may skip (`Optional`), which the claims completion sends into the user's chat; the labels of its buttons are not part of the message |
| `phone-number-request-required` | the same request for a phone number the sign-in cannot finish without (`Required`); a wording stated for one of the two kinds does not answer for the other |
| `web-confirmation-notice` | the message a channel sends into the user's chat once a sign-in has started under `LoginConfirmation.Mode` = `OnWebPage`, to send the user to the sign-in page where the question is asked; sent once per sign-in, by the channels that send messages into the chat (Email does not). Ships one wording, at the bare kind: `Sign-in started — confirm it on the sign-in page` |
| `outcome-receipt-confirmed` | the outcome receipt for a confirmed decision — the terminal text a transaction answers with |
| `outcome-receipt-declined` | the outcome receipt for a declined decision |
| `outcome-receipt-expired` | the outcome receipt for an expired transaction |
| `outcome-receipt-awaiting-claims` | the state a channel shows while a confirmed sign-in waits for the claims completion; it is not a terminal receipt — the receipt of the outcome follows as a message of its own. Ships one wording, at the bare kind: `Sign-in confirmed. One step left: provide the requested details to finish.` |
| `post-login-welcome` | the welcome message a channel sends after a completed sign-in, when `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior` asks for one |
| `post-login-menu` | the text above the buttons of the menu a channel sends after a completed sign-in, when `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior` resolves to `Menu` |
| `post-login-redirect` | the text above the link button a channel sends after a completed sign-in, when `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior` resolves to `Redirect` |
A template's value is a **ladder of steps**, fullest to minimal, as one array. A step is either a
string (a text that suits any sink) or a structure `{ "Subject": "…", "Html": "…", "Plain": "…" }`,
where `Html` and `Plain` are the **editions** of the step: an email is composed once and carries both of
its parts at once. Each edition is optional, but a step must state at least one — otherwise startup
fails, naming the message kind and the number of the step. The one shown is the first step that states
the edition asked for and has all of its slots filled, so the two parts of one email may come from
different steps, and the subject is taken from the step chosen for `Html`. An edition no step states is
one the email does not carry at all — that is how an HTML-only email is declared. The minimal step must
lean on guaranteed slots only — checked at startup, on **every** step and for **every edition**
separately. A declaration replaces the ladder whole: the steps stated at different addresses are never
merged.
**A wording the product ships may sit at a narrower address than the one you write.** The lookup goes
level by level, and a level exhausts every step of the address — from the most specific down to the
broadest — before the resolution drops to the level below. The shipped declarations are the fallback of
the `Core` level, read at the **same** addresses; and `Veriqa:MessageTemplates` in your
`appsettings.json` **is** that level. So a declaration of yours placed at a broader address than the
shipped one is never reached: the narrower step answers first, and it answers from the product. Nothing
fails and nothing is logged — your configuration is valid, it is simply never asked for. (A record
above the core is a different level and is read before it, so a wording in a client entry is not
shadowed this way — but it applies to that client alone.)
The outcome receipts are where this is met first. Each of the three terminal kinds ships a wording at the bare
`{kind}` **and** narrower ones for a sign-in:
| Shipped address of `outcome-receipt-confirmed` | Text |
| - | - |
| `outcome-receipt-confirmed:Templates` | `Confirmed ✅` |
| `…:ByType:login:BySurface:in-channel-messenger:Templates` | `Sign-in confirmed ✅` |
| `…:ByType:login:BySurface:in-channel-messenger:ByDevice:mobile:Templates` and `…:ByDevice:tablet:Templates` | `Sign-in confirmed ✅ Tap Back to return to the sign-in page.` |
| `…:ByType:login:BySurface:in-channel-plain:Templates` | `Sign-in confirmed` |
| `…:ByType:login:BySurface:in-channel-plain:ByDevice:mobile:Templates` and `…:ByDevice:tablet:Templates` | `Sign-in confirmed. Tap Back to return to the sign-in page.` |
| `…:ByType:login:BySurface:email-confirm-page:Templates` | `Sign-in confirmed! You can close this tab.` |
`outcome-receipt-declined` ships the four addresses without `ByDevice`; `outcome-receipt-expired`
ships those four plus a step at `ByType:login`. A receipt of a **sign-in** shown in a messenger asks
about `{kind, login, in-channel-messenger}` — and about the channel, which no shipped receipt narrows
by, and about the device the sign-in was started on — so restating
`outcome-receipt-confirmed:Templates` changes nothing there. Word it at the same addresses the
product used, the two device steps included:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"MessageTemplates": {
"outcome-receipt-confirmed": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [ { "Name": "app", "Type": "string", "Source": "ServerInitiatorContext" } ]
},
"ByType": {
"login": {
"BySurface": {
"in-channel-messenger": {
"Templates": [ "Signed in to {app} ✅", "Signed in ✅" ],
"ByDevice": {
"mobile": { "Templates": [ "Signed in to {app} ✅ Tap Back to return.", "Signed in ✅ Tap Back to return." ] },
"tablet": { "Templates": [ "Signed in to {app} ✅ Tap Back to return.", "Signed in ✅ Tap Back to return." ] }
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
```
**A sign-in started on a phone or a tablet gets a receipt of its own.** The button of the channel
opens the app on the same device, so the receipt tells the user how to get back to the sign-in page;
a sign-in started on a computer keeps the short text. The device steps are the reason the example
above states `ByDevice`: in the configuration of the host a shipped step that names the device is
asked before your step at the same address without it, so a declaration of
`…:in-channel-messenger:Templates` alone leaves phones and tablets with the shipped
`Sign-in confirmed ✅ Tap Back to return to the sign-in page.`. A declaration in a client entry, a
tenant record or a `ui_config` record is a level above the core and answers whole — no shipped step
is reached from there.
The contract stays at the root of the kind — it narrows by the transaction type and the action type and
never by the surface — and the ladder ends with a step using no slot, because no slot of a receipt is
guaranteed (below).
A receipt of a **confirmation** is a different address: the shipped file states nothing under
`ByType:confirmation`, so there the broad `{kind}` declaration is the step that answers and rewording it
works as written. The surfaces a receipt is addressed with are `in-channel-messenger` (a channel that
renders emoji — the messengers the product ships an adapter for, and any channel declaring as much of
itself), `in-channel-plain` (a channel that does not), `email-confirm-page` (the confirmation page of
the Email channel), `core-page` (the confirmation page Veriqa serves itself) and `interaction-page` (the
page a confirmation with no browser callback leaves the user on).
**Outcome receipts are plain text only.** All four `outcome-receipt-*` kinds ship with one edition —
`Plain` — and the general rule "an edition no step states is one the email does not carry" does not
apply to them: a receipt has a single part, and not showing it means not answering the user at all.
So a receipt ladder overridden with the `Html` edition **only** yields no text whatsoever — that is a
broken installation rather than a different look: the render fails, naming the message kind, and no
other edition is substituted for it. Escaping a receipt on its way into a page is the page's
job, so plain text takes nothing away from your wording.
**A receipt can name what was confirmed.** The shipped contract of the three receipt kinds declares
no slots, so the shipped receipts say nothing about the action. Declare caller slots in the contract of
a receipt on your level — under `ByType:confirmation:ByAction:{action type}` to word it per action —
and the receipt is filled from the `slot_values` the confirmation was created with, by the same names.
A caller slot of a receipt states `MaxLength`, as it does in the question:
```json theme={null}
"outcome-receipt-confirmed": {
"ByType": {
"confirmation": {
"ByAction": {
"purchase-title": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [ { "Name": "title", "Type": "string", "MaxLength": 64 } ]
},
"Templates": [ "Purchase confirmed: “{title}” ✅", "Purchase confirmed ✅" ]
}
}
}
}
}
```
A value the
transaction does not carry (a sign-in, a confirmation created without it) leaves the step that uses
it out, and the next step answers — so the minimal step of a receipt never counts a caller slot as
guaranteed, even one marked `Required`. A receipt answering a decision from a channel the question
was never shown in gets no caller values, and neither does a receipt on the entry page of a
confirmation unless `InteractionPage` is in `ConfirmationSubjectDisplay.Surfaces`. The server slots
described below are filled there all the same, except `outcome_at` on the entry page.
**A receipt can also carry what the product knows about the transaction.** Its contract may declare
the server slots `app`, `browser`, `os`, `region` (type `string`, `Source: ServerInitiatorContext`) and
`outcome_at` (type `datetime`, `Source: ServerSystem`); a caller value never fills them. Naming one of those five `Source: Caller` instead is not refused at startup, but it does not hand you the slot: `app` is always the product's, and the other four are yours only on the branches where the product has no value of its own. Use a name of your own instead. `app` names the
application: the `client_id` of a confirmation, the client's display name (or its `client_id`) for a
sign-in. `browser`, `os` and `region` come from the initiator context, so only a sign-in has them, and
they obey the same `Enabled` and `DisplayFields` of `Veriqa:InitiatorContext` as the sign-in prompt.
`outcome_at` is the moment of the decision, or the deadline of an expired transaction; the entry page words
its receipts before the outcome, so there it has no value. None of these
slots is guaranteed in a receipt, even one marked `Guaranteed`, so the minimal step cannot rest on them.
**The welcome message greets the user by name.** The kind `post-login-welcome` is the text sent when
[`Veriqa:CompletionBehavior`](#veriqacompletionbehavior) resolves to `WelcomeMessage`. Its shipped
contract declares one slot — `name` (type `string`, `Source: ServerIdentityClaims`), filled from the
`name` claim of the identity the sign-in resolved — and its shipped ladder has two steps:
```json theme={null}
"post-login-welcome": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [ { "Name": "name", "Type": "string", "Source": "ServerIdentityClaims" } ]
},
"Templates": [ "Welcome, {name}! You are signed in.", "Welcome! You are signed in." ]
}
```
A channel that gave no name leaves the first step out, and the second answers. The message is sent as
plain text and in the language of the recipient — the one the channel reported, otherwise the language
of the page the sign-in started on. `name` is the only claim a slot is filled from as the product
ships today: a slot of the same source under another name gets no value, so a step that uses it is
always left out. Word the message per channel under
`post-login-welcome:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:{channel}:Templates`.
The levels of the two settings differ. The contract resolves from `Tenant`,
`Application` and `Core`; the template from those **plus** a `ui_config` record. So a record selected
by a request parameter can pick which of your wordings a user sees, yet can neither widen the slot
list nor introduce an action type of its own.
<Note>
**The `Tenant` level.** No reader for the `Tenant` level is registered out of the box — the
integrator writes one. Without it the resolution goes to `Application`/`Core`.
</Note>
**The `Application` level is the client entry.** Above the core the address is relative to the
record of the level, and the record of `Application` is the entry of the client in
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients`: the contract of a message for one application sits at
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients:[n]:MessageTemplates:{kind}:…:Contract`.
**Action types of confirmations your server creates** are message kinds of their own, and they are
declared **only above the core** — in the client entry, as `MessageTemplates:{action type}` with a
`Contract` and `Templates`. A kind visible only in the host section `Veriqa:MessageTemplates` is
refused by `POST /api/transaction/confirmation` with `action_type_unknown`. A complete example with
the request and the answer: [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api).
**The `device_type` axis refines any step.** Its value is the type of the device the transaction was
started on, as the [initiator context](#veriqainitiatorcontext) states it — `desktop`, `mobile`,
`tablet` or `unknown` — and its group, `ByDevice`, is the innermost one: it stands under whichever
node the rest of the address names, the bare `{kind}` included, and needs no surface. A step that
names the device is asked immediately before the same step without it, so a wording without
`ByDevice` keeps answering for every device no wording was stated for. Only the receipts are asked
about the device today; a transaction with no initiator context — it is switched off, or the device
type is not collected — is asked about without it. The contract of a message does not narrow by the
device.
**The `channel` axis refines the surface**, so it never appears without
`surface`. The product ships six values along it — both wordings of the pre-filled message, under
`deeplink-prefill:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:whatsapp` and `…:ByChannel:email`, and the request
for the phone number in Instagram and in Messenger, under
`phone-number-request:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:instagram` and `…:ByChannel:messenger` and at
the same two addresses of `phone-number-request-required`;
the other kinds state no value along this axis, and a step without a channel answers for every channel at once.
Asking a key about an axis it does not declare is an error.
**Wording a message for one channel** therefore takes the surface as well. The request for the phone
number is the plain case: `phone-number-request` ships `Share your phone number` at the bare `{kind}`
and a wording for each of two channels — Instagram and Messenger, which adds what to do without a
number in the profile ([phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number#instagram)) — and it is asked about with the surface `in-channel`
and the channel of the sign-in. The request for a `Required` number is the kind
`phone-number-request-required`, shipped and addressed the same way. A wording for one channel sits at
`Veriqa:MessageTemplates:phone-number-request:BySurface:in-channel:ByChannel:{channel}:Templates`:
```json appsettings.json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"MessageTemplates": {
"phone-number-request": {
"BySurface": {
"in-channel": {
"ByChannel": {
"telegram": {
"Templates": [ "Tap the button below to share your phone number" ]
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
```
The other channels keep their shipped text. The same address in a client entry words the request for
one application. The shipped contract of the kind declares no slots, so a wording that uses one needs
a contract of yours at `phone-number-request:Contract`; the request fills the server slots `app`,
`browser`, `os` and `region` from the transaction, by the rules described for the receipts above, and
never a caller slot. End the ladder with a step that uses no slot: `browser`, `os` and `region` may
have no value, a caller slot of this kind never has one, and marking a slot `Guaranteed` or `Required`
does not change that. The
text is rendered as plain text and translated into the user's language like any other wording.
## Health endpoints
| Endpoint | Purpose |
| - | - |
| `/health/live` | Liveness — the process is up |
| `/health/ready` | Readiness — configured dependencies answer |
Readiness registers a check per configured dependency, so it reflects exactly what you wired up:
no database configured means no database check. The remaining endpoints, the metrics and the
traces: [Observability](/docs/guides/observability).
## Keys in the declaration catalog
The table below is built from the **declaration catalog** of keys: the name, the value type, the
levels, the dimensions and the address on every level. The remaining keys are described in the sections above.
The keys below are the ones **Veriqa** owns. The same catalog is open to what you ship: an
extension of your own declares its keys on the core, application and `ui_config` levels through the
same public API, and its declarations join this schema at startup — see
[Declare your own configuration keys](/docs/guides/config-keys).
The "Default" column prints what the owner of the key declared: what the core level answers when its
record states nothing. For a key that declares no such answer, the column says so outright — its defaults live in
the sections above. "Declared, value not printed" stands where an answer is declared and has no text
to it: the declared answer is `null`, or the key is declared secret — the schema of a secret key
carries the fact of the answer and never its text. What an installation put into a setting is in no
column of this table: what is printed here is a declaration, not a resolution.
| Key | Value type | Levels | Dimensions | Address per level | Default | Secret |
| - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| `AuthPage.Instruction` | `string` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `instruction` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPage.Texts` | `CorePageTextOverride` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant | `text` | UiConfig: `texts:{text}`<br />Application: `AuthPage:Texts:{text}`<br />Tenant: `AuthPage:Texts:{text}` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPage.Title` | `string` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `title` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.BrandName` | `string` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | — | UiConfig: `brand_name`<br />Application: `BrandName`<br />Tenant: `BrandName`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:BrandName` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.Cancel.Enabled` | `bool` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | — | UiConfig: `cancel:enabled`<br />Application: `Cancel:Enabled`<br />Tenant: `Cancel:Enabled`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:Cancel:Enabled` | `true` | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.ChannelButton.ShowChannelButton` | `ChannelButtonVisibility` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | — | UiConfig: `channel_button:show_channel_button`<br />Application: `ChannelButton:ShowChannelButton`<br />Tenant: `ChannelButton:ShowChannelButton`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:ChannelButton:ShowChannelButton` | `Always` | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.ChannelLayout` | `ChannelLayout` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | — | UiConfig: `channel_layout`<br />Application: `ChannelLayout`<br />Tenant: `ChannelLayout`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:ChannelLayout` | `Tabs` | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.CustomCss` | `CorePageCustomResource` | UiConfig · Application · Core | — | UiConfig: `custom_css_path`<br />Application: `CustomCssPath`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:CustomCssPath` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.CustomJs` | `CorePageCustomResource` | Application (behind a gate) · Core | — | Application: `CustomJsPath`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:CustomJsPath` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.FooterHtml` | `string` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `FooterHtml`<br />Tenant: `FooterHtml`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:FooterHtml` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.HopInstructionHtml` | `string` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `HopInstructionHtml`<br />Tenant: `HopInstructionHtml`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:HopInstructionHtml` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.LogoUrl` | `string` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | `theme` | UiConfig: `logo_url`<br />Application: `LogoUrl`<br />Tenant: `LogoUrl`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:LogoUrl` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.Preset` | `DesignPreset` | UiConfig · Core | — | UiConfig: `preset`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:Preset` | `Default` | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.PrimaryColor` | `string` | UiConfig · Application · Core | `theme` | UiConfig: `primary_color`<br />Application: `PrimaryColor`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:PrimaryColor` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.QrCode.PixelsPerModule` | `int` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | UiConfig: `qr_code:pixels_per_module`<br />Application: `QrCode:PixelsPerModule`<br />Tenant: `QrCode:PixelsPerModule`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:QrCode:PixelsPerModule` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.QrCode.ShowQrCode` | `QrCodeVisibility` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | — | UiConfig: `qr_code:show_qr_code`<br />Application: `QrCode:ShowQrCode`<br />Tenant: `QrCode:ShowQrCode`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:QrCode:ShowQrCode` | `DesktopOnly` | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.SignalRClientPath` | `string` | UiConfig · Core | — | UiConfig: `signalr_client_path`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:SignalRClientPath` | not declared | no |
| `AuthPageDesign.Theme` | `AuthPageTheme` | UiConfig · Core | — | UiConfig: `theme`<br />Core: `Veriqa:AuthPageDesign:Theme` | `Auto` | no |
| `ChannelDisplay.Channels` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `channels` | not declared | no |
| `ChannelDisplay.Hints` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:ChannelDisplay:Hints:{channel}` | not declared | no |
| `ChannelDisplay.Mode` | `ChannelDisplayMode` | UiConfig · Core | — | UiConfig: `channel_display_mode`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ChannelDisplay:Mode` | `Multichannel` | no |
| `Channels.BotName` | `string` | Tenant · Core | `channel` | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:BotName` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Enabled` | `IReadOnlyCollection`1\` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | no |
| `Channels.HealthProbeInterval` | `TimeSpan` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:HealthProbeInterval` | `00:00:15` | no |
| `Channels.Http.AdapterSettings` | `string` | Tenant · Core | `channel` | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:AdapterSettings` | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.Http.AllowInsecureHttp` | `bool` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:AllowInsecureHttp` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.Http.BaseUrl` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:BaseUrl` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.CodeStart.LinkCarriesTransaction` | `bool?` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:CodeStart:LinkCarriesTransaction` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.CodeStart.MessageTemplate` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:CodeStart:MessageTemplate` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.DeliversOutcomeNotice` | `bool` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:DeliversOutcomeNotice` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.PhoneNumber.Acquisition` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:PhoneNumber:Acquisition` | `[]` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.PhoneNumber.Proof` | `PhoneNumberProof` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:PhoneNumber:Proof` | `NotProven` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.ProvidesRecipientLocale` | `bool` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:ProvidesRecipientLocale` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.RendersEmoji` | `bool?` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:RendersEmoji` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.SupportedMessageKinds` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:SupportedMessageKinds` | `[plain_text]` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.SupportsInChannelConfirmation` | `bool` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:SupportsInChannelConfirmation` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.Http.Capabilities.SupportsMessageUpdate` | `bool` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Capabilities:SupportsMessageUpdate` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.Http.DeepLinkSchemes` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:DeepLinkSchemes` | `[]` | no |
| `Channels.Http.DeepLinkTimeout` | `TimeSpan` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:DeepLinkTimeout` | `00:00:02` | no |
| `Channels.Http.DisplayName` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:DisplayName` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.ErrorMessageText` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:ErrorMessageText` | `Something went wrong. Go back to the sign-in page and start again.` | no |
| `Channels.Http.IconSvgPath` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:IconSvgPath` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.OperationTimeout` | `TimeSpan` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:OperationTimeout` | `00:00:10` | no |
| `Channels.Http.PreviousTransportSecret` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:PreviousTransportSecret` | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.Http.RetryBudget` | `TimeSpan` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:RetryBudget` | `00:00:20` | no |
| `Channels.Http.StaleLinkReplyText` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:StaleLinkReplyText` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.Tenant` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:Tenant` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.TransportSecret` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:TransportSecret` | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.Http.UnaddressedReplyText` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:UnaddressedReplyText` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.Http.UnmatchedCodeReplyText` | `string` | Core | `channel` | Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:Http:UnmatchedCodeReplyText` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.InboundVerification` | `ChannelInboundVerification?` | Tenant · Core | `channel` | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:InboundVerification` | not declared | no |
| `Channels.OutcomeNotice.DisplayIntent` | `OutcomeNoticeDisplayIntent` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `OutcomeNoticeDisplayIntent`<br />Tenant: `OutcomeNoticeDisplayIntent`<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:OutcomeNotice:DisplayIntent` | `ReplacePrompt` | no |
| `Channels.SpareStartCodeEnabled` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | `channel` | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:{channel}:SpareStartCodeEnabled` | `true` | no |
| `Channels.email.Credentials` | `EmailTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.instagram.Credentials` | `InstagramTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.instagram.UnaddressedReplyEnabled` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:Instagram:UnaddressedReplyEnabled` | `true` | no |
| `Channels.max.Credentials` | `MaxTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.messenger.Credentials` | `MessengerTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.messenger.DeepLinkByPageId` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:Messenger:DeepLinkByPageId` | `false` | no |
| `Channels.messenger.UnaddressedReplyEnabled` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: `Veriqa:Channels:Messenger:UnaddressedReplyEnabled` | `true` | no |
| `Channels.telegram.Credentials` | `TelegramTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.viber.Credentials` | `ViberTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.wechat.Credentials` | `WeChatTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `Channels.whatsapp.Credentials` | `WhatsAppTenantCredentials` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | yes |
| `ClaimCompletion.CollectedClaimsRetentionDays` | `int` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `ClaimCompletionCollectedClaimsRetentionDays`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:CollectedClaims:RetentionDays` | `0` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailCodeAttempts` | `int` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:CodeAttempts`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:CodeAttempts`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits:CodeAttempts` | `5` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailMailsPerAddress` | `int` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerAddress`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerAddress`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits:MailsPerAddress` | `5` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailMailsPerDomain` | `int` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerDomain`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerDomain`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits:MailsPerDomain` | `0` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailMailsPerSubject` | `int` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerSubject`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerSubject`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits:MailsPerSubject` | `10` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailMailsPerTransaction` | `int` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerTransaction`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailLimits:MailsPerTransaction`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailLimits:MailsPerTransaction` | `3` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.EmailMethods` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionEmailMethods`<br />Tenant: `ClaimCompletionEmailMethods`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:EmailMethods` | `[Push, Code, MagicLink]` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.FormEnabled` | `bool` | Application · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionFormEnabled`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:FormEnabled` | `true` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.FormSurface` | `ClaimFormSurface` | Application · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionFormSurface`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:FormSurface` | `Auto` | no |
| `ClaimCompletion.PhoneOptionalWindow` | `TimeSpan` | Application · Core | — | Application: `ClaimCompletionPhoneOptionalWindow`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ClaimCompletion:PhoneOptionalWindow` | `00:01:00` | no |
| `Client.InitiateLoginUri` | `string` | Application | — | Application: `InitiateLoginUri` | not declared | no |
| `CompletionBehavior.Action` | `CompletionBehaviorAction` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `CompletionBehavior:Action`<br />Tenant: `CompletionBehavior:Action`<br />Core: `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior:Action` | not declared | no |
| `CompletionBehavior.MenuItems` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `CompletionBehavior:MenuItems`<br />Tenant: `CompletionBehavior:MenuItems`<br />Core: `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior:MenuItems` | not declared | no |
| `CompletionBehavior.RedirectButtonText` | `string` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `CompletionBehavior:RedirectButtonText`<br />Tenant: `CompletionBehavior:RedirectButtonText`<br />Core: `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior:RedirectButtonText` | `Open` | no |
| `CompletionBehavior.RedirectUrl` | `string` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `CompletionBehavior:RedirectUrl`<br />Tenant: `CompletionBehavior:RedirectUrl`<br />Core: `Veriqa:CompletionBehavior:RedirectUrl` | not declared | no |
| `ConfirmationSubjectDisplay.Surfaces` | `IReadOnlyCollection`1\` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `ConfirmationSubjectDisplaySurfaces`<br />Tenant: `ConfirmationSubjectDisplaySurfaces`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ConfirmationSubjectDisplay:Surfaces` | `[]` | no |
| `HealthChecks.ChannelProbeLimit` | `TimeSpan` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:HealthChecks:ChannelProbeLimit` | `00:01:00` | no |
| `HopMode.AcceptClientSignals` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:AcceptClientSignals`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:AcceptClientSignals` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.CollectFingerprint` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:CollectFingerprint`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:CollectFingerprint` | `false` | no |
| `HopMode.CollectGeoLocation` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:CollectGeoLocation`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:CollectGeoLocation` | `false` | no |
| `HopMode.CollectIpAddress` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:CollectIpAddress`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:CollectIpAddress` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.CollectScannerContext` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:CollectScannerContext`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:CollectScannerContext` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.CollectUserAgent` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:CollectUserAgent`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:CollectUserAgent` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.EmitScannedStatus` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:EmitScannedStatus`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:EmitScannedStatus` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.Enabled` | `bool` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `HopMode:Enabled`<br />Tenant: `HopMode:Enabled`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:Enabled` | not declared | no |
| `HopMode.HopPath` | `string` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:HopPath` | `/r` | no |
| `HopMode.QrMode` | `HopQrMode` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `HopMode:QrMode`<br />Tenant: `HopMode:QrMode`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:QrMode` | `PerChannel` | no |
| `HopMode.RedirectStyle` | `HopRedirectStyle` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `HopMode:RedirectStyle`<br />Tenant: `HopMode:RedirectStyle`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:RedirectStyle` | not declared | no |
| `HopMode.ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab` | `bool` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `HopMode:ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab`<br />Tenant: `HopMode:ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:ShowChannelButtonsOnAnyChannelTab` | `true` | no |
| `HopMode.StoreRawUserAgent` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:StoreRawUserAgent`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:StoreRawUserAgent` | `false` | no |
| `HopMode.TokenLifetime` | `TimeSpan?` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: no path<br />Tenant: `HopMode:TokenLifetime`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:TokenLifetime` | declared, value not printed | no |
| `HopMode.WarnOnRepeatScan` | `bool` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `HopMode:WarnOnRepeatScan`<br />Core: `Veriqa:HopMode:WarnOnRepeatScan` | `true` | no |
| `IdentityMatch.ComparableTypes` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `IdentityMatchComparableTypes`<br />Tenant: `IdentityMatchComparableTypes`<br />Core: `Veriqa:IdentityMatch:ComparableTypes` | `[]` | no |
| `InitiatorContext.DisplayFields` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Application · Core | — | Application: `InitiatorContextDisplayFields`<br />Core: `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:DisplayFields` | `[application, browser, os, region]` | no |
| `InitiatorContext.Enabled` | `bool` | Application · Core | — | Application: `InitiatorContextEnabled`<br />Core: `Veriqa:InitiatorContext:Enabled` | `true` | no |
| `Logging.Mode` | `LoggingMode` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: `Logging:Mode` (derived from the name)<br />Core: `Veriqa:Logging:Mode` | `System` | no |
| `Logging.RetentionDays` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:Logging:RetentionDays` | `90` | no |
| `LoginConfirmation.Mode` | `LoginConfirmationMode` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `LoginConfirmationMode`<br />Tenant: `LoginConfirmationMode`<br />Core: `Veriqa:LoginConfirmation:Mode` | `ChannelDefault` | no |
| `MessageTemplates.Contract` | `MessageContract` | Application · Tenant · Core | `kind` · `transaction_type` · `action_type` | Application: `MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:Contract`<br />Tenant: `MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:Contract`<br />Core: `Veriqa:MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:Contract` | not declared | no |
| `MessageTemplates.Template` | `MessageTemplateVariant[]` | UiConfig · Application · Tenant · Core | `kind` · `transaction_type` · `action_type` · `surface` · `channel` · `device_type` | UiConfig: `MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:[BySurface:{surface}]:[ByChannel:{channel}]:[ByDevice:{device_type}]:Templates`<br />Application: `MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:[BySurface:{surface}]:[ByChannel:{channel}]:[ByDevice:{device_type}]:Templates`<br />Tenant: `MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:[BySurface:{surface}]:[ByChannel:{channel}]:[ByDevice:{device_type}]:Templates`<br />Core: `Veriqa:MessageTemplates:{kind}:[ByType:{transaction_type}]:[ByAction:{action_type}]:[BySurface:{surface}]:[ByChannel:{channel}]:[ByDevice:{device_type}]:Templates` | not declared | no |
| `OidcServer.AccessTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:AccessTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `3600` | no |
| `OidcServer.AuthorizationCodeLifetimeSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:AuthorizationCodeLifetimeSeconds` | `300` | no |
| `OidcServer.EnableRefreshTokenRotation` | `bool` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:EnableRefreshTokenRotation` | `true` | no |
| `OidcServer.EnableRevocation` | `bool` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:EnableRevocation` | `true` | no |
| `OidcServer.Issuer` | `string` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:Issuer` | declared, value not printed | no |
| `OidcServer.RefreshTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:Server:RefreshTokenLifetimeSeconds` | `1209600` | no |
| `OpenIddict.ClientCompatibilityQuirks` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Application · Core | — | Application: `CompatibilityQuirks`<br />Core: `Veriqa:OpenIddict:CompatibilityQuirksAllowApplicationOverride` | not declared | no |
| `RateLimit.AuthorizePermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:AuthorizePermitLimit` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.AuthorizeWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:AuthorizeWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.CallbackPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:CallbackPermitLimit` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.CallbackWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:CallbackWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationCreatePermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationCreatePermitLimit` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationCreateWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationCreateWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationPagesPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationPagesPermitLimit` | `30` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationPagesWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationPagesWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationResultPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationResultPermitLimit` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.ConfirmationResultWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:ConfirmationResultWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.EmailStartPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:EmailStartPermitLimit` | `5` | no |
| `RateLimit.EmailStartWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:EmailStartWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.HopResolvePermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:HopResolvePermitLimit` | `30` | no |
| `RateLimit.HopResolveWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:HopResolveWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.HopSignalPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:HopSignalPermitLimit` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.HopSignalWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:HopSignalWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.PollingPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:PollingPermitLimit` | `600` | no |
| `RateLimit.PollingWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:PollingWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.SignalRPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:SignalRPermitLimit` | `30` | no |
| `RateLimit.SignalRWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:SignalRWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.TokenPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:TokenPermitLimit` | `20` | no |
| `RateLimit.TokenWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:TokenWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.UserAuthPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:UserAuthPermitLimit` | `5` | no |
| `RateLimit.UserAuthWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:UserAuthWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RateLimit.WebhookPermitLimit` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:WebhookPermitLimit` | `100` | no |
| `RateLimit.WebhookWindowSeconds` | `int` | Core | — | Core: `Veriqa:RateLimit:WebhookWindowSeconds` | `60` | no |
| `RestrictionPolicy.Channel` | `RestrictionPolicySet` | Application · Tenant · Core | `channel` | Application: `RestrictionPolicyByChannel:{channel}`<br />Tenant: `RestrictionPolicyByChannel:{channel}`<br />Core: `Veriqa:RestrictionPolicies:ByChannel:{channel}` | not declared | no |
| `RestrictionPolicy.Common` | `RestrictionPolicySet` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `RestrictionPolicy`<br />Tenant: `RestrictionPolicy`<br />Core: `Veriqa:RestrictionPolicies:Common` | not declared | no |
| `ScopesClaims.Catalog` | `IReadOnlyList`1\` | Tenant · Core | — | Tenant: no path<br />Core: no path | not declared | no |
| `ScopesClaims.ClaimLevel` | `ClaimRequirementLevel` | Application | `claim` | Application: `ClaimLevels:{claim}` | not declared | no |
| `ScopesClaims.RequireEmail` | `bool` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `RequireEmail`<br />Tenant: `RequireEmail`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ScopesClaims:RequireEmail` | `false` | no |
| `ScopesClaims.RequirePhone` | `bool` | Application · Tenant · Core | — | Application: `RequirePhone`<br />Tenant: `RequirePhone`<br />Core: `Veriqa:ScopesClaims:RequirePhone` | `false` | no |
| `Transaction.DefaultTimeZone` | `string` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `default_time_zone` | not declared | no |
| `Transaction.TtlSeconds` | `int` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `ttl_seconds` | not declared | no |
| `TransactionEngine.RejectBots` | `bool` | Application · Core | — | Application: `RejectBots`<br />Core: `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:RejectBots` | not declared | no |
| `UiConfig.SelectorAssigned` | `bool` | UiConfig | — | UiConfig: `schema_version` | not declared | no |
## Next steps
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Channel setup" icon="comments" href="/docs/guides/channels">
Telegram, WhatsApp, other channels and Email — end to end.
</Card>
<Card title="Production hardening" icon="shield-check" href="/docs/guides/hardening">
What to check before shipping.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Server-to-server confirmation API
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/reference/confirmation-api
Declare an action type, create a confirmation from your backend, show its QR, read the outcome and learn who confirmed.
Your backend can ask a person to confirm an action — a payment, a device, a data transfer — in a
trusted channel, with no sign-in and no browser redirect. This page is the full contract: the
configuration that makes it possible, the requests and the responses.
A runnable example is `samples/dotnet/inproc/confirmation` in the repository: one application that
is both the Veriqa issuer and the backend that calls it. Two more are built the same way:
`samples/dotnet/inproc/step-up` confirms a destructive action and checks that the account owner
confirmed it (`expected_identities`), and `samples/dotnet/inproc/agent-approval` makes an AI agent's
tool call wait for a person's approval.
## The flow
1. Your backend gets a token with the **Client Credentials** grant.
2. It creates the transaction: `POST /api/transaction/confirmation`, naming a **declared action type**
and filling the slots of its message.
3. It shows the user `channel_entry` from the response — the QR image (`qr`) on a screen, or the link
(`url`) on the same device.
4. The user opens the channel, reads the wording and confirms or declines.
5. Your backend polls `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result` until the outcome is no longer `pending`.
6. Optionally, it exchanges a confirmed transaction for the `id_token` of the person who confirmed.
## 1. Configure the client
Everything lives in **the client entry** of the application that calls the API:
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"OpenIddict": {
"Clients": [
{
"ClientId": "payments-backend",
"ClientSecret": "<from a secret store>",
"AllowClientCredentials": true,
"AllowConfirmationTokenGrant": true,
"AllowedScopes": [ "openid", "channel" ],
"MessageTemplates": {
"approve-payment": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [
{ "Name": "amount", "Type": "string", "MaxLength": 32, "Required": true },
{ "Name": "payee", "Type": "string", "MaxLength": 64 }
]
},
"Templates": [
"Approve a payment of {amount} to {payee}?",
"Approve a payment of {amount}?"
]
}
}
}
]
}
}
}
```
| Key | Why it is needed |
| - | - |
| `ClientSecret` | The client must be confidential: `AllowClientCredentials` on a client without a secret prevents startup |
| `AllowClientCredentials` | Lets the backend get a token for this API. Off by default |
| `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant` | Only for step 6. Requires `openid` in `AllowedScopes` |
| `MessageTemplates:{action type}` | The **declaration** of the action type: its contract and its wordings |
### Where the action type is declared
The action type **is the message kind**, and it is declared **in the client entry**:
`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients:[n]:MessageTemplates:{action type}:Contract` and `…:Templates`. There is
no `ByType` or `ByAction` group to add for it.
<Warning>
**The host section `Veriqa:MessageTemplates` does not declare an action type.** That section is the
`Core` level, the place of the product's own messages, and an action type visible only there is
refused with `action_type_unknown`: an application must not be able to ask a person to confirm a
text the product ships for its own purposes. The host starts without complaint either way — the
refusal comes from the API.
</Warning>
A `Tenant` level is also read, when your host registers a reader for it; none is registered out of
the box.
### What the user reads when it ends
Two host-level settings control the wording at the end of the transaction, and the runnable
samples above state both:
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"Channels": {
"OutcomeNotice": {
"DisplayIntent": "NewMessage"
}
},
"MessageTemplates": {
"outcome-receipt-confirmed": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [ { "Name": "app", "Type": "string", "Source": "ServerInitiatorContext" } ]
},
"Templates": [ "{app}: confirmed ✅", "Confirmed ✅" ]
},
"outcome-receipt-declined": {
"Contract": {
"Slots": [ { "Name": "app", "Type": "string", "Source": "ServerInitiatorContext" } ]
},
"Templates": [ "{app}: declined ❌", "Declined ❌" ]
}
}
}
}
```
`DisplayIntent` says where the receipt of the outcome appears. The product ships `ReplacePrompt` —
the receipt takes the place of the message that asked the question — and a confirmation is the case
for the other value: the question carries the wording of the action, so replacing it leaves the
conversation with an outcome and no record of what it answered. `NewMessage` keeps both. It is an
intent rather than a promise: Telegram and MAX honor it, WhatsApp always sends a new message. Where
the platform lets the buttons of a delivered message be taken away without rewriting its text,
`NewMessage` takes them away as it delivers the receipt: the question keeps its wording as the record
of what the outcome answered, and nothing under a settled transaction invites another press. Where
the platform has no such operation, a button may survive — pressing again only earns another receipt,
because a terminal transaction cannot be replayed.
The receipt kinds are the product's own messages, so they live in the host section rather than in
the client entry — the rule about action types above does not reach them. The product ships no
wording under `ByType:confirmation`, so the broad `{kind}` declaration is the step that answers and
rewording it works as written. `{app}` is filled by the server with the `ClientId`, as above; the
last step of each ladder uses no slot, because no slot of a receipt is guaranteed — not even one
marked `Guaranteed`.
### The contract
`Contract:Slots` is an array. Each slot:
| Member | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `Name` | Slot name, `snake_case`, unique within the contract. The template refers to it as `{name}` |
| `Type` | `string`, `enum`, `number`, `datetime` or `entity_ref` |
| `Source` | If omitted, the source is `Caller`: your backend fills it in `slot_values`. `ServerInitiatorContext`: the server fills it from the transaction context — `app` (the client name), and for a sign-in also `browser`, `os` and `region`; the length is capped, as for any value from outside. `ServerSystem`: a value the core computes itself (`link`, `valid_until`, `code`, `lang`); the length is not capped, and a moment is shown as a time of day |
| `Required` | Caller slots: the request is refused without a value. Default `false` |
| `Guaranteed` | Server slots: the value is always there. Default `false` |
| `MaxLength` | **Mandatory** for a caller `string` / `entity_ref` slot. Ceiling 128 |
| `Values` | The allowed set of an `enum` slot, non-empty |
| `Min` / `Max` | Optional bounds of a `number` slot |
The server fills `{app}` of a confirmation with the client's `ClientId`, not its `DisplayName`. To put a
human-readable name into the wording, use a slot of your own.
### The templates
`Templates` is a ladder, fullest wording first. The shown step is the first one whose slots all have
values, so the optional `payee` drops out cleanly when it is not sent. **The last step may use only
slots that always have a value** — a caller slot with `Required: true` or a server slot with
`Guaranteed: true`. A ladder whose last step leans on an optional slot is discarded as a whole, and the
transaction has no text to show. Messengers show the plain text; a step may also be a structure
`{ "Plain": "…", "Html": "…" }` — see [`Veriqa:MessageTemplates`](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqamessagetemplates).
## 2. Get a token
```http theme={null}
POST /connect/token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic base64(client_id:client_secret)
grant_type=client_credentials
```
The response carries `access_token`, `token_type` and `expires_in`; cache the token until shortly before
it expires. A token issued to a user is refused on this API with `403`.
The endpoint is served over `https` only — over plain HTTP it responds with `400 invalid_request`, "This
server only accepts HTTPS requests". Behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS, the proxy must be
trusted and forward `X-Forwarded-Proto`
([OS service, step 7](/docs/quickstart/os-service#7-https)).
## 3. Create the confirmation
```http theme={null}
POST /api/transaction/confirmation
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"action_type": "approve-payment",
"slot_values": { "amount": "42.00 EUR", "payee": "ACME Ltd" },
"idempotency_key": "9f1c2e4a-payment-1842"
}
```
| Field | Type | Meaning |
| - | - | - |
| `action_type` | string, **required** | A declared action type (see above) |
| `slot_values` | object `name → string` | Values of the caller slots. Numbers and dates are sent as strings too. A slot the contract does not declare is refused. Total size up to 16 KB |
| `idempotency_key` | string, up to 128 | A repeat with the same key from the same client returns the **same** transaction and a fresh `channel_entry`, instead of creating a second one |
| `locale` | string, BCP 47 | Language of the wording and of the dates in it. If absent, the base language is used |
| `time_zone` | string, IANA | Time zone for the dates and times in the wording. If absent, the deployment default is used, or else UTC |
| `ttl_seconds` | integer | Lifetime of the transaction, clamped to 60…1800. If absent, `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:TransactionTtlSeconds` applies |
| `ui_config` | string | A `ui_config` record allowed to this client. If absent, the client's default is used |
| `requested_channel_type` | string | Preferred channel, for example `telegram` |
| `allowed_channel_types` | string array | Channels the confirmation may go through |
| `expected_identities` | object `type → value` | Who is expected to confirm, by the comparable identity types declared in [`IdentityMatch.ComparableTypes`](/docs/reference/configuration#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog). The result then says which type matched. Leave it out when you want to learn who confirmed |
| `include_channel_entries` | boolean | Also return `channel_entries` — a deep link with its QR for every available channel |
| `correlation_id` | string | Your identifier, for your own logs |
| `client_context` | string | Opaque data of yours, up to 4 KB |
The wording itself is never returned, and your slot values are not logged above `Debug`.
### The response — `201 Created`
```json theme={null}
{
"transaction_id": "k3VfQx0nS9e0mT2cHq7L1A",
"expires_at": "2026-09-16T15:45:00+00:00",
"response_valid_until": "2026-09-16T15:45:00+00:00",
"channel_entry": {
"kind": "deep_link",
"channel_type": "telegram",
"display_name": "Telegram",
"url": "https://t.me/your_bot?start=auth_…",
"qr": "…",
"valid_until": "2026-09-16T15:45:00+00:00"
}
}
```
*The identifiers and the link are synthetic.* The response is sent with `Cache-Control: no-store`.
| Field | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `transaction_id` | The identifier for the result and the token exchange |
| `expires_at` | When the transaction expires |
| `response_valid_until` | The earliest moment among the transaction and every entry returned: do not show anything from this response after it |
| `channel_entry.kind` | `deep_link` — a link straight into the channel (one channel is available); `page_url` — Veriqa's page where the user picks a channel |
| `channel_entry.channel_type` | The channel of a `deep_link`; `null` for `page_url` |
| `channel_entry.display_name` | The channel name to label the entry with — the one the Veriqa sign-in page shows on the channel tab, a custom channel's declared label included. Not localized; `null` for `page_url`. The QR image does not carry it: label the entry in your own UI |
| `channel_entry.url` | The address to open on the same device |
| `channel_entry.qr` | The entry as a PNG `data:` URI — put it into `<img src>` as is. Without [hop mode](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqahopmode) it encodes `url`. With hop mode on it encodes a one-time link to your Veriqa server leading to the same place: into the channel for `deep_link`; for `page_url` with `HopMode.QrMode` set to `Unified` or `UnifiedWithChannels`, to the page where the user picks a channel on the phone. The image carries the attribution strip under the code, so it is not square. `null` when `url` is too long for a QR code — show the link alone |
| `channel_entry.valid_until` | Do not show the entry after this moment |
| `channel_entries` | Only with `include_channel_entries: true`: an array of entries of the same shape, one per channel |
<Warning>
**The entry works like a bearer token.** Whoever opens it first becomes the confirming person. Show the QR
only to the person you are asking, and put the context they need to recognize the request into the
wording.
</Warning>
## 4. Read the outcome
```http theme={null}
GET /api/transaction/{transaction_id}/result
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
```
```json theme={null}
{ "outcome": "confirmed", "matched_type": null }
```
| `outcome` | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `pending` | No answer yet — ask again in a couple of seconds |
| `confirmed` | The person confirmed |
| `declined` | The person declined |
| `expired` | The time ran out |
| `failed` | The transaction ended without the person's decision, for example the channel could not continue |
`matched_type` is the name of the comparable type that matched `expected_identities`, or `null`. Only
the client that created the transaction may read it: any other transaction — unknown, removed after
`CompletedRetentionSeconds`, or another client's — returns the same `404 transaction_not_found`.
## 5. Learn who confirmed (optional)
With `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant`, exchange a `confirmed` transaction **once** for the `id_token` of
the confirming person:
```http theme={null}
POST /connect/token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic base64(client_id:client_secret)
grant_type=urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation
&transaction_id=k3VfQx0nS9e0mT2cHq7L1A
&scope=openid%20channel
```
The `id_token` carries `sub`, and with the `channel` scope `channel_type` and `channel_user_id`. The
rules of the exchange — single redemption, `invalid_grant` for every kind of "no", what the
application learns — are in [Linking from your server](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#linking-from-your-server-without-a-sign-in).
## Errors of the creation request
Every refusal is a Problem Details response (`application/problem+json`): the code is in `title`, and `detail`
names no value you sent. Nothing is created on any refusal.
| Status | `title` | What to check |
| - | - | - |
| `401` | — | No token, or an invalid one |
| `403` | — | The token was issued to a user, not to the client |
| `400` | `action_type_missing` | `action_type` is absent or blank |
| `400` | `action_type_unknown` | No declaration of this action type is visible for this client: it is not in the client entry's `MessageTemplates`, or it is only in the host section `Veriqa:MessageTemplates`. The server log names the address it looked at |
| `400` | `ui_config_invalid` | The `ui_config` record does not exist or is not allowed to this client |
| `400` | `locale_invalid` | `locale` is not a well-formed BCP 47 tag |
| `400` | `time_zone_invalid` | `time_zone` is not a zone the server knows |
| `400` | `slot_undeclared` | `slot_values` has a name the contract does not declare |
| `400` | `slot_required_missing` | A required slot has no value |
| `400` | `slot_value_invalid` | A value breaks its slot's type, `MaxLength`, `Values` or bounds |
| `400` | `slot_values_too_large` | `slot_values` exceed 16 KB |
| `400` | `candidate_type_undeclared` / `candidate_value_invalid` | An `expected_identities` type is not declared for this client, or its value has no canonical form |
| `400` | `invalid_idempotency_key` / `idempotency_key_conflict` | The key is longer than 128, or was already used with different parameters |
| `503` | `channel_display_failed` | The transaction exists but no channel entry could be built right now — for example, no channel is enabled. A repeat with the same `idempotency_key` returns it again |
## Next steps
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Linking from your server" icon="link" href="/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#linking-from-your-server-without-a-sign-in">
Learn which messenger account confirmed and store it next to your user.
</Card>
<Card title="Veriqa:MessageTemplates" icon="message" href="/docs/reference/configuration#veriqamessagetemplates">
Ladders, editions, levels and axes of messages.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Known limitations
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/reference/limitations
What Veriqa does not have today, what behaves differently from what you might expect, and what compatibility is verified.
These limitations are described on their own pages as well — here they are gathered in one place so
that the "does this fit" decision happens before an integration rather than halfway through it.
## Not in the product
| Limitation | Details |
| - | - |
| **The cloud is unavailable** | The cloud documentation describes a fixed API contract, not a running service — [Veriqa Cloud](/docs/cloud/overview). The self-hosted path works |
| **No provider-side sign-out** | There is no `end_session_endpoint` — see [OIDC support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities) |
| **Email Push is off by default** | Signing in by sending a pre-filled email (the one-tap email) is enabled with `Channels:Email:PushEnabled` and requires inbound configuration — [Channels](/docs/guides/channels) |
## Operations
| Limitation | What to account for |
| - | - |
| **Key replacement is not seamless** | The configuration accepts one signing and one encryption certificate, so old and new keys never overlap: replacing one invalidates live tokens. Plan it as an operation that invalidates sessions — [Production hardening](/docs/guides/hardening) |
| **More than one instance needs shared state** | A SignalR backplane and shared DataProtection keys, otherwise instances cannot read each other's cookies and tokens — [self-hosted, running more than one instance](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted) |
| **Rate limiting is per instance** | There are no cluster-wide limits — put a limiter in front of the application if you need them |
| **No per-IP limits in the core** | Buckets are counted per route, per user or per client, never per address, and the core does not block addresses. A per-IP limiter and address blocking live on the reverse proxy / WAF — [Production hardening](/docs/guides/hardening#rate-limiting-and-anti-abuse) |
## Channel properties your application will see
| Limitation | What to account for |
| - | - |
| **Telegram carries no email** | And it will not. If your application requires an address, Veriqa collects it inside the sign-in (a required `email`), or your own code supplies it — [Claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment) |
| **`picture` needs the `avatar` scope and comes through userinfo** | The avatar is the image itself, a `data:` URI (from MAX possibly an `https` URL). It is issued only to a client that requests `avatar`, only through `/connect/userinfo`, and never in the `id_token` — [Resolved identity and claims](/docs/concepts/oidc-explainer#resolved-identity-and-claims) |
| **On the Email channel `name` equals the address** | There is no display name to take, so the shape of the account depends on the channel |
| **`family_name` does not always arrive** | Only when the channel supplied a last name: it is optional in Telegram and MAX, and absent on Email |
## Verified compatibility
| Area | Status |
| - | - |
| WordPress, Drupal, TYPO3, Joomla, Bitrix | ✅ verified — [CMS integrations](/docs/integrations/overview) |
| GitLab, Keycloak, Grafana, Nextcloud, Odoo, Moodle | ✅ verified — [business systems](/docs/integrations/apps) |
| Discourse | 🟡 signing in an existing user is verified; account creation is not |
| Shopify, Wix | ⚠️ connecting to the platform itself is not verified; what it takes — [SaaS builders](/docs/integrations/saas-builders) |
| Mattermost | ⚠️ not verified |
| A public deployment (real domain + valid certificate) | ⚠️ not verified |
| The WhatsApp and MAX channels with client applications | ⚠️ not verified; Telegram and Email are |
| The Viber channel on the live platform | ⚠️ not verified: the adapter has been run only against a mock of the Bot API. Since 5 February 2024 Viber issues new bots on commercial terms only, so the bot and its token are obtained from Viber before a deployment — [Viber](/docs/guides/channels#viber) |
| Roles, groups and permissions from claims | ⚠️ not verified in any system |
## Deviations from the specifications
Two known differences between Veriqa's behavior and what a client may expect — an opaque reference
access token instead of a JWT and a strict refusal of `scope` in the token request — are described in
[OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities). That page also states that there is
**no** formal OpenID Foundation certification.
**Resource indicators (RFC 8707) are not supported.** Veriqa registers no resources, so a `resource`
parameter is rejected with `invalid_target` for any value. This behavior is not configurable. Clients
written for Microsoft Entra ID often send the parameter anyway (see [Moodle](/docs/integrations/apps));
for such a client the per-client quirk
[`drop-resource-parameter`](/docs/guides/client-compatibility) strips it before validation, which is a
relaxation of the request form and not support for resource indicators — no audience is granted.
# OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities
What is implemented, what is not, which deviations are known, and whether there is a formal certification.
This page answers "what exactly do you support" in one list, so the answer does not have to be
assembled from several sections.
## Supported
| Capability | Status | Note |
| - | - | - |
| Authorization Code Flow | ✅ | `code` is the only supported `response_type` |
| PKCE | ✅ | `S256` only. `plain` is refused for every client; a public client without PKCE is refused |
| Refresh tokens | ✅ | via the `offline_access` scope, enabled per client |
| UserInfo | ✅ | `/connect/userinfo` |
| Discovery + JWKS | ✅ | `/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/.well-known/jwks` |
| Token revocation (RFC 7009) | ✅ | `/connect/revoke` |
| Token introspection (RFC 7662) | ✅ | `/connect/introspect`. The response carries metadata only — `active`, `iss`, `sub`, `jti`, `client_id`, `token_type`, `exp`, `iat`, `nbf`; the user's claims come from `/connect/userinfo`. Enabled per client with `AllowIntrospection`, confidential clients only. A client with this permission sees `sub` and `client_id` of tokens issued to other clients, so grant it only to your own confidential clients |
| `iss` in the authorization response (RFC 9207) | ✅ | mix-up protection |
| Client authentication | ✅ | `client_secret_basic`, `client_secret_post`, `private_key_jwt` |
| `response_mode` | ✅ | `query` (the default), `fragment` and `form_post` — all three advertised in discovery are applied; `form_post` responds with an auto-posting page that submits the response to your `redirect_uri` |
| `prompt` | ✅ | `consent`, `login`, `none`, `select_account` |
| `id_token` signing | ✅ | `RS256` |
| Client Credentials Grant | ✅ | only for creating confirmation transactions server-to-server (`POST /api/transaction/confirmation`) and reading their result; enabled per client with `AllowClientCredentials`, confidential clients only |
| Confirmation token grant | ✅ | Veriqa's own extension grant ([RFC 6749 §4.5](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-4.5)), `grant_type=urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation`: the client that created a confirmation transaction exchanges it, once the outcome is `confirmed`, for the `id_token` of the person who confirmed. Enabled per client with `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant`, which requires `AllowClientCredentials` and `openid` in `AllowedScopes`. Each transaction is redeemed once; no refresh token is issued. See [linking from your server](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#linking-from-your-server-without-a-sign-in) |
| Scopes | ✅ | `openid`, `profile`, `email`, `phone`, `offline_access`, `channel` and `avatar` — the last two are Veriqa's own, not standard. `avatar` gates the `picture` claim, which is served through userinfo only. A claim the [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims`](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqascopesclaims) catalog lists under a scope goes into both the `id_token` and the access token (and so into userinfo) when that scope is granted, and into no token otherwise — on sign-in, on a refresh and in the confirmation token grant alike, whether the channel gave the value or Veriqa collected it. A custom claim the catalog does not list goes into the access token only |
| The `claims` parameter (OIDC Core §5.5) | ✅ | requirement levels only — the claim set is still driven by scopes. A claim in the `id_token` or `userinfo` member marked `essential: true` becomes required: the sign-in does not complete without it; any other claim named there is asked of the user, who may decline. A claim counts only when a requested scope covers it, and a claim Veriqa cannot complete stays issue-if-available (see `Level` in [`Veriqa:ScopesClaims`](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqascopesclaims)). `value` and `values` are not enforced. A parameter that is not a JSON object, or whose `id_token` or `userinfo` member is not an object, is refused with `400 oidc_request_invalid`. Discovery publishes `claims_parameter_supported: false` (the OpenIddict default); the parameter is honored regardless |
## Not supported
Listed explicitly so that you do not plan around something absent.
| Capability | Status | What it means in practice |
| - | - | - |
| RP-Initiated Logout (`end_session_endpoint`) | ❌ | signing out of your application does not end the session on the Veriqa side; `revocation_endpoint` exists for revoking tokens, which is a different operation |
| Pushed Authorization Requests (RFC 9126) | ❌ | — |
| JWT-Secured Authorization Request (JAR) | ❌ | the `request` and `request_uri` parameters are not accepted |
| DPoP | ❌ | tokens are not bound to a sender key |
| mTLS-bound tokens | ❌ | — |
| Dynamic Client Registration | ❌ | clients are declared in configuration |
| Device Authorization Grant | ❌ | — |
| Resource indicators (RFC 8707) | ❌ | Veriqa registers no resources, so a `resource` parameter is rejected with `invalid_target` for any value — that is the default and it does not change. Clients written for Microsoft Entra ID send the parameter regardless; for those, the per-client quirk [`drop-resource-parameter`](/docs/guides/client-compatibility) strips it before validation instead of granting any resource |
## Known deviations
Two places where Veriqa's behavior differs from what a client may expect. Knowing about them in
advance is enough.
**The access token is an opaque reference token, not a readable JWT.** The client receives an
identifier; the token content stays in the Veriqa OpenIddict database. The refresh token has the
same form. A client that tries to parse the access token as a JWT gets an error or a log warning —
Grafana, for one, behaves this way. It does not affect sign-in: the access token is meant for the
Veriqa server, and the client takes session content from the `id_token` and UserInfo. An API of
yours checks an access token through [introspection](#supported), not by keys. Earlier builds issued
the access token as an encrypted JWE; such tokens are still accepted until they expire.
**The `scope` parameter is rejected in the token request.**
[RFC 6749 §4.1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.3) does not define it for
`grant_type=authorization_code`, and the Veriqa server follows it strictly. Two known clients send it anyway — the
`openid-connect-generic` plugin for WordPress and `omniauth_openid_connect` for GitLab; how to clear
it on their side is described on the [WordPress](/docs/integrations/wordpress) and
[Veriqa in business systems](/docs/integrations/apps) pages.
## Certification
**There is no formal OpenID Foundation certification.** WordPress, Drupal, Nextcloud, Keycloak,
Discourse and Odoo verify and accept the Veriqa `id_token` signature against JWKS — six independent
implementations — and Keycloak configures itself entirely from the Veriqa discovery document.
# 0.6 — first public release
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6
Veriqa 0.6, the first public release: sign-in and confirmation through trusted messengers behind a standard OpenID Connect provider, embedded in .NET or run as a server.
Veriqa 0.6.0 was published on September 23, 2026 — the first release anyone can install. To your
application Veriqa is a standard OpenID Connect provider; the user confirms the sign-in in a
messenger or a mailbox they already use — **Telegram, WhatsApp, other channels or Email**.
## What's in it
### Channels
* **Built in:** four channel adapters. Each channel is a separate adapter and
is switched on in configuration. [Supported channels](/docs/guides/supported-channels) covers what each
one adds to the claims and whether the user has to send a message;
[Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels) walks through setup end to end.
* **Email in two modes:** the classic magic link, on by default, and the one-tap email, where the
user sends a pre-filled email — [which mode to choose](/docs/guides/channels#which-mode-to-choose).
* **A channel of your own** as a .NET adapter inside your host —
[Build your own channel adapter](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter).
### Deployment modes
* **Embedded in ASP.NET Core.** Veriqa extends OpenIddict in your own host and leaves token issuance
to it — [Quickstart .NET](/docs/quickstart/dotnet).
* **Self-hosted server in Docker.** Your application stays a plain OIDC client on any stack —
[Quickstart self-hosted](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted), with client quickstarts for
[Node.js](/docs/quickstart/node), [Java](/docs/quickstart/java) and [Python](/docs/quickstart/python).
* **OS service.** The same server from a self-contained archive as a systemd unit or a Windows
service — no Docker and no .NET runtime on the machine —
[Install as an OS service](/docs/quickstart/os-service).
### Scenarios
* [Passwordless sign-in](/docs/scenarios/passwordless-login) — a QR code on screen, confirmation in a
messenger, sign-up in the same step.
* [Sign-in with channel linking](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking) — the user signs in and the product
gains a live channel.
* [Second factor and step-up](/docs/scenarios/step-up) — a fresh confirmation before a sensitive
operation.
* [Replacing SMS codes](/docs/scenarios/sms-replacement), [leads without CAPTCHA](/docs/scenarios/lead-capture)
and [account recovery](/docs/scenarios/account-recovery).
* [Sign-in surfaces](/docs/scenarios/surfaces) — smart TV, kiosk, a device with no keyboard.
* [Server-to-server confirmation](/docs/reference/confirmation-api) — your backend asks a person to
confirm an action, such as a payment or a data transfer, with no sign-in and no redirect;
[Confirmed form submission](/docs/integrations/confirmed-form) builds on it.
### Also included
* Three ways to learn that the confirmation happened: the redirect back, live status over SignalR
and status polling — [How a sign-in completes](/docs/concepts/completion).
* A transaction store on InMemory, EF Core or Redis, and the OpenIddict database on PostgreSQL or
SQL Server — [Storage](/docs/guides/storage).
* The [initiator context](/docs/concepts/initiator-context) in the confirmation message — who started the
sign-in and from where, with an optional offline GeoIP provider.
* An audit trail, off until you enable it — [Security and data handling](/docs/guides/data-handling).
* Sign-in page design, localization and extension points —
[Configuration & customization](/docs/guides/customization).
* Verified integrations with [CMS engines](/docs/integrations/overview) and
[business systems](/docs/integrations/apps).
## Where to get it
* **NuGet packages** on nuget.org, version `0.6.0` for all 26 packages. The core is MPL-2.0;
`Veriqa.Core.Contracts`, `Veriqa.ServiceDefaults` and `Veriqa.Samples` are MIT.
* **Docker image** `veriqa/veriqa` on Docker Hub, tags `0.6.0` and `latest`, `linux/amd64`:
`docker pull veriqa/veriqa:0.6.0`.
* **OS service archives** for `linux-x64`, `linux-arm64` and `win-x64` with a SHA-256 sums file —
attached to the repository's releases; [Install as an OS service](/docs/quickstart/os-service)
explains how to download and verify them.
* **Source code** — the repository at [veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source).
| Area | Packages |
| - | - |
| Server and engine | `Veriqa.Core.AuthServer`, `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine`, `Veriqa.Core.Configuration`, `Veriqa.Core.Contracts` |
| Channels | `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter`, `Veriqa.Core.BaseChannels` (metapackage: Telegram, WhatsApp, Email), `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Telegram`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.WhatsApp`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Email`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Max`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Redis` |
| Stores and events | `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.EntityFrameworkCore`, `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Redis`, `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.RabbitMq`, and the PostgreSQL and SQL Server migrations: `Veriqa.Core.TransactionEngine.Migrations.*`, `Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.Migrations.*` |
| Audit trail | `Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail`, `Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail.EntityFrameworkCore`, `Veriqa.Core.AuditTrail.Migrations.*` |
| Other | `Veriqa.Core.AuthServer.MaxMind`, `Veriqa.ServiceDefaults`, `Veriqa.Samples`, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelLocales` |
## 0.6.1
A maintenance update with no change in behavior: package descriptions, search tags and package
READMEs.
## Known limitations
[Known limitations](/docs/reference/limitations) lists what 0.6 does not have and what behaves
differently than you might expect; deviations from the OIDC specifications are in
[OIDC and OAuth 2.0 support](/docs/reference/oidc-capabilities).
# 0.6.2 — hop mode, the HTTP channel and claim completion (upcoming)
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6.2
What Veriqa 0.6.2 brings: hop mode for the QR code, a channel in any language over HTTP, Twilio for WhatsApp, claim completion and the phone number from the channels.
<Note>
This version is being prepared for release: nothing described here is in the published packages
and image yet. The latest release is [0.6.1](/docs/releases/0.6#061).
</Note>
## Hop mode
The QR code carries a short one-time link to your Veriqa server instead of the channel link. That
gives a light QR code, a scan signal on the computer, a launch page on the phone, one QR code for
every channel and the context of the scanning device. It is off by default; we recommend turning it
on — see [Hop mode](/docs/concepts/hop-mode).
## A channel in any language over HTTP
A new package, `Veriqa.Core.ChannelAdapter.Http`: your own channel is a separate service in any
language, connected by configuration, with no rebuild of the host. A schema describes the wire
contract, and a conformance suite checks your service before you connect it — see
[An HTTP channel adapter in any language](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#an-http-channel-adapter-in-any-language).
## WhatsApp through Twilio
Twilio is a built-in WhatsApp delivery provider next to the Meta WhatsApp Business Platform; one key
selects it — see [Delivery through Twilio](/docs/guides/channels#delivery-through-twilio).
## Claim completion and the phone number
* **The phone number from the channel itself:** the user shares it with a button in the chat — see
[Phone number](/docs/guides/phone-number).
* **Missing claims completed inside the sign-in** — a form on the sign-in page or on the confirming
device, and ways to verify an email address — see
[Progressive claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment).
* **A collected claims store** on EF Core, with deletion by `sub` — see
[Collected claims store](/docs/guides/storage#collected-claims-store).
## Security
* A confirmation is bound to the channel subject and to the browser the answer came from.
* The interstitial cookie is bound to the authorize request, GeoIP reads only a trusted IP, and the
per-user rate limiter evicts old partitions.
* The response to creating a server-to-server confirmation returns the channel's `display_name`.
## What to check when you upgrade
* **The `sub` of WhatsApp users changes.** It was `whatsapp:+number` and is now `whatsapp:{BSUID}`,
the ID Meta assigns per business portfolio; the number moves to `preferred_username`. There is no
migration: existing WhatsApp users get a new `sub` in your application.
* **`ShowQrCode` defaults to `DesktopOnly`** instead of `Always`: a phone shows channel buttons
instead of a QR code. To keep the old look, set `"ShowQrCode": "Always"`.
* **New EF Core migrations** for the transaction store and the audit trail — apply them when you
upgrade; see [Storage](/docs/guides/storage).
# 0.6.3 — the sign-in page and channel restriction policies (upcoming)
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6.3
What Veriqa 0.6.3 brings: a cancel button and layouts for the sign-in page, per-application page texts, channel restriction policies, one-tap email over IMAP.
<Note>
This version is being prepared for release: nothing described here is in the published packages
and image yet. The latest release is [0.6.1](/docs/releases/0.6#061).
</Note>
## The sign-in page
* **A cancel button**, on by default — see [Cancel button](/docs/guides/customization#cancel-button).
* **Channel button visibility and an "all channels at once" layout** — see
[Channel button visibility](/docs/guides/customization#channel-button-visibility) and
[Channel layout](/docs/guides/customization#channel-layout).
* **Your own page texts for one application** — the `AuthPage.Texts` dictionary covers the sign-in
page, the hop pages and the Email pages; see
[Rewording a page element for one application](/docs/guides/customization#rewording-a-page-element-for-one-application).
* If resubscribing after a reconnect fails, the page falls back to polling the status; an expired
sign-in stops the spinner on every page.
## Channel restriction policies
Anyone with a messenger can confirm a sign-in. Policies narrow that circle by what the channel
reports about the person confirming: only corporate email domains, only phone numbers from the
countries you name, or only users whose channel passes a phone number. They are set per channel in
configuration and are off by default. This is a filter on channel data, not a cryptographic barrier:
a country code is a number prefix, not where the person is. The keys are `RestrictionPolicy.*` in
the [key catalog](/docs/reference/configuration#keys-in-the-declaration-catalog).
## Channels
* **Email: one-tap email over IMAP** — no inbound mail provider and no public address needed, with
mailbox sign-in by password or OAuth 2.0; see
[One-tap email over IMAP](/docs/guides/channels#one-tap-email-over-imap).
* **An action after sign-in** — `CompletionBehavior`: a welcome message and a post-action in the
chat; see [Veriqa:CompletionBehavior](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqacompletionbehavior).
* The text that asks for the phone number is an ordinary message kind, `phone-number-request`, and
is edited like any other channel message.
* MAX in webhook mode parses a shared contact correctly.
## Documentation
A new [Observability](/docs/guides/observability) page: metrics, traces, logs and health checks.
## What to check when you upgrade
* **The Cancel button appears on every sign-in page.** If you built your own through `CustomJsPath`,
remove it — or turn the built-in one off.
* **Phone numbers are accepted in E.164 only.** A custom or HTTP adapter that reports a number in
another form no longer passes it on. The rule is the public `E164PhoneNumber` in
`Veriqa.Core.Contracts`.
# 0.6.4 — Instagram, sign-in page texts and PathBase (upcoming)
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6.4
What Veriqa 0.6.4 brings: the Instagram channel, markup in sign-in page texts, a host under a path prefix, the Menu and Redirect post-actions.
<Note>
This version is being prepared for release: nothing described here is in the published packages
and image yet. The latest release is [0.6.1](/docs/releases/0.6#061).
</Note>
## Instagram
Instagram Direct is a built-in channel of the core: the user signs in through a conversation with your
Instagram account — see [Instagram](/docs/guides/channels#instagram).
## The sign-in page
* **Inline markup in `Title`, `Instruction` and a channel hint** — see
[Markup in the title, the instruction and a channel hint](/docs/guides/customization#markup-in-the-title-the-instruction-and-a-channel-hint).
* The built-in instruction names only what the page shows, and a single-channel page names its
channel. A new page for an expired sign-in.
* The claim completion state is visible in the channel; the Telegram phone keyboard is removed after
the answer; "Cancel sign-in" sits under the completion form.
## Channels
The `Menu` and `Redirect` post-actions for Telegram and MAX — what the bot shows after the sign-in;
see [Veriqa:CompletionBehavior](/docs/reference/configuration#veriqacompletionbehavior).
## Operations
A host under a base path prefix — `Veriqa:PathBase`; see
[Under a path prefix](/docs/guides/reverse-proxy#under-a-path-prefix).
## What to check when you upgrade: sign-in page wording
Your own wording set for one of the built-in texts below — in `AuthPage:Texts` or in a locale file —
stops applying where the page no longer shows that text. Move it to the new key:
| Where | Key that stops applying there | Key to move the wording to |
| - | - | - |
| Expired sign-in | `Session expired` | `This sign-in request has expired` |
| Single-channel page — whatever it shows | `Scan the QR code or tap the channel button` · `Tap the channel button to sign in` | `Scan the QR code or tap the button to sign in via {0}` · `Scan the QR code to sign in via {0}` · `Tap the button to sign in via {0}` |
| Several channels with their own QR codes, buttons hidden | `Choose a channel and scan the QR code or tap the button` | `Choose a channel and scan the QR code` |
| Several channels behind one QR code, buttons hidden | `Scan the QR code or tap the channel button` | `Scan the QR code to sign in` |
The earlier keys stay in force only on a multi-channel page that shows a button. A replacement for a
single-channel text must carry the `{0}` slot, where the page puts the channel's icon and name.
Delete the earlier docs recipe for a screen with hidden buttons — the `tv-app` example: the
instruction now follows the button by itself. The full table of variants is in
[The instruction follows both settings](/docs/guides/customization#the-instruction-follows-both-settings).
**`Title`, `Instruction` and a channel hint already set as plain text may look different:** these
texts are now read as HTML. `Terms & Conditions` now shows "Terms & Conditions", and a bare `<`
or `>` fails the check — the value is shown as written and a warning goes to the log. Review your
values for `&`, `<` and `>`.
# 0.6.5 — Messenger, WeChat and Viber (upcoming)
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6.5
What Veriqa 0.6.5 brings: the Messenger, WeChat and Viber channels, a dark theme for service pages, hop mode per application, superseding unfinished sign-ins.
<Note>
This version is being prepared for release: nothing described here is in the published packages
and image yet. The latest release is [0.6.1](/docs/releases/0.6#061).
</Note>
## Three new channels
[Messenger](/docs/guides/channels#messenger), [WeChat](/docs/guides/channels#wechat) and
[Viber](/docs/guides/channels#viber) become built-in channels of the core. Viber was tested against a
Bot API stand-in, with no live run. A refusal from the Messenger, Instagram and Viber clients
now comes back as a result instead of an exception, and a repeated "Yes" or "No" no longer sends a
new message.
## The sign-in page and hop mode
* Service pages follow the `Theme` setting, the dark theme included.
* Hop mode can be turned on for one application or tenant — see
[Hop mode for one application](/docs/reference/configuration#hop-mode-for-one-application).
* Sign-in errors are returned to the client with a redirect.
## Sign-ins and transactions
* **A new sign-in supersedes the same user's unfinished ones** — see
[A new sign-in closes the earlier ones](/docs/guides/storage#a-new-sign-in-closes-the-earlier-ones).
* **A sign-in survives the issuing of the authorization code:** for a sign-in already redeemed, the callback
answers that the session has expired.
* **Two linked bots** — the `{handle}` slot; see [Two bots](/docs/guides/existing-bot#two-bots).
* The HTTP channel passes the phone number, on request or automatically.
## What to check when you upgrade
* **A new EF Core migration** for the transaction store — apply it when you upgrade.
* **Parallel sign-ins of one user:** an unfinished sign-in closes as soon as the same user starts a
new one. If your scenario keeps two sign-ins open at once, check it.
# 0.6.6 — sign-in by a code and fixes from live runs (upcoming)
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/0.6.6
What Veriqa 0.6.6 brings: a fallback sign-in code, Redis and RabbitMQ in the standalone server, a new QR code mode, Email under hop mode and fixes from live runs.
<Note>
This version is being prepared for release: nothing described here is in the published packages
and image yet. The latest release is [0.6.1](/docs/releases/0.6#061).
</Note>
## Sign-in by a code
Where the channel link does not carry the transaction to the bot, the sign-in has a second path: the
page shows a short code, and the user sends it to the bot. For Instagram and Messenger the code is
offered automatically; under hop mode it is on the phone's launch page and disappears as soon as the bot
answers. `BotName` sets the bot's name. The HTTP channel supports a start by a code for registrations
with no owner — see
[Start by a code](/docs/guides/custom-channel-adapter#start-by-a-code--when-the-link-cannot-be-relied-on).
## The sign-in page and hop mode
* The hop pages and the sign-in page show where the question is waiting.
* Canceling on the sign-in page sends a "declined" receipt into the channel.
* A third QR code mode, `QrMode: UnifiedWithChannels`: the shared QR code and the buttons of every
channel on the first tab, followed by a tab per channel with its own QR code.
* Email under hop mode: one page with the address field, or the email right away — see
[Email under hop mode](/docs/guides/channels#email-under-hop-mode).
* Fixes from live runs: the countdown and the live status of the `OnWebPage` question page, the
"Choose another way" button.
## The standalone server
The standalone server image includes the Redis stores, event publishing to RabbitMQ and MaxMind
GeoIP — switched on by configuration keys, with no build of your own; see
[Quickstart self-hosted](/docs/quickstart/self-hosted).
## Samples and documentation
* Google and Apple pseudo-channels — `samples/dotnet/pseudo-channels`.
* A Claude Code mod with a QR code panel — `samples/claude-code`; see
[Approvals in Claude Code](/docs/research/claude-code-approvals).
* The [Helio](/docs/samples/showcase/support-desk) and [Nova Stream](/docs/samples/showcase/streaming-tv)
showcases.
* A new page, [You already have a bot](/docs/guides/existing-bot).
## What to check when you upgrade
* **Email with `LoginConfirmation.Mode = OnWebPage`:** the sign-in email no longer completes the
sign-in; it only links the mailbox, and the sign-in page decides. "No" there gives
`declined_by_user`.
* Some built-in texts are reworded — if you override them, check them against
[Configuration & customization](/docs/guides/customization).
# Coming next
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/releases/next
What the next two Veriqa releases are preparing: pseudonymized channel identifiers, anomaly detection, sign-in with Google, Apple and Huawei as a separate service, and device binding levels.
<Note>
These are plans, not a commitment to dates: what each release contains may change.
</Note>
## Next release: privacy and risk signals
**Pseudonymized channel identifiers.** Today `channel_user_id` is the platform's native identifier:
a Telegram ID, a WhatsApp ID, an email address. A new tenant mode replaces it below the channel
adapter with a deterministic pseudonym under a key Veriqa does not store, and trims the set of
stored claims. A database leak no longer links a person to the address that reaches them in a
messenger.
**Anomaly detection for the initiator context.** Veriqa remembers derived, non-personal signals of
confirmed sign-ins — the country and the device type — and flags a sign-in that does not match
them. IP, User-Agent and city are not stored. It is opt-in: until you turn it on, nothing
changes.
## The release after: new ways to sign in and device binding
**Sign-in with Google, Apple and Huawei as a separate service.** A container next to Veriqa,
connected by configuration through the HTTP channel: the sign-in device shows a QR code, the user
signs in to their account on the phone and confirms on a "Yes / No" page. It helps on devices with
no keyboard and for people who do not use any messenger.
**Binding levels between the initiator and the confirmer.** Levels of trust between the device where
the sign-in started and the device where it is confirmed — from the base level up to a "same device"
policy for scenarios where confirming from someone else's phone must not be possible.
# Approving AI-agent actions
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/agent-approvals
Human consent on a surface the agent does not control: what the product already has for it and what this construction still lacks.
A software agent acts on a person's behalf, and someone has to say "yes" to the risky part of that
work — consent that is worth little if it is collected on the very screen the agent controls. Why
this matters and for whom is covered on the
[Approving AI-agent actions](https://veriqa.app/whats-next/agent-approvals?lang=en) page. Here is
the engineering side.
## What it builds on
The direction needs no separate protocol: confirming an action is the same transaction as
confirming a sign-in, only with a different purpose. A transaction with an explicit state and a
single outcome, a message in a trusted channel, the person's answer and an entry in the audit
trail — all of it already exists in Veriqa's core.
For confirming an action rather than a sign-in, the product has:
1. **Server-to-server creation of a confirmation transaction.** The application calls
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation`, authenticating with client credentials — no OIDC request
and no user redirect. The response carries the entry point for the person: the channel's deep link and
the same address as a QR image, with a "Powered by Veriqa" attribution strip under the code. The
application reads the outcome with
`GET /api/transaction/{id}/result`.
2. **Concrete wording of the confirmation.** The request names a declared action type
(`action_type`), and the person sees not "confirm sign-in" but that action's message: which
action, over what, with which parameters.
3. **A safe way to carry the action's data.** Free-form text from the application never reaches
the user's message — that is a direct route to substituting the meaning of the confirmation. The
data travels in typed slots (`slot_values`) against the schema declared for the action type and
is validated before the transaction is created.
## Available today: an agent whose tools you know
When you build the agent yourself and its tools are known in advance, nothing more is needed. The
approval goes where the tools are invoked, not into the prompt:
1. Each tool with consequences gets an **approval policy** in your code: which declared action type
asks the person, and which arguments of the call fill its slots.
2. The code that invokes tools checks the policy. For such a tool it creates the confirmation, shows
or sends its entry point, and waits for the outcome.
3. The tool runs only on `confirmed`. On `declined` or `expired` the harness returns a refusal as the
result of the call, the same way it reports any other failed call to the model.
Whatever the model decides to call, a tool with a policy does not run without a confirmed
transaction. The person reads the slot values of a declared action type, never text the agent wrote.
The runnable example is `samples/dotnet/inproc/agent-approval` in the repository. A support agent
handles a refund ticket with three tools: `lookup_order` and `send_customer_email` run on their own,
while every `refund_payment` call waits for a person to approve it in Telegram. The run log records who
approved. For a single destructive action in an ordinary application — deleting a project, closing an
account — see `samples/dotnet/inproc/step-up`: there the backend also checks that the person who
confirmed is the owner of the account (`expected_identities`).
For a harness whose tools you do not write, `samples/claude-code` shows the same approval plugged
into Claude Code through its hooks — see [Approvals in Claude Code](/docs/research/claude-code-approvals).
## What does not exist today
What is missing is the generic layer for agents whose tools the integrator does not write — agent
platforms and harnesses where an approval should plug in without code of your own:
* **a vocabulary of actions** — a shared language for "what are we confirming", rather than a
free-form set of action types per integrator;
* **an integration surface** for agent platforms and tool protocols, such as an approval step a
tool server declares by itself;
* **approval policies** around confirmations: what always requires a human, what only above a
threshold, what can be granted once and reused.
## Where its limits are
The direction inherits the boundary of the rest of Veriqa: confirmation rests on the person's
trusted channel and on the API of that channel's platform.
<Warning>
This is a strong and convenient step for scenarios where such trust has a place, but **not
cryptographic proof of intent**. Taking part in the scheme does not turn a messenger into a
hardware security module. Where the risk model demands more, use stronger measures.
</Warning>
# Stronger sign-in with a chain of channels
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/auth-chain
One transaction confirmed in several channels: how it is designed — and why this is not strict MFA.
A sign-in that needs confirmation not in one trusted channel but in several: the same transaction is
confirmed first in, say, Telegram and then over email, and there is no partial success. Why this
matters and for whom is covered on the
[Stronger sign-in with a chain of channels](https://veriqa.app/whats-next/auth-chain?lang=en) page.
Here is how it is designed.
## How it is designed
* **The linked-identity model** — several channel identities joined into one record, and the rule
by which its stable identifier becomes the user's identifier for the application. The order of
confirmations does not affect it, and adding or losing a channel later does not turn the user
into someone else.
* **The "K of N" policy** — the application requires confirmation from K of the N linked channels.
A chain of two is the special case where K and N are both two.
* **Linking and recovery** — how channels enter the set and what happens when one of them is lost.
* **The default** — off. For applications that have not enabled the chain, nothing changes.
A chain adds friction by definition, so it is meant to be switched on by the application for
sensitive actions and step-up rather than for ordinary sign-in.
## Where its limits are
<Warning>
**A chain is not strict multi-factor authentication.** Both confirmations are of the same nature:
possession of a channel plus trust in that channel's platform. Two messengers on one phone are
lost together with the phone; a SIM swap can affect several at once.
</Warning>
To be equally clear: a chain **does not make sign-in phishing-resistant** and adds no cryptographic
barrier between the browser and the phone. It increases the number of independent confirmations,
not the strength of the binding between them.
The gain is real and specific all the same: an attacker needs control over two independent channels
instead of one, which is a markedly higher bar than a single stolen messenger session. The most
useful pair is a messenger and email — the two channels least likely to fail together. That is a
recommendation to whoever configures it, not a rule the product enforces.
## What not to confuse with a chain
An attribute obtained inside a channel is not another link. When a user shares their phone number
with one tap in a messenger and the platform itself confirms the number, the chain still has the
same number of channels: this is enrichment of the identity, not an additional confirmation. Its
value is that a verified number arrives without sending, paying for or waiting on an SMS code.
# Approvals in Claude Code
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/claude-code-approvals
A sample plugin that stops chosen Claude Code actions until a person approves them in a messenger through Veriqa: tool calls, long command cycles and costly runs.
The sample shows how Veriqa fits into a ready-made agent harness: a person approves sensitive agent
actions — not only tool calls, but also heavy runs that burn time and tokens — and every approval,
refusal and expiry lands in the Veriqa audit trail. This matters most for teams where several
developers work with agents at once.
Claude Code and development tasks are the example chosen here; the approach fits another harness
and other tasks. The sample lives in `samples/claude-code/` in the repository
([veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source)), is MIT-licensed and is meant to be reworked for
your own needs. Its README is the setup guide.
## Three demos
| Demo | What is stopped | Action type |
| - | - | - |
| A tool call | `git push` and `rm -r…` in the Bash or PowerShell tool | `agent-tool-call` |
| The start of a long command cycle | `/cycle`, `/cycle-chain` — typed by a person or started by the agent | `agent-command-start` |
| A costly run with an estimate | a run estimated at 1 billion input and 50 million output tokens, about 6250 USD | `agent-costly-run` |
The costly run takes **two approvers in turn** — a developer, then a manager — each from their own
messenger account enrolled beforehand. A confirmation from any other account refuses the action.
## How it works
The plugin is a Claude Code mod — a plugin of function hooks that runs inside Claude Code 2.1.295 or
later — so the approval happens in the harness itself, without the model taking part.
1. A hook of the plugin holds the tool call or the slash command and matches it against its rules.
If nothing matches, Claude Code continues as usual.
2. If a rule matches, the plugin creates a confirmation with
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation` (client credentials). The action waits; nothing has run.
3. The plugin opens a pane of its own with what is asked, the QR code Veriqa returned and the link.
On a narrow terminal its status line says what is waited for, and a command opens the pane.
4. The hook waits for the outcome, reading `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result` until the transaction
ends. The action runs only on `confirmed`; declined, expired, refused in the pane, a confirmation
from the wrong account or an unreachable host all refuse it. In a chain the pane moves on to the
next approver's code.
The person sees wording declared on the host with typed slot values filled in — "Claude Code in
demo-shop wants to push the branch to the remote repository" — never text the agent wrote.
## Channels of the sample
The person answers in Telegram by default — the host reads it by long polling, so the demo works on
`localhost`. Messenger, WhatsApp and Instagram, or a page where the person picks one of these
channels on the phone, need the host on a public HTTPS address: Meta delivers the answer by webhook,
and the phone has to reach the page.
## Why not the harness's own "Allow" button
* **A named person.** The host checks which messenger account confirmed, not merely that someone
pressed a button.
* **Someone other than the developer.** A chain asks a second person, so nobody signs off their own
spending.
* **A trail outside the agent's session.** Approvals are recorded on the Veriqa host, not in a local
transcript the same user can edit.
* **A question the agent does not write,** answered on a separate device over a channel the agent
does not control.
For a single developer watching their own agent, the harness button is often enough; the difference
shows when several people share agents, spending or responsibility.
## Demo shortcuts
<Warning>
Veriqa runs on the developer's machine only to make the demo quick to set up; in a team the
approving host is a shared service. The second approver's QR code is shown in the same
pane for the demonstration only — Veriqa does not deliver the question to that person,
and in a real setup the link reaches them another way: their own chat, email, a ticket.
</Warning>
The plugin puts a person in the loop; it is not a sandbox. The limits are listed in the sample's
README. The engineering background of the direction is on
[Approving AI-agent actions](/docs/research/agent-approvals).
# Honest voting on any website
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/honest-voting
A vote confirmed in the voter's messenger and a result that can be checked: what the product already has for it, what this direction still lacks and where its limits are.
Online votes — a fan favorite, a contest, an award — are too often decided by whoever bought the
votes. A CAPTCHA is solved by a paid service for a fraction of a cent, an email address costs nothing,
and a social account costs a few cents. The organizer has nothing to answer an accusation with but
a promise.
The direction is a voting widget that can be embedded on any website. Every vote is a Veriqa
confirmation in the voter's messenger — one tap, with no sign-up, no password and no code to
type — and the result comes with a signed receipt that the voter and a third party can check. In
one line: a vote whose result can be shown, not just promised.
## What it is for
* **The voter** votes without an account, and the receipt lets them check that their vote is in
the total.
* **The nominee** gets a win that can be proved. A victory nobody can verify is worth little once
someone says it was bought.
* **The organizer** moves from "trust us" to "check for yourself", and does not have to store
phone numbers to fight fraud.
* **The sponsor** gets a result that can be audited, and reach measured in people rather than
clicks.
* **The site developer** embeds a widget instead of building verification, number storage and
their own anti-fraud.
A campaign that runs in several networks at once gets one more thing. Today the votes from each
network are added up, and the same person counts once per network. A phone number is the one
identifier all the networks share: if the posts in every network lead to one ballot, one person is
one vote whatever the entry point, and the organizer sees how many unique people each network
brought and how far the audiences overlap. The cost is one extra step: a poll built into the
network itself — a channel poll or a Stories sticker — has nowhere to put a confirmation.
## How strong the protection is
No anti-fraud is perfect, and the direction does not claim immunity. It claims fraud that is
**more expensive** than with the methods common on websites today: a CAPTCHA or an email
confirmation costs a fraud farm next to nothing, a social account a few cents, and an identity
anchored to a phone number roughly an order of magnitude more than a social account.
SMS verification uses the same anchor, and against it the protection is on par. The difference
lies elsewhere: messages in a messenger are not billed per message, and the voter does not retype a
code. The same trade-off as in [Replacing SMS codes](/docs/scenarios/sms-replacement): the phone anchor
at the price of a messenger wherever the audience has one.
## What it builds on
A vote is not a separate product but a confirmation of an action carrying data — which poll and
which choice. That transaction already exists:
1. **Server-to-server confirmation.** The website's server calls
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation` with a declared action type (`action_type`) and receives
the channel's deep link and a QR code for the voter. The outcome is read with
`GET /api/transaction/{id}/result` — `confirmed`, `declined`, `expired` or `failed` — and the
response does not disclose who confirmed.
2. **The exact subject in the message.** The poll and the choice travel in typed slots
(`slot_values`) against the schema of the action type, and the voter sees in the chat what they
are voting for, with Confirm and Decline buttons.
3. **The phone number as the key.** WhatsApp delivers `phone_number` — with the message, or through
the phone step when the user hides the number behind a username. Telegram hands over an account
identifier rather than a number — see the [channel catalog](/docs/guides/supported-channels).
4. **The audit trail.** The trail is append-only; a deployment can explicitly turn on recording
the parameters of the confirmed operation, and user identifiers appear in it only masked.
## What does not exist today
* **One person — one vote.** The product confirms an action but neither counts votes nor
deduplicates them within a poll.
* **A key that does not keep the number.** Deduplication needs the phone, but the record should
hold a one-way keyed hash, different for every poll, rather than the number itself — the
approach described in [Resilience to a personal-data leak](/docs/research/leak-resilience). In
Telegram the number is available only after the user explicitly shares it.
* **A signed receipt and a checkable total.** The voter needs a receipt, and the poll a published
summary against which the voter checks that their vote is included and a third party checks that
the total matches the register. The message Veriqa sends after a confirmation is text for the
user, not an attestation, and the audit trail is not tamper-evident.
* **The anchor level as a property of the poll.** Not a "protected" badge but "collected on an
anchor costing about this much per identity", together with the checks around the key: virtual
number ranges, bursts of votes from one network, repeated patterns.
* **The widget and the service behind it.** A widget on an arbitrary website means the voting is
hosted by Veriqa rather than by the integrator: allowed origins, rate limits, an abuse policy.
* **Email** does not fit this transaction: an address costs nothing, so a vote confirmed by email
anchors nothing.
A voting or contest platform that accepts an external OpenID Connect provider can connect Veriqa
as its sign-in method today, like any other OIDC client — see
[SaaS builders](/docs/integrations/saas-builders) for how that connection works. Whether the platform
lets a public audience sign in through an external provider is up to that platform. The
platform then counts the votes itself, so the anchor and the one-tap confirmation are available
this way, while the receipt and the checkable total are not.
## Where its limits are
<Warning>
A confirmed vote is **attributable**: it is tied to the voter's confirmation. This fits a fan
favorite, a contest or an award. It does not fit elections or any decision with legal
consequences, where the secrecy of the ballot matters.
</Warning>
* **Votes bought from real people are not stopped by anything here.** The phone anchor raises the
price of a vote to the cost of a person's time and stops there.
* **The receipt shifts trust but does not remove it.** It proves that the website did not alter the
result; it does not prove that Veriqa did not issue fictitious identities.
* **Coverage.** Where a large share of the audience uses none of the supported messengers — in the
US, for example, no single messenger dominates — the widget cannot be the only way to vote, and
any fallback without a phone anchor brings the guarantee down to its own level.
* **The receipt is an attestation of the count**, not an electronic signature in the legal sense.
# Resilience to a personal-data leak
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/leak-resilience
The link between a person and the way to reach them is the most toxic thing in a connector's database. What Veriqa stores today, how the mode is designed and what it does not give you.
Any connector between an application and a messenger has to answer which messenger account belongs
to this user — and the usual answer is stored for as long as the account itself lives. Why that
column is more toxic than a password is on the
[Resilience to a personal-data leak](https://veriqa.app/whats-next/leak-resilience?lang=en) page.
Here is what exists today and what it is meant to become.
## What Veriqa stores today
Start with the current state, because that is what you make a risk decision on.
**The channel identifier and the profile are stored in the clear.** The key of a channel identity is
the pair "channel type + user identifier within it", and the profile sits next to it: display name,
first and last name, username, email address, phone number, avatar, locale. There are no derived
forms along the storage path, and the record has no lifetime either. This is exactly the behavior
any connector has — but it is better to know it in advance.
**Masking today covers the journals only.** By contract the audit trail and the logs write neither
tokens nor unmasked identities, and that works. The rule does not touch the main store.
**And a qualification the risk decision turns on: out of the box that store does not exist.**
Veriqa ships no implementation of the port that would persist a channel identity and registers
none, so a stock installation keeps the profile only for the minutes the transaction lives.
Everything described above starts applying the moment you register an implementation of your own.
The full inventory — what is kept where, for how long, and what is encrypted — is in
[Security and data handling](/docs/guides/data-handling).
<Note>
The encryption the product already has applies to **channel provider secrets**, not to user
identifiers. The hardening guidance covers secrets and the database connection — not identifiers.
</Note>
## How the mode is designed
The mode is designed as the integrator's decision — a tenant-level mode switched on deliberately, not
a default that changes behavior for everyone. It comes down to four properties, and they are
connected.
**A derived value instead of the native identifier.** The record holds a one-way hash keyed with a
secret, not the identifier itself. The same person always yields the same value — the account is
recognized on every sign-in — but the value does not unwrap back into a Telegram id or an email
address.
**The secret does not live next to the data.** It belongs in a KMS or a secret store, self-hosted
deployments included, with no concessions. This is not hardening advice but a condition of the
scheme working at all: the space of possible inputs is small enough to be enumerated in full, and a
secret inside the same snapshot as the database would let an attacker simply recompute the function.
Where there is no secret store, the mode is designed **not to switch on** rather than to degrade
into something weaker.
**Different integrators get different values.** The tenant takes part in the computation, so the
same person becomes a different value in each integrator's database. Two leaked databases do not
join to each other, and neither joins to a purchased marketing list.
**And where the scenario allows — no value at all.** If the user always arrives from the channel,
the identifier comes with every confirmation and there is nothing to keep between transactions. The
strongest form of the property is not "well encrypted" but "never written down".
## What it costs
Both consequences follow from the property itself rather than qualifying it:
* **Finding a user by their Telegram id or email address becomes impossible.** That is exactly
what is being paid for.
* **A scenario that pushes a confirmation into the channel itself** does need the native identifier
back. There it is designed to live encrypted under the same service's key — reversible, unlike a
hash: stronger than storing it in the clear, weaker than a mode that stores nothing.
## What it does not do
<Warning>
**The data does not leave the scope of GDPR or national personal-data law.** Pseudonymization
there is a safeguard (GDPR Art. 4(5) and Art. 32(1)(a)), not anonymization: the data stays
personal and the controller's duties do not go away. What changes is how much there is left
to lose.
</Warning>
# Research
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/overview
Directions we are working on: which Veriqa machinery they build on today and where their limits are.
This section holds the directions we are working on. Every article answers the same questions:
which problem the direction solves, what in the product it already builds on today, what is not
there yet and where its limits are.
<Note>
An article in this section describes research, not a shipped capability. What works out will
appear in releases as it is developed; if a direction does not hold up, the article itself will
say so. Shipped capabilities are described in the rest of the documentation, channels in the
[supported-channels catalog](/docs/guides/supported-channels).
</Note>
## What is here
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Smart TV and keyboard-free surfaces" icon="tv" href="/docs/research/smart-tv">
Signing in where there is nothing to type on: a television, a kiosk, a three-button device.
</Card>
<Card title="Place and identity" icon="location-dot" href="/docs/research/place-and-identity">
A presence factor: a QR code that exists only inside the room.
</Card>
<Card title="Approving AI-agent actions" icon="robot" href="/docs/research/agent-approvals">
Human-in-the-loop on a surface the agent cannot reach.
</Card>
<Card title="Approvals in Claude Code" icon="terminal" href="/docs/research/claude-code-approvals">
A sample plugin: agent actions and costly runs wait for a person in the messenger.
</Card>
<Card title="Stronger sign-in with a chain of channels" icon="link" href="/docs/research/auth-chain">
One transaction confirmed in several trusted channels.
</Card>
<Card title="Resilience to a personal-data leak" icon="shield-halved" href="/docs/research/leak-resilience">
The link between a person and the way to reach them — the most toxic thing a breach can carry.
</Card>
<Card title="Honest voting on any website" icon="check-to-slot" href="/docs/research/honest-voting">
A vote confirmed in the voter's messenger and a result that can be checked.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
## How this differs from the "What's next" pages on the site
Most of these directions also have a page on the site, and those answer **"why does this
matter"**: which problem it solves, for whom, and what it is worth.
The articles here answer a different question — **"what exists for it today"**: which existing
machinery the direction builds on and what the product does not have yet.
# Place and identity
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/place-and-identity
A presence factor: a QR code that exists only inside the room. What the idea demands of the channel model and where its limits are.
Every familiar sign-in factor is tied to a person or to their device, and not one of them answers
the question "is the person actually here?". Place answers it. Why this matters and for whom is covered
on the [Place and identity](https://veriqa.app/whats-next/place-and-identity?lang=en) page. Here is
what it demands of the product.
## What it builds on
The idea needs no new protocol: a sign-in on the work computer gives identity, a QR code on site gives
presence. Both steps are ordinary confirmation transactions, which Veriqa already knows how to run.
Several surfaces were considered, and they are not equally hard:
| Surface | What it gives | What it costs |
| - | - | - |
| A sheet printed on the office printer | place, plus a way to carry the QR code where there is no screen | consumables, a shared output tray, vendor-specific printing |
| A screen in a shared area (the meeting-room TV) | a large QR code, readable from anywhere in the room | the hardware is already there, but content appears only the way the vendor allows |
| A desk IP phone | place more precisely — a specific desk rather than a corridor | the screen is small: how much data fits into a readable QR code is a question to measure |
| A dedicated mini-panel | no consumables, no shared tray, no vendor-specific printing | it is a hardware purchase |
## What does not exist today
Neither a printer nor a screen is a Veriqa channel, and the reason is not a missing adapter.
**The channel model has no category of a "place channel" at all**: every existing channel is tied
to a person — Telegram, WhatsApp, other channels and Email answer "who", not "where".
Such a category is a change to the channel model rather than one more adapter, and it is common to
every surface in the table above.
## Where its limits are
* **Against a colleague in the same room the place factor does not protect at all** — they are
already inside. The factor is exactly as strong as the control over physical access.
* **Printing adds risks of its own.** A sheet outlives the session, it can be forgotten in a shared
tray, and a personalized onboarding sheet is a long-lived linking secret that a short lifetime
does not cure. Without one-time tokens and the invalidation of the remaining QR codes on first
use, such a scenario is not safe.
* **A QR code on a permanent screen is visible to everyone in the room and to cameras.** It can
therefore only ever be a marker of place and never a secret: short lifetime, rotation, and
possession of it alone grants nothing.
<Note>
A separate upside unrelated to security: where policy forbids radio and Bluetooth and Wi-Fi are
switched off, a whole class of competing proximity factors is unavailable — cross-device passkeys
confirm device proximity precisely over BLE. A paper or on-screen QR code needs no radio at all.
</Note>
# Smart TV and keyboard-free surfaces
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/research/smart-tv
Signing in and confirming where there is nothing to type on: how this differs from device flow and what Veriqa already has for it.
A television, a kiosk, a three-button device: start the sign-in where typing is awkward and confirm
it in a messenger on the phone. Why this matters and for whom is covered on the
[Smart TV and keyboard-free surfaces](https://veriqa.app/whats-next/smart-tv?lang=en) page. Here is what
the product has for it today.
## Relationship to OAuth 2.0 Device Flow
The first question people ask is whether this restates RFC 8628. It does not — the standard and
Veriqa answer different questions and live on different layers.
| | RFC 8628 | Veriqa |
| - | - | - |
| The question it answers | how a device without a browser obtains a token | **how** the user proves they are who they claim |
| What it defines | `device_code`, `user_code`, `verification_uri`, token-endpoint polling | the confirmation method — possession of a trusted channel |
| On the authentication method | says nothing: the `verification_uri` may hold anything, a password included | that is its entire subject |
The overlap is only in the shape of the interaction — "start where typing is awkward, confirm on the
phone". There is no protocol duplication: a browser sign-in through Veriqa lives entirely inside
`authorization_code`, and the server-to-server entry point ends in an exchange of its own on the token
endpoint.
## What it adds compared with device flow
* **It collapses the verification step.** In device flow the second device goes through another
full sign-in: open the address, type the code, authenticate. Here it is one tap in a messenger
where the session already exists. Strictly speaking this is not an improvement on the standard
but a method dropped into the hole the standard deliberately left empty.
* **It targets code phishing.** A known weakness of device flow: the attacker starts the flow on their
side and talks the victim into entering their code — the standard does nothing to bind the initiator
to the confirming party. On a browser sign-in Veriqa shows the initiator's context at
the moment of confirmation, and that addresses precisely this vector.
* **It links a channel in the same step.** Outside device flow's scope entirely: the standard
ends at issuing a token.
<Warning>
Showing the initiator's context is **not protection against relay or MITM**. The measure is
probabilistic and works through the user's attention. The reinforcement is narrow; plain device
flow does not have even that.
</Warning>
## What exists today
**A browser or a webview on the device.** If the platform offers a webview, the ordinary sign-in
through `/connect/authorize` works: a page with a QR code, confirmation in a messenger, and the
application receives OIDC tokens.
**The server-to-server confirmation entry point — no browser needed.** The application calls
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation`, authenticating with client credentials and naming a declared
action type (`action_type`), and receives a `channel_entry` in the response: the address for the
user (`url`) — the channel's deep link or the channel-selection page — and the same address as a
ready-made QR image (`qr`, a PNG data URI) with the moment it stops being valid (`valid_until`). An
application on any TV SDK can show that image; the device needs no browser for it. The user scans
the QR code with their phone and confirms in the messenger. Send `include_channel_entries: true` and
the response also carries `channel_entries` — a deep link with its QR code for every available
channel — so the screen can offer a choice of messengers.
The QR image carries the product attribution: a "Powered by Veriqa" strip under the code, below its
quiet zone, so the picture is taller than it is wide — leave room for the strip rather than fitting
the image into a square frame. The strip is part of what the software renders under its license:
cropping it off is technically possible, and whether you may do so is a licensing matter, not a
setting.
The application reads the outcome with `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result`: `confirmed`, `declined`,
`expired` or `failed`, and `pending` while there is no answer yet. If expected identities
(`expected_identities`) were passed at creation, the result also tells whether the confirming
person matched the expected one (`matched_type`).
**Signing in without a browser, when the application has a backend.** Once the outcome is
`confirmed`, the application's server exchanges the transaction for the `id_token` of the person who
confirmed: `POST /connect/token` with `grant_type=urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation`,
the `transaction_id` and a `scope` that contains `openid`. The server keeps the `sub` from the token
next to its own account and opens its own session on the TV. The client needs
`AllowClientCredentials`, `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant` and `openid` in `AllowedScopes`; the exchange
and its rules are described in
[Linking from your server](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking#linking-from-your-server-without-a-sign-in).
How this differs from a browser sign-in:
* **No `refresh_token`.** A transaction is redeemed once; the long-lived session on the TV is the
application's own.
* **It is a confirmation, not a sign-in.** It needs a declared `action_type` with its text, and with
the grant enabled the application learns the confirming person's channel identity in **every**
confirmation of that client. A separate client for the TV scenario is worth considering.
* **The initiator's context is what your backend writes.** The request comes from your server, not
from the TV, and the QR is a bearer entry: whoever opens it first confirms, and the `sub` is
theirs. Put the device and the place into the action type's text through slots your backend
fills.
<Note>
Client credentials are the application's secret. Call the server-to-server entry point from your own
server, not from code on the device: a secret shipped inside a TV application can be extracted.
</Note>
## What does not exist today
* **A path for a device with no backend of its own.** The client secret cannot live on the device,
so a TV application without a server has no way to obtain tokens yet. A full implementation of Device
Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) is in progress.
* **There are no native SDKs for TV platforms**: the server-to-server entry point and the exchange are
plain HTTP requests.
# Action confirmation
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/samples/confirmation
Samples in which a backend asks a person to confirm an action in a messenger: a plain confirmation, step-up before a destructive action and approval of an AI agent's tool call.
Here the backend, not the browser, starts the transaction: it asks a person to confirm an action in
a messenger and acts on the outcome. There is no sign-in and no browser redirect. The three samples
live under `samples/dotnet/inproc/` in the repository ([veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source))
and are MIT-licensed.
| Sample | The action | What it adds | Address |
| - | - | - | - |
| `confirmation` | "Approve a payment of 42.00 EUR to ACME Ltd?" | The bare mechanism: create, show the channel entry, wait, read the outcome | `https://localhost:7310` |
| `step-up` | Deleting a project, which cannot be undone | Only the **owner of the account** may confirm: `expected_identities` and `matched_type` | `https://localhost:7330` |
| `agent-approval` | A support agent's `refund_payment` tool call | Human-in-the-loop: the tool runs only after a person approves the call | `https://localhost:7340` |
## How each of them works
Every sample is one process in two roles: the Veriqa issuer (embedded) and the backend that calls it
**only over the public HTTP API**. Point the backend at a standalone Veriqa and it works the same.
1. `POST /connect/token` with `grant_type=client_credentials`.
2. `POST /api/transaction/confirmation` with the declared `action_type` and its `slot_values`.
3. The page shows `channel_entry.qr` — the QR image the API returns — for the user to scan with their phone.
4. The backend polls `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result`.
5. On `confirmed` it may exchange the transaction once for the `id_token` of the person who
confirmed (`grant_type=urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation`).
The full contract — fields, errors, the exchange — is in the
[confirmation API reference](/docs/reference/confirmation-api).
## The configuration that makes it work
The backend's client entry in `appsettings.json` carries:
* `AllowClientCredentials: true` — the backend may get a token for the API (needs a `ClientSecret`);
* `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant: true` and `openid` in `AllowedScopes` — step 5;
* `MessageTemplates:<action type>` — the declaration of the action: `Contract:Slots` and `Templates`.
It belongs in the **client entry**; an action type declared only at the host level is refused with
`action_type_unknown`;
* for `step-up` also `IdentityMatchComparableTypes`, which declares the identity compared with the
person who confirmed. Without it the request is refused with `candidate_type_undeclared`.
The host section sets `Veriqa:Channels:OutcomeNotice:DisplayIntent` to `NewMessage`: the receipt
arrives as a message of its own and the question with the wording of the action stays in the
conversation. See `OutcomeNotice` in [Configuration](/docs/reference/configuration).
## Run a sample
Each sample needs a trusted local HTTPS certificate (`dotnet dev-certs https --trust`) and a Telegram
bot token from [@BotFather](https://t.me/BotFather). Pass the token through user secrets, not a
committed file:
```bash theme={null}
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/inproc/confirmation set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:BotToken" "<token>"
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/inproc/confirmation set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:Enabled" "true"
dotnet run --project samples/dotnet/inproc/confirmation
```
For `step-up` and `agent-approval` replace the project path. In Development the bot runs in polling
mode, so no public URL is needed. Without an enabled channel, creating a confirmation fails with
`503 channel_display_failed`.
What to try in each:
* **confirmation** — click **Ask for approval**, confirm in the bot: the page shows
`Outcome: confirmed` and the claims of the `id_token`.
* **step-up** — delete a project: the first person to confirm becomes the owner. Delete another one
from a different Telegram account: the confirmation succeeds, but the page shows *Not deleted —
confirmed, but not by the owner*.
* **agent-approval** — click **Hand the ticket to the agent**: the agent stops at `refund_payment`
until you approve. Decline on a second run: the refund is not executed and the agent tells the
customer a colleague will contact them. The agent follows a fixed plan, so no model or API key is
needed.
## See also
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
* [Approving AI-agent actions](/docs/research/agent-approvals)
* [Video: step-up on a desktop](/docs/videos/desktop-step-up)
# Nova Stream — streaming on a TV
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/samples/showcase/streaming-tv
A showcase sample that imitates a streaming service on a television: sign-in by QR code from the sofa, the viewer's card from channel claims, and step-up when buying a title.
Nova Stream is a runnable emulator of a **product**, not of one mechanism. The scenario samples each
show a single thing — a sign-in, a confirmation, a step-up; this one strings them together the way a
viewer encounters them on a television: a sign-in, the person's data, recognition on the next visit and a
confirmed purchase.
The sample lives in the repository ([veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source)) under
`samples/dotnet/showcase/streaming-tv` and listens on `https://localhost:7350`. Its `README.md` is
the detailed setup guide; this page is the overview.
## What the viewer sees
<Steps>
<Step title="Sign-in by QR code from the sofa">
The TV redirects to the Veriqa sign-in page, which shows a QR code. The viewer scans it with their
phone camera and confirms in the messenger — nothing is typed with the remote.
</Step>
<Step title="A welcome card from the channel's claims">
The card on screen is built from what the channel provides: display name, first and last name,
picture, `@username` and a masked user id (Telegram), a masked phone (WhatsApp), an address
(Email) — Nova Stream asks for the contacts at sign-in. Identifiers are masked on the server; the
full value never reaches the browser.
</Step>
<Step title="A date of birth and a favorite genre inside the sign-in">
The `Veriqa:ScopesClaims` catalog declares both, so Veriqa asks for them on its own form inside
the sign-in, and the collected claims store remembers the answer. 18+ titles are closed to a
viewer under age, and titles of the favorite genre come first. See
[Progressive claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment).
</Step>
<Step title="Recognition of a returning viewer">
A first-time viewer is welcomed by name; a viewer who has been here before lands straight in
the catalog.
</Step>
<Step title="Step-up when buying a title">
Buying a title shows a QR code and is confirmed in the channel **by the viewer who asked**. A
confirmation from anybody else buys nothing.
</Step>
</Steps>
The two flows leave different receipts in the chat. A sign-in's question is replaced by "Sign-in to
Nova Stream confirmed ✅" (`ReplacePrompt`); a purchase keeps its question and gets the receipt as a
message of its own (`NewMessage`, set in the backend client's entry), so what was confirmed stays
readable. See `OutcomeNotice` in [Configuration](/docs/reference/configuration).
### The interface on a television
The interface belongs to the fictional service: a ten-foot layout, remote-control navigation and no
interaction that needs a pointer.
| Key | What it does |
| - | - |
| arrows | move the focus |
| `Enter` | select |
| `Backspace`, Tizen `10009`, webOS `461` | close the purchase window |
| `F` (desktop) | full screen |
The sign-in page and the confirmation window are Veriqa's own screens, shown as they are: the sample
names its brand beside the Veriqa mark and adapts the arrangement for a big screen through
`AuthPageDesign`:
* the television shows the QR codes of all enabled channels side by side — the
[channel layout](/docs/guides/customization#channel-layout) is `Grid`, because nobody walks up to a TV
to switch a tab;
* the "Open in …" buttons appear on a phone only — the
[visibility of the channel buttons](/docs/guides/customization#channel-button-visibility) is
`MobileOnly`; a phone that opens the page gets the buttons instead of the QR;
* the QR of the purchase window is drawn at 12 px per module instead of the default 6, so it scans
off the screen from across the room;
* a stylesheet enlarges the card on screens 1600 CSS pixels wide or wider.
**A set of channels per browser language.** The sign-in client has two `ui_config` records that
differ in `Channels`; the sample names one of them in the authorize request by the first language of
`Accept-Language`. A record narrows what the host has enabled — it is presentation, not a
restriction.
### TV browsers
Everything the page ships targets **ES2018** and the CSS of Chromium 68 — the engine of Tizen 5.5 and
webOS 5 — with fallbacks for the Chromium 53 of webOS 4.x where a layout depends on it. Newer syntax
such as `?.` or `??` is a parse error there: the script does not load at all. Nothing is loaded from
outside the origin.
## How it is built
One process plays three roles; splitting them into separate hosts changes nothing but the addresses.
| Role | What it is |
| - | - |
| Embedded issuer | Veriqa inside the process: `AddVeriqaAuthServer` → `UseVeriqaAuthServer` → `MapVeriqaAuthServer` |
| Browser-side OIDC client | the standard `AddOpenIdConnect` handler, pointed at this very process |
| Backend that creates confirmations | `VeriqaConfirmationClient`, calling the [server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api) over HTTP |
The purchase creates a confirmation that names **one** expected identity — the identity from the channel the
current session came through (`expected_identities`). The title is bought only when the outcome is
`confirmed` and `matched_type` is the expected type; another type, `declined`, `expired` or
`failed` leave the library unchanged. The server remembers which title a transaction pays for, so no browser can buy one title by confirming another.
## Running it
* .NET SDK 10.0+ and a trusted development certificate (`dotnet dev-certs https --trust`) — the
application calls itself over HTTPS.
* **Enable at least one channel and give it credentials.** Channels ship disabled with empty
credentials; a Telegram bot token is the shortest path:
```bash theme={null}
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/showcase/streaming-tv set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:BotToken" "<token>"
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/showcase/streaming-tv set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:Enabled" "true"
dotnet run --project samples/dotnet/showcase/streaming-tv
```
Open `https://localhost:7350`. WhatsApp and Email are switched on the same way, through their
sections of `appsettings.json`. A sign-in page that offers no way in means no channel is enabled.
<Note>
In `Development` the sample switches WhatsApp and Email on with placeholder values, only to show
what a multi-channel sign-in page looks like. Neither can carry a sign-in through — Telegram is the
channel that works.
</Note>
**On a real TV.** A television cannot reach `localhost`: put the sample behind an HTTP tunnel. Nothing
in the code changes — the issuer, the redirect URI, the authority and the channels' public addresses
are set to the public host through environment variables, all of them together, and Telegram
switches to `Webhook` mode. The exact list is in the sample's README; see also
[Behind a reverse proxy](/docs/guides/reverse-proxy).
<Tip>
A Telegram bot delivers its updates to one webhook address, so with one bot token only one of the
two showcase samples can take sign-ins at a time.
</Tip>
## Videos
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Sign-in on a TV" icon="tv" href="/docs/videos/tv-sign-in">
Sign-in by QR code from the sofa on a real TV, with no keyboard and no typing.
</Card>
<Card title="Step-up on a TV" icon="cart-shopping" href="/docs/videos/tv-step-up">
Buying a title, confirmed in the messenger by the signed-in viewer.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
## See also
* [Samples](/docs/samples#showcase-samples)
* [Sign-in surfaces](/docs/scenarios/surfaces)
* [Smart TV and keyboard-free surfaces](/docs/research/smart-tv)
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
# Helio — customer support
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/samples/showcase/support-desk
A showcase sample that imitates the support section of a website: a public page, sign-in, the customer's card and step-up before a ticket is closed or deleted.
Helio is a runnable emulator of a whole product rather than of one mechanism: the support section
of a fictional company's website. It strings together what an ordinary web product does — a page
anyone can read, sign-in, the person's data, and a confirmation before an action that matters — so
the flows can be seen end to end the way a customer encounters them.
`samples/dotnet/showcase/support-desk` · `https://localhost:7360`
<Note>
The support page belongs to the fictional company. The sign-in page and the confirmation window
are Veriqa's own screens, shown as they are: `AuthPageDesign` sets only the brand name, the logo,
the primary color and shows the QR code only on a desktop.
</Note>
## What the customer sees
<Steps>
<Step title="A public page">
The support section is readable by anyone; nobody is redirected on arrival.
</Step>
<Step title="Sign-in">
The visitor is sent to the Veriqa sign-in page and comes back signed in: with a QR code on a desktop, with
the channel button on a phone. The sign-in asks for no contact.
</Step>
<Step title="The customer's card">
The card is built from the claims the channel provides: display name, first and last name, picture,
`@username` and a masked user id (Telegram). A phone or an address appears only once the customer
has confirmed it. Next to it are the customer's tickets.
</Step>
<Step title="A contact when a feature needs it">
"Call me back" and "Answer by e-mail" open once the customer confirms a phone number or an email
address — each by one more authorize request. The request adds the scope and names the claim as
essential in the `claims` parameter, and the application accepts the value only with its
`*_verified` mark. See [Progressive claim enrichment](/docs/concepts/claim-enrichment).
</Step>
<Step title="Step-up">
Closing or deleting a ticket is confirmed in the channel, **by that person**. The dialog on the
page only guards against a misclick; the question in the channel is the one that decides.
</Step>
</Steps>
The two flows leave different receipts in the chat. A sign-in's question is replaced by
"Sign-in to Helio Support confirmed ✅" (`ReplacePrompt`); a ticket action keeps its question and
gets the receipt as a message of its own (`NewMessage`, set in the backend client's entry), so
what was confirmed stays readable. See `OutcomeNotice` in [Configuration](/docs/reference/configuration).
## How it is built
One process plays three roles:
| Role | What it is |
| - | - |
| Embedded Veriqa issuer | `AddVeriqaAuthServer` → `UseVeriqaAuthServer` → `MapVeriqaAuthServer` |
| Browser-side OIDC client | the standard `AddOpenIdConnect` handler, pointed at this very process |
| Backend that creates confirmations | `VeriqaConfirmationClient`, calling the [server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api) over HTTP |
**Step-up addressed to the signed-in person.** Closing and deleting a ticket are two declared action
types, `resolve-ticket` and `delete-ticket`, each with its own wording. Every confirmation names one
expected identity — the identity from the channel the current session came through
(`expected_identities`) — and the operation is applied only when `matched_type` agrees: a
confirmation from another account leaves the ticket untouched, as do a decline and an expiry.
The server remembers which ticket a transaction acts on, so no browser can delete one ticket
by confirming another.
**Identifiers stay on the server.** The full channel user id addresses the step-up and is never sent
to the browser: the user id and the phone number are masked before they are put into a response.
**No database.** The tickets are synthesized from the `sub` claim, so the same person sees the same
list on every visit. Only the tickets the customer has closed or deleted are kept in memory; a
restart forgets them.
<Note>
This step-up goes through the server-to-server confirmation API. The other route — a repeat
authorize and an `auth_time` check in the browser — is described in
[Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up).
</Note>
## Running it
Prerequisites:
* .NET SDK 10.0+;
* a trusted development certificate — the application calls **itself** over HTTPS:
`dotnet dev-certs https --trust`;
* credentials for at least one channel. A Telegram bot token from
[@BotFather](https://t.me/BotFather) is the shortest path.
Channels ship **disabled with empty credentials**: a channel switched on without its credentials
stops the application from starting. Switch on the ones you have and start the sample:
```bash theme={null}
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/showcase/support-desk set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:BotToken" "<token>"
dotnet user-secrets --project samples/dotnet/showcase/support-desk set "Veriqa:Channels:Telegram:Enabled" "true"
dotnet run --project samples/dotnet/showcase/support-desk
```
Open `https://localhost:7360`. The sample wires the Telegram, WhatsApp and Email adapters; WhatsApp
and Email are switched on the same way, through their sections `Veriqa:Channels:WhatsApp:*` and
`Veriqa:Channels:Email:*` with `Enabled` set to `true`. The sign-in page offers exactly the
channels that are on — an empty sign-in page means none is enabled. Credentials for each channel are
described in [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels).
<Tip>
A Telegram bot delivers its updates to one webhook address, so with one bot token only one of the
two showcase samples can take sign-ins at a time.
</Tip>
The sample also runs behind an HTTP tunnel, with Telegram switched to `Webhook` mode. The variables
to set, the API of the page and the details of the step-up are in the sample's `README.md` in the
repository ([veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source), path
`samples/dotnet/showcase/support-desk`) — it remains the detailed setup guide.
## Videos
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Sign-in on a desktop" icon="desktop" href="/docs/videos/desktop-sign-in">
Sign-in by QR and the customer card built from the channel claims.
</Card>
<Card title="Sign-in on a phone" icon="mobile" href="/docs/videos/mobile-sign-in">
No QR code — the channel button opens the messenger on the same device.
</Card>
<Card title="Step-up on a desktop" icon="desktop" href="/docs/videos/desktop-step-up">
Deleting a ticket takes a confirmation in the messenger.
</Card>
<Card title="Step-up on a phone" icon="mobile" href="/docs/videos/mobile-step-up">
Closing a ticket is confirmed in Telegram on the same device.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
## See also
* [Showcase samples](/docs/samples#showcase-samples)
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
* [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api)
* [Sign-in and channel linking in one action](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking)
* [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels)
# Sign-in on a website via a messenger
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/samples/sign-in
Samples of website sign-in through a messenger: the issuer with Veriqa embedded, a stock OIDC client, the same sign-in under .NET Aspire and the client code for an external issuer.
A website signs a person in through a messenger the same way it would through any OpenID Connect
provider: it redirects to the issuer, the person confirms in the messenger, and the browser comes
back with tokens. The samples below show both sides of that sign-in. Everything lives under
`samples/` in the repository ([veriqa.app/source](https://veriqa.app/source)) and is MIT-licensed.
<Note>
Veriqa lives on the **issuer** side. The website itself stays a plain OIDC relying party: the
client sample has no Veriqa package and would look the same against any conformant provider.
</Note>
## The samples
| Path | Side | What it shows | Form |
| - | - | - | - |
| `dotnet/inproc/login` | issuer | Veriqa embedded in the application (`AddVeriqaAuthServer` / `MapVeriqaAuthServer`); the issuer runs inside the process | runnable · `https://localhost:7300` |
| `dotnet/inproc/login-client` | client | A stock ASP.NET Core relying party (`AddCookie` + `AddOpenIdConnect`, Authorization Code + PKCE) | runnable · `https://localhost:7020` |
| `dotnet/aspire/login` | issuer | The same embedded issuer under .NET Aspire: the transaction store is an orchestrated resource (needs Docker) | runnable · `https://localhost:7320` |
| `dotnet/remote/login` | client | A client of an external issuer — self-hosted or Veriqa Cloud | code to copy |
| `java/Application.java` | client | The same client on Spring Security OAuth2 Client | code to copy |
| `node/index.ts` | client | The same client on `openid-client` + Express | code to copy |
| `python/main.py` | client | The same client on Authlib + FastAPI | code to copy |
## Run the pair
The issuer starts first — otherwise the client fails its discovery call.
<Steps>
<Step title="Enable a channel on the issuer">
The issuer ships with every channel `"Enabled": false`, and with none enabled the sign-in page
returns `no_channels_available`. Enable a channel in
`samples/dotnet/inproc/login/appsettings.Development.json` and give it credentials — a bot token
is the quickest route, see [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels).
</Step>
<Step title="Start the issuer">
```bash theme={null}
dotnet run --project samples/dotnet/inproc/login
```
Its root route returns `Hello!` and nothing more: the issuer has no page for a signed-in user;
the sign-in starts and ends at the client.
</Step>
<Step title="Start the client and sign in">
```bash theme={null}
dotnet run --project samples/dotnet/inproc/login-client
```
Open `https://localhost:7020/`. An anonymous visitor goes straight to the Veriqa sign-in page;
after the confirmation in the messenger the page shows `Hello, {name}!`.
</Step>
</Steps>
Both projects need a trusted local HTTPS certificate (`dotnet dev-certs https --trust`). Use the
`https` address of the client: a flow started over plain HTTP sends a `redirect_uri` the issuer does
not know.
## Why the pair needs no configuration
The issuer already registers the second project as its client, so three values agree out of the
box:
| Client | Issuer (`Veriqa:OpenIddict:Clients[]`) |
| - | - |
| `Oidc:Authority` = `https://localhost:7300` | the issuer's own address |
| `Oidc:ClientId` = `my-app` | `ClientId` |
| `CallbackPath` = `/signin-oidc` on port 7020 | an `AllowedRedirectUris` entry |
`redirect_uri` is compared literally, without wildcards: change the client's port and change
`AllowedRedirectUris` with it. `my-app` has no `ClientSecret`, so it is a **public** client and PKCE
(S256) is required of it.
## What else the client shows
* **Cancel** on the Veriqa page returns `error=access_denied`; the client turns it into a plain
"sign-in canceled" page through `AccessDeniedPath`.
* Any other failed return goes through `OnRemoteFailure` to a "sign-in failed" page; the error text
goes to the log, not to the user.
* `GET /signout` drops only the local cookie. Veriqa has no end-session endpoint, so there is no
federated sign-out — see [Known limitations](/docs/reference/limitations).
## See also
* [.NET quickstart](/docs/quickstart/dotnet) — the same wiring, step by step
* [How the auth flow works](/docs/concepts/auth-flow)
* [Passwordless sign-in and registration](/docs/scenarios/passwordless-login)
* [Video: sign-in on a website](/docs/videos/web-sign-in)
# Account recovery
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/account-recovery
"Forgot password" stops being a quest: a linked trusted channel becomes the recovery path, with no chain of emails and codes.
Classic account recovery is a chain: an email with a link, a click, a new-password form,
sometimes an SMS code on top. Every link breaks — the email lands in spam, the mailbox is
unreachable, the number has changed.
When a user has a **linked trusted channel**, recovery becomes the same action as signing in: a
confirmation in a messenger where they are already authenticated.
## How it works
Veriqa has no separate "recovery mode", and none is needed. The user goes through an ordinary
sign-in via the linked channel, you recognize them by `sub` (or by the stored
`channel_type` + `channel_user_id` pair) and grant access to the account.
What follows is your decision: let them straight in, offer to set a new password, or require a
second confirmation in another channel if the operation warrants it — see
[step-up](/docs/scenarios/step-up).
## What has to be in place first
The channel must be linked **before** access needs recovering. The convenient moment is the
sign-in itself: one action gives you both authentication and the link — see
[sign-in and channel linking](/docs/scenarios/channel-linking).
## What Veriqa does not do
* **it does not keep your accounts** and has no concept of "recovery" — it confirms an identity in
a channel, the rest is your logic;
* **it does not store passwords** and takes no part in changing them;
* **it does not decide for you** whether one confirmation is enough: that policy is yours.
<Warning>
**Recovery is exactly as trustworthy as the channel behind it.** The link lives on your side, and
so does the decision that this channel suffices to hand an account back. For high-privilege
accounts, requiring confirmation in two different channels is the sounder default.
</Warning>
# Sign-in and channel linking in one action
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/channel-linking
One action, two results: the user signs in and the product gains a live notification channel. What to send, and what to store on your side.
A single user action produces **two results**: they sign in, and your product gains a **live
channel** — Telegram, WhatsApp, [another messenger](/docs/guides/supported-channels) or email,
whichever they confirmed in. From then on you can send notifications, approvals and service
messages without asking for a contact separately.
## What you send
An ordinary authorize request with the `channel` scope:
```http theme={null}
GET /connect/authorize
?client_id=my-app
&response_type=code
&scope=openid%20profile%20channel
&redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback
&state=…
&code_challenge=…
&code_challenge_method=S256
```
## What you get
After exchanging the code for tokens, two extra claims:
| Claim | Meaning |
| - | - |
| `channel_type` | The channel type: `telegram`, `whatsapp`, `max`, `email` |
| `channel_user_id` | The user's identifier inside that channel |
**Without the `channel` scope there are no typed claims.** They reach neither the `access_token`
nor the `id_token`, and therefore never appear in the `/connect/userinfo` response — it mirrors
the access token.
<Warning>
The gate closes the individual claims but **not the value**. With the default identity resolver
`sub` is composed as `{channel_type}:{channel_user_id}`, so an application that splits the string
on the colon gets both parts without requesting the scope. Treat the gate as a way **not to
handle** channel identifiers where you do not need them, rather than as a way to hide them.
</Warning>
<Note>
The gate applies in **every delivery mode, the embedded one included**. Even when Veriqa is
linked as a library into your own process, the application receives the identity through the
normal authorize → code → token exchange rather than as a ready-made principal. There is no
"internal" path that hands out channel claims bypassing the scope.
</Note>
## How to link them
`sub` is the stable subject identifier; the `channel_type` + `channel_user_id` pair is the user's
address in a specific messenger. The link lives **on your side**: Veriqa does not keep your
application's accounts and does not map them to channels.
The practical consequence: `sub` is your account key. The off-the-shelf CMSes do the same — Drupal
and TYPO3 store it as the external identity name.
## When the account already exists
The scenario doubles as "add a channel to an existing account": a user who signed in the usual way
goes through authorize with the `channel` scope, and you store the returned pair next to your
account. There is no separate API for this — it is the same request.
## Linking from your server, without a sign-in
Sometimes there is no browser redirect to hang the link on: your server wants a channel for an
account on its own — for example, a signed-in user asks your support bot to connect a messenger. That
goes through the server-to-server confirmation entry followed by a token exchange.
**What the integrator enables** for the client: `AllowClientCredentials`, `AllowConfirmationTokenGrant`
and `openid` in `AllowedScopes` (plus `channel` if you want the typed claims). The permission is the
integrator's: no parameter of your request widens what is disclosed, and the claims never go beyond
`AllowedScopes`.
1. **Create a confirmation transaction** with `POST /api/transaction/confirmation`, **without**
`expected_identities` — you do not know yet which channel account will confirm; that is exactly
what you want to learn. Show the user the `channel_entry` from the response.
2. **Wait for the outcome** with `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result` until it is `confirmed`. With no
expected identities `matched_type` is `null` — that is not a refusal, and the token is issued all
the same.
3. **Exchange the transaction for a token:**
```http theme={null}
POST /connect/token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic …
grant_type=urn:veriqa:params:oauth:grant-type:confirmation
&transaction_id=…
&scope=openid%20channel
```
You get an ordinary token response: `access_token`, `token_type`, `expires_in` and
`id_token`, with no `refresh_token`. `scope` follows
[RFC 6749 §5.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.1): it is returned only
when the granted scopes differ from the requested ones. The exchange grants exactly what you
requested, so the member is absent — do not require it.
4. **Store `sub`** from the `id_token` next to your account.
The rules of the exchange:
* `scope` must contain `openid`; `channel` adds `channel_type` and `channel_user_id`; anything else
stays within `AllowedScopes`. `offline_access` is refused with `invalid_scope`, as is a `scope`
without `openid`. A missing `transaction_id` is `invalid_request`.
* **A transaction is redeemed once.** A second exchange gets `invalid_grant` — the same error with
the same description as an unknown identifier, another client's transaction, a transaction not yet
completed or one already removed after `CompletedRetentionSeconds`. The responses do not tell these
reasons apart on purpose, so exchange right after `confirmed`. Of two simultaneous exchanges,
exactly one gets the token.
* Once applies to the redemption, not to reading the claims: the `access_token` of the same response
carries the same claims and returns them from `/connect/userinfo` until it expires.
* **The link key is `sub` as a whole.** With the default identity resolver it is composed as
`{channel_type}:{channel_user_id}`, but a host with its own identity resolver may compose it
differently — do not parse the string; request the `channel` scope when you need the pair.
<Warning>
**What the application learns, and who warns the user.** With the grant enabled, your application
receives the confirming person's channel identity in **every** confirmation of that client, not
only where the task needs it. Veriqa asks the user no separate "share my data" question: the
warning that data is being handed over, and the context of the request, live in the wording of the
integrator's `action_type` and in the slots your backend fills. Veriqa does not check that every
action type of such a client carries that warning — it is the integrator's responsibility. The
entry is a bearer one: whoever opens it first confirms, and `sub` belongs to them — which is why
the context of the request belongs in the wording.
</Warning>
The context of the request is assembled from `string` slots of the action type's message contract;
each such slot must declare its `max_length`, and the ceiling is 128 characters. The integrator writes
the wording, and your backend fills the slots (`slot_values`) at creation with what it sees of the
device — someone who forwards the QR cannot forge those values, because they do not own your
backend. For example, a template:
```text theme={null}
Link {service} to this messenger account? {service} will receive your account identifier. Requested from {device}, {location}.
```
Here `service`, `device` and `location` are slots your backend fills. The server fills `{app}` of a
confirmation itself, with the transaction's application identifier (`client_id`) rather than the
client's `DisplayName` — so a human-readable
application name reaches the wording only through a slot of your own. *The example is synthetic: these slot names and this wording are not in
the shipped configuration.* How to declare the contract and the template, and the full request and response, are in
[Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api).
## Two bots: handing the user over to your bot
The sign-in is handled by the bot Veriqa runs, while your own bot runs the business scenarios. After the
sign-in the first bot shows a link button into the second, and your bot has to learn **who** tapped
it. The address of that button can carry a **link handle** — a single-use value your server exchanges
for the identity of the user who has just signed in.
Two bots is one of several ways to use a bot you already run together with Veriqa — the comparison
is in [You already have a bot](/docs/guides/existing-bot).
1. **Put `{handle}` into the address of the button** — `RedirectUrl` or the `Action` of a link item of
the menu ([Menu and Redirect](/docs/reference/configuration#menu-and-redirect-a-message-with-buttons)):
```json theme={null}
{
"Veriqa": {
"CompletionBehavior": {
"ActionByChannel": { "telegram": "Redirect" },
"RedirectUrl": "https://t.me/shop_bot?start={handle}"
}
}
}
```
*The example is synthetic: `shop_bot` is not a real bot.* The handle is 22 characters
`[0-9A-Za-z]`; the rest of the platform's budget for the start parameter (64 characters in
Telegram) is yours.
2. **Your bot receives the handle** when the user taps the button — in Telegram, as
`/start <handle>`.
3. **Your server exchanges it**, with the client credentials token of the application the user signed
in to ([how to get the token](/docs/reference/confirmation-api#2-get-a-token); the client needs
`AllowClientCredentials`):
```http theme={null}
POST /api/link-handle/redeem
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{ "handle": "…" }
```
```json theme={null}
{ "sub": "telegram:123456789", "channel_type": "telegram", "channel_user_id": "123456789" }
```
`channel_type` and `channel_user_id` are returned only to a client whose `AllowedScopes` contain
`channel`; otherwise the response carries `sub` alone. `sub` is the one this application receives in
its tokens.
4. **Store the link on your side** — "the user of my bot ↔ `sub`". Veriqa keeps the handle only until
it is exchanged or expires, and keeps no link.
<Warning>
**Check who tapped the button.** A button can be forwarded, and whoever taps it brings the
handle to your bot. Where the platform gives a person one identifier for every bot — Telegram, for
example — compare the sender of the message (`from.id`) with `channel_user_id` from the response and
refuse a mismatch. Veriqa does not make this comparison for you: the endpoint takes the handle only.
The comparison needs the `channel` scope on the client. Where each bot sees its own identifier for
the same person, or the tenant has pseudonymization on (`channel_user_id` is then a pseudonym),
there is nothing to compare with — the handle is a bearer link: the link goes to whoever taps
the button first.
</Warning>
The rules of the exchange:
* **A handle is exchanged once**, and only by the application the sign-in belongs to. Another
application gets `404`, and the handle stays valid for its own.
* **It is short-lived:** `Veriqa:TransactionEngine:CompletedRetentionSeconds` (600 seconds by default)
from the moment the button is sent. The button stays in the chat: tapped later, it brings your bot a
handle for which the endpoint returns `404` — ask the user to sign in again.
* **`404` is one response** for a missing or empty `handle`, an unknown, expired or already exchanged
one, and another application's — the reasons are not told apart on purpose. A body that is not JSON
is `400`, a `Content-Type` other than JSON is `415`; no token is `401`; a token issued to a user is `403`. A `500` means the identity could
not be read — that handle is spent too.
* **The handle works before the browser finishes the sign-in** — and when the browser tab was closed
and never does. The identity is confirmed by the user in the channel by then.
* **Several replicas need a shared store.** Without the Redis
[channel stores](/docs/guides/storage#channel-stores-multiple-replicas) a handle is found only by the
replica that issued it.
* **A button without a handle is fine** where you do not need it — in Telegram your bot sees the same
user identifier the sign-in returned in `channel_user_id`, so an account already linked is
recognized without an exchange.
* The endpoint exists for sign-ins only; a confirmation your server creates is followed by no button.
### When the sign-in is pointless without your bot
The sign-in completes when the user confirms it in the channel: the browser receives the `code` and
returns to your application. The button into your bot arrives afterwards and does not affect the
sign-in — a user who never taps it is signed in all the same, while your bot does not know them
yet and cannot message them.
If the move into your bot is mandatory for you, the gate belongs to your application:
1. **After the sign-in, check whether a link exists** for the `sub` you received. It appears when your
server has exchanged the handle (step 3 above); where your bot sees the same identifier the sign-in
returned, it appears when the bot has received the first message from that user.
2. **No link — show a "one step left" screen** with a link into your bot, and do not let the user go
any further. The user is already signed in with you, so you can issue the link on that screen
yourself: a single-use token of your own in the start parameter, which your bot matches to the
session. It does not need the handle from Veriqa — that one exists only in the button in the chat
and is short-lived.
3. **Grant access once the link has appeared** — on an event from your bot or by polling from the page.
If there is no website and your product lives entirely in the bot, no separate gate is needed: the
exchange of the handle is the sign-in to the bot, and a user who did not tap the button simply
did not sign in.
<Note>
There is no setting today that makes Veriqa hold the sign-in until the handle is exchanged. We are
considering one; until then your application is what makes the move mandatory.
</Note>
<Card title="One sign-in, two channels" icon="shield-halved" href="/docs/scenarios/step-up">
A sensitive operation can require confirmation in two different trusted channels.
</Card>
# Leads and feedback without CAPTCHA
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/lead-capture
A visitor verifies themselves through a messenger in seconds — the site gets a verified contact and a live channel instead of a dead address from a form.
A feedback form collects whatever was typed into it: a mistyped address, a disposable mailbox, a
made-up number. CAPTCHA filters out some bots, but it does nothing for the quality of the contact.
Veriqa handles it differently: the visitor verifies themselves in a messenger within seconds, and
the site receives a **verified contact and a live channel** — one you can actually write to later,
not just store.
## Two ways, and they are different solutions
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Submission without sign-in" icon="file-signature" href="/docs/integrations/confirmed-form">
The user confirms the submission, but **no session is created** and no account is provisioned.
Needs a small server-side handler next to the form.
</Card>
<Card title="Sign-in with channel linking" icon="link" href="/docs/scenarios/channel-linking">
The user signs in and you gain the channel along the way — if you have accounts and a member
area.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
<Warning>
**No OIDC plugin for any CMS does the first one.** Plugins cover signing in to an account, while
Contact Form 7, WPForms and Bitrix web forms are not tied to an account at all. "A member area"
and "a confirmed submission" are two different solutions, not two settings of one.
</Warning>
## What the site gets
* **proof of confirmation** — who exactly (`sub`) confirmed the submission and in which channel
(`channel_type`);
* **a live channel** to reply through: a message in the messenger someone just confirmed in beats
an address typed by hand;
* **a bot filter cheaper than CAPTCHA**: some channels report that the sender is a bot, Veriqa
returns that flag in the claims, and such submissions can be cut off **before** a record is
created.
<Note>
This is a filter, not anti-fraud. It removes the stream of junk submissions; it does not replace
a fraud-prevention system.
</Note>
## What it takes
The server-side handler is minimal: about 250 lines of PHP with no external dependencies. Step by
step on [Confirmed form submission](/docs/integrations/confirmed-form).
# Passwordless sign-in and registration
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/passwordless-login
The base scenario: a QR on screen, confirmation in a messenger, registration in the same action — and what your application has to do for it.
The base Veriqa scenario: the user opens your application on a desktop, sees a QR code, scans it
with their phone camera and confirms the sign-in in a messenger. There is no form to fill in and
no password to create: **registration happens in the same action as the sign-in**.
## What your application does
Nothing beyond ordinary OpenID Connect:
```http theme={null}
GET /connect/authorize
?client_id=my-app
&response_type=code
&scope=openid%20profile
&redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback
&state=…
&nonce=…
&code_challenge=…
&code_challenge_method=S256
```
Then the standard code-for-tokens exchange. Veriqa needs no client SDK, widget or JS component:
the sign-in page with the QR code is rendered by the server.
## What the user experiences
1. a QR code appears on screen — that is all the sign-in needs;
2. the user opens their phone camera, scans it and follows the link;
3. a familiar app opens — Telegram, WhatsApp or [another messenger](/docs/guides/supported-channels)
(or an email, on the Email channel);
4. the user confirms with a button — no password, no SMS code;
5. your auth system issues the tokens and the sign-in is done.
<Note>
The first sign-in and every later one look identical to the user. The difference is on your
side: if the `sub` is new to you, you provision an account; if it is not, you recognize the
existing one.
</Note>
## What arrives in the claims
`sub` is the stable subject identifier — the way you recognize a returning user. With
`scope=profile` a human-readable name and related fields come along; the exact set depends on the
channel.
<Warning>
**Not every channel provides an email.** Telegram does not hand out addresses and never will, so
the account is created without one. If an email is mandatory for you, use the Email channel or
ask for the address in a separate step after the first sign-in. How the off-the-shelf CMSes cope
with this is in [Veriqa in a CMS](/docs/integrations/overview).
</Warning>
## What if the messenger is not on that device
That is the point: the confirmation happens **on another device**, the phone. The messenger does
not have to be installed where the user signs in from — which is exactly what separates this from
the built-in messenger sign-in buttons, where the app and the messenger must share a machine.
Same-device sign-in works too, but it is the fallback rather than the main path.
## Next
<CardGroup>
<Card title="Channel linking" icon="link" href="/docs/scenarios/channel-linking">
Get a live notification channel from the same action.
</Card>
<Card title="The full OIDC flow" icon="route" href="/docs/concepts/auth-flow">
What happens between authorize and token.
</Card>
</CardGroup>
# Replacing SMS codes
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/sms-replacement
The same familiar flow, with no per-message charge and with full authentication instead of code delivery.
An SMS code solves a narrow problem: deliver a string the user will retype into a form. Veriqa
covers the same need differently — the user **confirms** the sign-in or the operation with a tap
in a messenger, and your application receives a full authentication result rather than "the code
matched".
## What changes for the user
* no retyping a code between screens — one tap in an app that is already open;
* nothing depends on SMS delivery: carrier queues, roaming, "the message will arrive within five
minutes";
* no phone number to hand over — the identity is confirmed through the channel.
## What changes for you
* **messages are not billed per message**, unlike SMS: at significant sign-in volumes that is
direct savings;
* instead of a home-grown "the code in the form matches the one we sent", you get standard OpenID
Connect: tokens, claims, lifetimes, `auth_time`;
* less personal data: if you do not actually need the phone number, you never store it.
<Note>
This is not only about sign-in. The same mechanism covers operation approval — see
[second factor and step-up](/docs/scenarios/step-up), where `auth_time` plays the role of "the
code was fresh".
</Note>
## Where SMS still has its place
If part of your audience has none of the supported messengers and no email, the mechanism has
nothing to build on. The full channel list and its statuses are on
[Supported channels](/docs/guides/supported-channels); the Email channel covers "no messenger, but there is a
mailbox".
# Second factor, step-up and action approvals
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/step-up
A fresh confirmation before a sensitive operation: a new authorize, the auth_time check, and why your own cookie is not evidence.
Sensitive actions — deleting important data, changing payment details, granting someone access,
approving a payment — deserve a fresh confirmation even from a user who is already signed in.
Veriqa does that with one tap in a messenger instead of an SMS code.
## What you send
A new authorize request **before the action itself**. There is nothing special in it:
```http theme={null}
GET /connect/authorize
?client_id=my-app
&response_type=code
&scope=openid
&redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback/step-up
&state=…
```
## What you check
The `auth_time` claim in the `id_token` — the moment the confirmation completed. Freshness is your
call: compare `auth_time` with the current time and decide whether it fits the window this
operation deserves.
<Warning>
**Do not trust your own cookie.** The evidence of a fresh confirmation is `auth_time` from the
new `id_token`, not the presence of a session in your application: a session only says the
person signed in at some point.
</Warning>
<Warning>
**The core does not read `max_age`.** Sending the standard OIDC `max_age=0` does no harm, but it
does not affect Veriqa's behavior — do not build logic on it. There is one freshness mechanism
here: a new authorize plus the `auth_time` check.
</Warning>
## Why this works
There is nothing to bypass: the issuer keeps no long-lived session. The only cookie between
callback and authorize is single-use and is cleared as soon as the code is issued, so every fresh
authorize request asks for confirmation in the channel again.
## Going stronger: two different channels
One sensitive operation can be confirmed in **two different trusted channels** — WhatsApp plus
email, for instance. To narrow a specific request to one channel, use `acr_values`:
```
&acr_values=channel:whatsapp
```
Multiple values are separated by spaces, and the user then picks from the ones listed.
## Enriching the profile along the way
A confirmation is a convenient moment to collect what you are missing: request `scope=email` or
`phone` and the application receives a **verified** contact during the confirmation itself — no
separate form, no separate verification. The exact claims depend on the channel.
## What does not exist for this
* **no "scenario" parameter** — Veriqa does not distinguish sign-in, step-up and operation
approval;
* **no server-side freshness check** — the acceptable `auth_time` window is yours to set and
verify;
* **there is a separate transaction entry, but it is not a step-up API.**
`POST /api/transaction/confirmation` creates a confirmation transaction (the application
authenticates with client credentials and receives a `transaction_id` and a way in for the user)
for a declared action type and its typed slots. Step-up on this page is built with a repeat
authorize and works without it.
# Sign-in surfaces
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/scenarios/surfaces
Desktop, smart TV, kiosk, a device with no keyboard: what changes for the integration, and what is supported.
Veriqa's sign-in is cross-device by design: the **initiator** shows a QR code and the
confirmation happens on the phone. That makes the range of surfaces a sign-in can start from wider
than usual — the initiator only has to display a code and wait for the outcome.
## What works today
| Surface | What the initiator shows | How it learns the outcome |
| - | - | - |
| Web application on a desktop | a QR on the sign-in page | the ordinary redirect to `redirect_uri` |
| Desktop application | a QR in its own window | a redirect into the system browser, or status polling |
| Smart TV, set-top box, kiosk with a browser or a webview | a QR on screen | live status over SignalR, or `GET /api/transaction/{id}/status` |
| Smart TV, set-top box, kiosk without a browser, application with a backend | a QR from the server-to-server confirmation entry | the backend reads `GET /api/transaction/{id}/result` and exchanges the confirmed transaction for an `id_token` |
| Mobile application | a link or a QR | confirmation in the messenger on the same device — the fallback path |
<Note>
Where the device has a browser or a webview, surfaces differ only in **how the initiator learns
that it finished**: the flow itself is the same authorize → code → token. Where it has none, the
application's backend creates a confirmation and exchanges it for the user's `id_token` — see
[Smart TV and keyboard-free surfaces](/docs/research/smart-tv). A device with no backend of its own has
no path yet: a full implementation of device flow is in progress.
</Note>
## Surfaces with no convenient input
This is where being cross-device pays off most. On a TV, a set-top box or a kiosk, typing a
password means picking letters with a remote; a QR code plus a confirmation on the phone removes
the problem entirely.
Two things help on such surfaces:
* **live status** — the `/hubs/auth` SignalR hub, with `GET /api/transaction/{id}/status` where
WebSockets are unavailable;
* **initiator context** — the confirmation message shows the person what they are confirming. On a
kiosk or a shared device that matters more than on a personal laptop: see
[Initiator context](/docs/concepts/initiator-context).
## When the initiator is a shared device
An office kiosk, a terminal in a hall, a screen by the entrance: the device is shared, but the
person confirming is one particular individual. Two things are worth keeping in mind.
**A transaction belongs to a session, not to a device.** The single-use cookie between callback and
authorize is bound to the latest load of the sign-in page: if the page reloaded, the confirmation
belongs to a different transaction and Veriqa returns `browser_nonce_mismatch`. That is protection
against confirming someone else's session — details in
[Troubleshooting](/docs/guides/troubleshooting).
**The QR on display is a secret for the length of the transaction.** On a shared surface it is
worth shortening the sign-in screen's lifetime and not leaving the code up after it completes.
## Place as part of the scenario
Binding a sign-in to a **physical place** (a QR on a printer or on a dedicated office screen) is a
research topic, see [Place and identity](/docs/research/place-and-identity).
## What does not depend on the surface
* the set of confirmation channels — that is about the user's phone, not about the initiator;
* the claims and their contents;
* the client requirement for a browser sign-in: a confidential client with a secret, or a public
client with PKCE S256. The server-to-server entry is for a confidential client only.
# Claude Code: a long command cycle
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/claude-code-command-cycle
The Claude Code plugin holds the start of a long command cycle until a person approves it.
The same plugin guards the start of a long command cycle — here a `/cycle` run, which burns time and tokens once it starts.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The cycle is requested; the plugin holds it and the session shows a Veriqa QR code.
2. The person scans it and opens Telegram.
3. The bot asks whether Claude Code may start the cycle; the person taps **Confirm**.
4. The cycle starts only after the approval.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Approvals in Claude Code](/docs/research/claude-code-approvals)
# Claude Code: a tool call
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/claude-code-tool-call
The Claude Code plugin holds git push until a person approves it in the messenger.
The sample Claude Code plugin guards a sensitive tool call. The agent is asked to push a branch to the remote repository.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. Claude Code tries `git push`; the plugin holds the call and the session shows a Veriqa QR code.
2. The person scans it and opens Telegram.
3. The bot shows the wording declared on the host — Claude Code in demo-shop wants to push the branch — and the person taps **Confirm**.
4. The push goes through, and the approval lands in the audit trail.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Approvals in Claude Code](/docs/research/claude-code-approvals)
* [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api)
# Claude Code: two approvers
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/claude-code-two-approvers
A costly run with a cost estimate starts only after two people approve it in their messengers in turn.
The costliest of the three plugin demos: a run estimated at 1 billion input and 50 million output tokens, about 6250 USD. It needs two approvers in turn — a developer, then a manager — each from their own messenger account enrolled beforehand.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The run is requested; the session shows a QR code for the developer.
2. The developer confirms in Telegram — step 1 of 2.
3. A new QR code is shown for the manager; the manager reads the estimate in their own messenger and taps **Decline**.
4. The run is **not approved**: nothing starts, and both decisions land in the audit trail.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Approvals in Claude Code](/docs/research/claude-code-approvals)
# Sign-in on a desktop
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/desktop-sign-in
Helio customer support in a desktop browser: sign-in by QR code and the customer card built from the channel claims.
The Helio showcase sample — a customer support site — in a desktop browser.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. On the public support page the user clicks **Sign in to see your tickets**.
2. The sign-in window shows a QR code; the user scans it with the phone camera.
3. Telegram asks to confirm the sign-in to "Helio Support", showing that the request comes from Chrome on Windows; the user taps **Confirm**.
4. The page shows **Sign-in successful!** and opens the customer card — name, Telegram `@username`, a masked user id — and the ticket list.
## See also
* [Sign-in and registration](/docs/basic-scenarios#sign-in-and-registration)
* [Initiator context](/docs/concepts/initiator-context)
* [Helio showcase sample](/docs/samples/showcase/support-desk)
# Step-up on a desktop
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/desktop-step-up
Helio in a desktop browser: deleting a ticket requires confirmation in the messenger.
The signed-in Helio customer deletes a ticket. Deletion cannot be undone, so it is not applied until the customer confirms it in the messenger.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The customer clicks **Delete** on ticket #A-900; the **Deleting ticket #A-900** dialog shows a QR code.
2. They scan it with the phone and open Telegram.
3. The bot asks to confirm deleting ticket A-900 and warns it cannot be undone; the customer taps **Confirm**.
4. The dialog reports **Confirmed. The ticket is deleted.** and the ticket disappears from the list.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
* [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api)
# Sign-in on a phone
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/mobile-sign-in
Helio on a phone: no QR code — the channel button opens the messenger on the same device.
The same Helio sample in a mobile browser. When the sign-in starts on the phone itself there is nothing to scan: the user taps the channel button.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. On the support page the user taps **Sign in to see your tickets**.
2. The sign-in window offers **Open in Telegram** instead of a QR code.
3. Telegram asks to confirm the sign-in to "Helio Support", showing that the request comes from Chrome Mobile on Android; the user taps **Confirm**.
4. Back in the browser — **Sign-in successful!**, the customer card and the ticket list.
## See also
* [Sign-in and registration](/docs/basic-scenarios#sign-in-and-registration)
* [Sign-in surfaces](/docs/scenarios/surfaces)
* [Helio showcase sample](/docs/samples/showcase/support-desk)
# Step-up on a phone
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/mobile-step-up
Helio on a phone: closing a ticket is confirmed in Telegram on the same device.
The signed-in Helio customer closes a ticket from the phone. The confirmation happens in the messenger on the same device.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The customer taps **Resolved** on ticket #A-845; the **Closing ticket #A-845** dialog offers **Approve in Telegram**.
2. The bot asks **Mark ticket A-845 "Duplicate charge for one order" as resolved?** — the customer taps **Confirm**.
3. Back in the browser the dialog reports **Confirmed. The ticket is closed.** and the ticket turns **Resolved**.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
* [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api)
# Sign-in on a TV
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/tv-sign-in
Nova Stream on a real TV: sign-in by QR code from the sofa, with no keyboard and no typing.
The Nova Stream showcase sample on a real TV. The screen shows the sign-in window with a QR code; the user types nothing with the remote.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The TV shows **Sign in via messenger** with a QR code.
2. The user scans the code from the screen with the phone camera and opens Telegram.
3. In the bot they tap **Confirm** under the sign-in request.
4. The TV opens the catalog, signed in.
## See also
* [Sign-in and registration](/docs/basic-scenarios#sign-in-and-registration)
* [Sign-in surfaces](/docs/scenarios/surfaces)
* [Nova Stream showcase sample](/docs/samples/showcase/streaming-tv)
# Step-up on a TV
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/tv-step-up
Nova Stream on a real TV: buying a title is confirmed in the messenger by the signed-in viewer.
In the same Nova Stream sample, a signed-in viewer buys a title. The purchase is not applied until the viewer confirms it in the messenger.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. The viewer picks **Buy "Deep Field" — 4.99 EUR**; the TV shows a QR code.
2. They scan it with the phone and open Telegram.
3. The bot asks **Buy "Deep Field" for 4.99 EUR?** — the viewer taps **Confirm**.
4. The title is marked **In your library**.
## See also
* [Server-to-server transaction](/docs/basic-scenarios#server-to-server-transaction)
* [Second factor, step-up and action approvals](/docs/scenarios/step-up)
* [Server-to-server confirmation API](/docs/reference/confirmation-api)
# Sign-in on a website
Source: https://veriqa.app/docs/videos/web-sign-in
The demo sign-in window on a desktop: the same sign-in through Telegram, WhatsApp and the one-tap email.
The demo sign-in window of a website on a desktop, shown three times — once per channel. Each time the user scans the QR code with the phone camera and confirms in the channel; no password, no form and no code to retype.
<video>
Your browser cannot play this video.
</video>
## What the video shows
1. **Telegram** — the QR code opens the bot, the user taps **Confirm** under the sign-in request.
2. **WhatsApp** — the QR code opens a chat with a pre-filled message; the user sends it and taps **Confirm**.
3. **Email** — the one-tap email: the QR code opens a pre-filled email in the mail app, and sending it is the confirmation.
4. The browser lands on the result page with the claims the application received.
## See also
* [Sign-in and registration](/docs/basic-scenarios#sign-in-and-registration)
* [Passwordless sign-in and registration](/docs/scenarios/passwordless-login)
* [Channel setup](/docs/guides/channels)